“Neutral” China - Examining China's role in international processes since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022
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Copyright (c) 2026 Noémi Csunyó

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Accepted 2026-01-05
Published 2026-01-29
Abstract
The study is based on China's perspective on the Russia-Ukraine war and its statements, political actions and economic aspirations since the escalation. China has tried to keep a neutral attitude towards the conflict. However, the Chinese position is complex, as it is heavily influenced by political and economic interests, which is reflected in the prosperous trade results with Russia as well. These major power aspirations are reflected in the reduction of economic dependence on the West, in the growing technological competition and political rivalry, particularly with the United States. Although China is increasingly opening up to Asian markets, its exports are still highly dependent on the US and European markets. Nevertheless, current developments are pointing towards further increasing independence and political tensions, which predict a shift in the global imbalances of power.
JEL codes: F15, F51, F53, O11
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https://doi.org/10.21845/comp/2026/1-2/3