Regulatory Coherence and Economic Growth
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Abstract
The paper is aimed at examining differences in market regulation across countries. Its starting point is the puzzle that poor countries apply more regulatory measures than rich ones do, although it has been empirically shown that those countries that regulate less grow faster. To explain this contradiction, the paper introduces the concept of regulatory coherence, and tries to explain the differences in this concept, together with the differences in the general level of regulation. The main argument is that regulatory coherence as well as the general level of regulation is dependent on the external, broad institutional system, because this affects the incentives of the regulators. The paper tries to support this theiretical argument empirically by a cluster analysis.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: B53, M13, L51
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