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  • Allocation Of Residual Income Rights Under Internal Governance Empirical Results from the Hungarian Trucking Industry
    Joseph Windsperger
    Maria Jell
    Views:
    119

    The paper offers a property rights and monitoring cost explanation for the allocation of residual income rights between the carriers and truck drivers under internal governance. First, by applying property rights theory, we argue that the structure of residual income rights depends on the importance of noncontractible (intangible) assets of the truck driver to generate a residual surplus. The more important the truck driver’s intangible knowledge
    assets, the more residual income rights should be transferred to him. In addition, we controlled for the monitoring costs as an additional explanatory variable of the allocation of residual income rights. According to agency theory, the higher the variable proportion of the driver’s income, the higher the monitoring costs.These hypotheses were tested by using data from the Hungarian trucking industry. The empirical results are supportive of the hypotheses.

    JEL- Index: G32, M2

  • Equilibrium analysis of a semi-mixed duopoly – the production-in-advance case: Játékelméleti modell – a készletre történő termelés esete
    63-74
    Tamas Laszlo Balogh
    Views:
    136

    We investigate a mixed duopoly where, according to the ownership structure, a private firm and a partially public firm are present on the market of a homogeneous good. The private firm is assumed to be a pure profit maximizer, while the other firm maximizes social welfare in proportion to its state-owned shares. We assume that production takes place before sales are realized. After an introduction to some important results in the field of mixed duopolies, we determine the Nash equilibrium prices and quantities for all possible orderings of moves in the framework discussed. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists only if certain conditions are satisfied, and illustrate our findings through a numerical example. Furthermore, we determine the equilibrium of the timing game, i.e. we investigate whether a simultaneous or a sequential ordering of decisions would arise on the market, if the ordering of moves was an endogenous variable.

    Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classifications: D43, L13

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