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  • Higher Level Prevention as Public Value in Competition Law
    133-152
    Views:
    113

    The problem-solving mechanism developed by Sparrow in the field of social regulation could also be implemented in competition law in order to prevent the recurrence of competition problems in a given industry. Competition authorities’ (like protection-type agencies) aim is the creation of public value. This is measured in terms of their ability to solve social problems by preventing or controlling harms. In the case of competition authorities, the public value is achieved by ensuring a competitive market environment through the curtailment of market power and the removal of barriers to entry. The public value of prevention is especially important when markets tend to become concentrated. In order to achieve the maximum preventive effect, all prevention tools must be operated effectively. This includes imposing structural remedies or switching to ex-ante prevention (regulation) when ex-post enforcement proves ineffective.

  • Questions of divisions of powers in the 21st century after the adoption of the new Fundamental Law of Hungary
    24-37
    Views:
    296

    The question of division of state powers is a crucial part of constitutional law determining how state organs work (or should work) in theory and in practice. After the adoption of the new Fundamental Law of Hungary, there are some modifications in the Hungarian constitutional system, including the division of powers as well. In this study we examine the original model of “3 branches of power – 1-1 function” as a starting point, and the other factors and branches which can modify the original model. In the study we try to focus to the examples of the former and present Hungarian legal system as certain proves of our theory about the new frameworks of division of powers in Hungary. In the end of this study we also examine, as an indirect argumentation, the opposite side of the separation of powers, i.e. concentration of powers.