Évf. 12 szám 2 (2013)
Tanulmányok

Oktatási jelzés és szűrés a munkaerőpiacon – az empirikus vizsgálatok tanulságai

Megjelent december 16, 2013
András István Kun
Debreceni Egyetem Közgazdaság- és Gazdaságtudományi kar
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Kun, A. I. (2013). Oktatási jelzés és szűrés a munkaerőpiacon – az empirikus vizsgálatok tanulságai. Competitio, 12(2), 39-60. https://doi.org/10.21845/comp/2013/2/3

Az oktatás jelző/szűrő hipotézise szerint az oktatási intézmények munkaerő-piaci funkciója nem csupán a tanulóik, hallgatóik munkavégző képességének (termelékenységének) növelése lehet, de mérhetik és jelezhetik is azt a munkaadók felé. A közgazdaságtan empirikus irodalmában az 1970-es évek óta
születnek újabb és újabb kísérletek ezen információs funkció igazolására, mérésére, mindeddig érdemi eredmény nélkül. Jelen tanulmány az oktatás, képzés munkaerő-piaci jelző/szűrő modelljeit és ezek empirikus irodalmát elemzi, mely során arra keresi a választ milyen okok állhatnak a tesztelési kísérletek
sorozatos kudarcai mögött. Legfőbb megállapítása szerint a méréseknek vissza kell térniük az elméleti modellekhez, mert túlzottan elszakadtak azoktól és az oktatás vállalati hasznosulásának vizsgálatára kell koncentrálniuk.

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