A fellebbezés elintézése a harmadfokú büntetőeljárásban
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Copyright (c) 2020 Debreceni Jogi Műhely
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Hogyan hivatkozzuk
Absztrakt
The questions of remedy are in close relations with the legal force. The legal force of the
clinching decisions represents the final, irreversible decision about the demand of penal law,
which decision is a guideline and undeniably binding for all, and cannot be attacked with an
ordinary appeal.
The legal force of other decisions with the capacity to have legal force defines a decision
which is final, irreversible, a guideline for all, obligatory (independent of executability) and
cannot be attacked with an appeal.
Furthermore, there are the decisions with formal legal force, the legal force of which stands
only for not being appealable.
A valid decision can only be made about the factual and legal basis of criminal responsibility
by the court that is entitled and obligated to do it, that is, only the court has a right during
criminal procedure to decide whether there was a crime or not, and if yes, who committed it.
In relation to this, the question of material legal force can only regard the constituted charge
and the act in consideration, when the court makes a permanent decision about the demand of
penal law, in the framework of the substantive judging of the act that became the object of
prosecution.
Lodging an appeal on legal grounds shall be governed by the provisions set forth in Chapter
XV of the Criminal procedure Act. The judgement of the court of second instance may be
appealed at the court of appeal. The appeal against the judgement of the court of second
instance may involve any of the dispositions therein or exclusively the justification thereof.
An appeal may be lodged for legal or factual reasons. An appeal suspends the part of the judgement to become final which is to be reviewed by the court of appeal owing to the appeal.
The third remedy is allowed only in cases where the first and second instance decision is
absolutely different in the question of guilty.