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• Equilibrium analysis of a semi-mixed duopoly – the production-in-advance case: Játékelméleti modell – a készletre történő termelés esete

  63-74

  Tamas Laszlo Balogh

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  136

  We investigate a mixed duopoly where, according to the ownership structure, a private firm and a partially public firm are present on the market of a homogeneous good. The private firm is assumed to be a pure profit maximizer, while the other firm maximizes social welfare in proportion to its state-owned shares. We assume that production takes place before sales are realized. After an introduction to some important results in the field of mixed duopolies, we determine the Nash equilibrium prices and quantities for all possible orderings of moves in the framework discussed. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists only if certain conditions are satisfied, and illustrate our findings through a numerical example. Furthermore, we determine the equilibrium of the timing game, i.e. we investigate whether a simultaneous or a sequential ordering of decisions would arise on the market, if the ordering of moves was an endogenous variable.

  Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classifications: D43, L13