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Competitio

Vol. 13 No. 1 (2014)
Papers

Political budget cycles: fiscal cycle effects in state expenditures in Poland

Published:
2014-06-16
DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.21845/comp/2014/1/3
Author
Agnes Halasz
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PDF (Hungarian)
Keywords
political budget cycles, state expenditures new democracy Poland
How To Cite
Selected Style: APA
Halasz, A. (2014). Political budget cycles: fiscal cycle effects in state expenditures in Poland. Competitio, 13(1), 47-62. https://doi.org/10.21845/comp/2014/1/3
Abstract

In this paper we aim to investigate what kind of role fiscal cycles played in the development of the state budget balances in Poland between 1989 and 2011. Overall, the results of the latest research have found that political budget cycles (PBC) are more typical in less developed countries with a shorter period of experience with democratic institutions, such as the post-socialist transition economies. Nevertheless, empirical studies point out that this phenomenon has been disappearing over time as voters learn how democratic institutions and political manipulation operate. However, this theory could not be proved by testing the pattern of Poland, neither in the case of budget balances nor for state expenditures. Despite the fact that some fiscal cycle effects were found in public sector wages and pensions in the election period of 1997 and 2001, these proved to be temporary, and simultaneously some other measures were identified that counterbalanced the effects of pork barrel spending. Overall, the cyclical evolution of the budget balances in Poland, particularly in the nineties, was not a result of political budget cycles.

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classifications: D72, E62, H3

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