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Competitio

Vol. 12 No. 1 (2013)
PhD student papers

The Economic Theory of Clubs

Published:
2013-06-17
DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.21845/comp/2013/1/4
Author
Nora Ilona Elek
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PDF (Hungarian)
Keywords
public good groups club club goods optimization
How To Cite
Selected Style: APA
Elek, N. I. (2013). The Economic Theory of Clubs. Competitio, 12(1), 64-85. https://doi.org/10.21845/comp/2013/1/4
Received 2020-05-26
Accepted 2020-05-26
Published 2013-06-17
Abstract

Defining club goods allows an analysis of goods that possess neither pure public goods nor pure private goods characteristics. This is the main significance of the economic theory of clubs. The present paper categorises club good among goods in general on the basis of the relevant literature, and specifies the core elements of a definition of clubs and club goods. Then, by summarizing the most important articles on the subject, this paper delineates fundamental questions and models of club theory. Finally, supporting the relevant practical issues of club theory, this study describes economic fields where the theory has been applied.

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification: H41, H49

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