Search

Search Results

• Mitől egyetem az egyetem?

  5-10

  Gyorgy Kovari

  Views:

  124

• Piacok, globalizáció, harmadik út: Lányi Kamilla válogatott tanulmányai. Kopint-Datorg Infokommunikációs Zrt., Budapest, 2007, 255 oldal

  189-194

  Judit Ricz

  Views:

  109

• The option value of education

  131-148

  Judit T. Kiss

  Views:

  96

  Within the theoretical frameworks of standard human capital theory countless analyses have been carried out into investment decisions, in which the examination of the uncertainty of the costs and benefits of education were mostly disregarded and an assessment of the option opportunities was often omitted. In this essay we tried to review one of the extension opportunities of the theory of standard human capital and the option approach of human capital investment. We looked for an answer to the question of what kind of models have been developed for the interpretation of education as an option and for the determination of the option value of the investment. In the study we have highlighted the fact that a decrease in uncertainty in human capital investment is as good an incentive for investing in more education as the public subsidization of education.

  JEL classification: C6, D8, I2, J2

• Bevezetés a nempozitivista intézményi közgazdaságtanba: Boettke, P.J. (ed): Handbook On Contemporary Austrian Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010. xviii+174 oldal

  Pal Czegledi

  Views:

  144

• Equilibrium analysis of a semi-mixed duopoly – the production-in-advance case: Játékelméleti modell – a készletre történő termelés esete

  63-74

  Tamas Laszlo Balogh

  Views:

  136

  We investigate a mixed duopoly where, according to the ownership structure, a private firm and a partially public firm are present on the market of a homogeneous good. The private firm is assumed to be a pure profit maximizer, while the other firm maximizes social welfare in proportion to its state-owned shares. We assume that production takes place before sales are realized. After an introduction to some important results in the field of mixed duopolies, we determine the Nash equilibrium prices and quantities for all possible orderings of moves in the framework discussed. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists only if certain conditions are satisfied, and illustrate our findings through a numerical example. Furthermore, we determine the equilibrium of the timing game, i.e. we investigate whether a simultaneous or a sequential ordering of decisions would arise on the market, if the ordering of moves was an endogenous variable.

  Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classifications: D43, L13