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• The Correlation between Second-Instance Review and the Decision-Making Powers of the Appellate Court in Criminal Procedure, in Light of an Unsuccessful Attempt to Amend Procedural Law

  92-110

  Bálint Csaba Kelemen

  Views:

  153

  From the perspective of Hungarian criminal procedure law literature, the period between 1954 and 1958 proved to be very productive. The background to this was that the legislator made significant changes to the appeal system, attempting to adopt the Soviet cassation-revision system. This concept was met with resistance from legal literature and resulted in a high degree of uncertainty in legal practice, which together prompted the legislature to restore a system very similar to the original. All this rightly raises the question: why was the theoretical framework of socialist Hungarian criminal procedure unsuitable for the cassation-revision system? In my study, I attempt to answer this question.

• Less is Sometimes More? The Guaranteeing Role of the Scope of the Second Instance Review in the first Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure (Act XXXIII of 1896)

  93-105

  Bálint Csaba Kelemen

  Views:

  329

  At the time of the codification of first Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure, the legal literature regarded the limited scope of second-instance revision as a limitation of appeal in favour of the defendant, and placed it in this sense inside the procedural doctrinal system. This idea, which is quite alien to contemporary procedural thinking, which focuses on speeding up and facilitating proceedings, raises the question: what are the principles on which the limited scope of review is considered as a guarantee for the defendant? In order to answer this question, my aim in the present study is to explore the system of principles that shaped the turn-of-the-century jurisprudence concerning the legal power of the second instance to grant review.

• The Basic Regulatory Issues of Agricultural Application of Precision Genome Editing and the Precautionary Principle

  42-64

  László Fodor

  Views:

  720

  The rapidly developing gene manipulation techniques (more recently „gene editing”) have long been controversial, which is reflected in the evolution of legal regulation in Europe. Hungaryʼs Fundamental Law (Art. XX.) clearly states that Hungarian agriculture desires to remain free from genetically modified organisms. According to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA resolution, 2017), the results of the new techniques (without transgenic implantation) are not regarded as GMOs (by the proper application of the genetic engineering law), these new techniques are not governed by the provisions of the Fundamental Law. Recently, a lawsuit was filed before the Court of Justice of the European Union in which the main question was whether GMOs should be considered the result of new techniques (if not, they do not need to be licensed). In the light of a detailed analysis of the precautionary principle, the study examines the question of whether genetic engineering or its results cover the scope of the legislation. According to the author, this question (as long as the revision of the regulation is not on the agenda) is not for the genetic technologists and plant breeders, but for the lawyers to decide. The conclusion of the study is that genetic engineering, respectively its results are subject to the regulation.

• The Judicial Protection of the Basic Structure of the Constitution: the Practice of Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in India

  132-148

  Virág Zsugyó

  Views:

  262

  One of the rare but more prominent cases of judicial protection of the existing constitution is the revision of constitutional amendments. From among courts that review amendments, this study presents India’s Supreme Court’s practice, which is regarded as a model. India’s constitution does not contain any unamendable provisions or explicit authorization for judicial control over constitutional amendments, yet the court reviews constitutional amendments on grounds of protecting the constitution’s basic structure. India’s Supreme Court’s practice is a typical example of a court imposing an implicit limitation upon constitutional amendments. Therefore, before analyzing the basic structure doctrine, the study briefly examines the nature of the implicit limitations of constitutional amendments and some issues that may arise in their justification.