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A modern osztrák közgazdaságtan „modernitása” : (Peter. J. Boettke – Christopher J. Coyne: The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 816 oldal)
92-98.Views:154Peter J. Boettke és egykori tanítványa, Christopher J. Coyne a kortárs modern osztrák közgazdaságtan legmeghatározóbb kutatói közé tartoznak. Az általuk szerkesztett kötet, a The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics nagyon impresszív vállalkozás, amely a kézikönyvek szokásos terjedelmét felülről feszítve gyűjti egybe a kortárs modern osztrák közgazdaságtan „témáit”. A szerzők nyilvánvaló célja ugyanis a modern osztrák közgazdaságtan által kutatott problémakörök tematikai felvonultatása.
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Growth theory from an Austiran institutional perspective
157-174Views:125Perhaps the one fundamental question of growth theory is why some countries are poor while others are rich. The paper identifies two main lines of research approaching this question, by applying the social analysis of Williamson, and points out that both approaches give an asymmetric answer. The paper applies a critique, which was formulated in the theory of the firm, and compares it with a transaction cost approach. According to this critique, the one approach to economic growth lays too much emphasis on technology, while the other neglects the technological side and emphasizes only the transaction costs and incentives. This paper argues that a new approach, based on the insights of modern Austrian economics, is able to integrate these two sides.
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Regulatory Coherence and Economic Growth
33-54Views:165The paper is aimed at examining differences in market regulation across countries. Its starting point is the puzzle that poor countries apply more regulatory measures than rich ones do, although it has been empirically shown that those countries that regulate less grow faster. To explain this contradiction, the paper introduces the concept of regulatory coherence, and tries to explain the differences in this concept, together with the differences in the general level of regulation. The main argument is that regulatory coherence as well as the general level of regulation is dependent on the external, broad institutional system, because this affects the incentives of the regulators. The paper tries to support this theiretical argument empirically by a cluster analysis.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: B53, M13, L51