The Effects of the 2011 Electoral Reform on the Results of the Hungarian Legislative Elections II. –: Empirical Analysis
https://doi.org/10.18392/metsz/2022/2/5
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Abstract
A radical electoral reform took place in Hungray in 2011, as a consequence of the sweeping
victory of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition in 2010. The government initiated and implimented
a reform which was not based on a consensus of all political parties. Taking advantage of its
political position (qualified majority government), Fidesz introduced among other changes the
winer compensation, and gave voting right to non-resident Hungarians. The present paper tries
to present some of the value-based and interest-oreinted arguments related to the reform of
2011, showing that the real (power) interests were hushed up, while the government tried to
legitimize the electoral reform based on several value-oriented arguments.
