Search

Search Results

• Problems of textual empiricism

  126-139

  Mátyás Bencze

  Krisztina Ficsor

  Ágnes Kovács

  Péter Sólyom

  Views:

  134

  In this paper the authors make some critical comments on Blutman László’s legal methodology. They argue for the claim that legal cases cannot be solved by applying the methods of natural sciences. Law is an interpretive social practice, therefore legal texts can have more than one equally justifiable interpretation which can be in conflict with each other. Correct legal decisions, especially in hard cases, are the result of resorting to the justifying principles and purposes of law and cannot be achieved by using ‘textual empiricism’ as a legal methodology.

• Towards a European Legal Scholarship. Recommendations of the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) on the Development of Education and Research

  54-61

  Péter Sólyom

  Views:

  124

  The German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) in 2012 published its study „Perspectives of Legal Scholarship in Germany. Current Situation, Analyses, Recommendations”. The recommendations are preceded by empirical and quantitative descriptions that provide information on the current situation of legal study and research in Germany. The document emphasizes the importance of cooperation between theoretical and practical part of the legal education. The report considers that students should acquire the ability of critical approach to legal prac- tice instead of memorising the substantive legal rules.

• The General Theory of the State and the Relativity of the Force of Law – Comment on the Theory of Georg Jellinek

  53-72

  Péter Sólyom

  Views:

  171

  This paper makes an in-depth examination of the theory established by Georg Jellinek who – extending the perspective of the jurisprudence of state law based on legal methods – was concerned with issues of public law within the frames of general theory of the state. The author will demonstrate the claim that the special concepts of Jellinek’s general and descriptive theory – like the „presupposition of factual validity” or the idea of the „state’s self-obligation to law” – are the results of Jellinek’s idea that there were no alternatives to the institutional system of the constitutional monarchy.