This paper is structured around three central questions. (1) Can animals be legal persons? (2) How is legal personhood related to the recognition of rights? (3) How do these two questions relate to effective animal protection? The paper first outlines the positions of the main proponents of well-known theories of rights —namely, the will-based and interest-based theories—in order to examine more closely whether legal personhood for animals can be justified at all. Moving on to the second question, while the recognition of legal personhood is traditionally considered a prerequisite for the recognition of rights, this text calls that assumption into question at one point. Subsequently, various models of animal protection are presented, each of which addresses the question of what purpose it serves to give rights to animals. Although the paper does not shy away from the difficulties that stand in the way of recognizing legal personhood and substantive rights, it concludes overall that the question of the effectiveness of animal protection is closely linked to the recognition of legal personhood.