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• Quantum Mechanics and Law. What Does the Failure of Environmental Regulation Teach Us?

  60-82

  Orsolya Bányai

  Views:

  224

  The article first of all holds that environmental regulation has failed. This is because it is too weak to prevent the overstepping of ecological boundaries by humanity. This legal regulation reflects that human behavior is psychopathological. This collective mental illness may originate from false self-identification. Therefore, the author reviews the outcomes of modern natural sciences, such as quantum physics, cosmology, and non-local consciousness research. These results give sufficient support to argue, despite the traditional paradigm of materialism, that some aspects of consciousness are not limited by the space-time continuum. Moreover, all consciousness, regardless of its physical manifestations, is part of the universal Consciousness. From these scientific results, in line with ancient scriptures, an Eternal Order has evolved, which can be described at least by four fundamental and universal truths. This Eternal Order should be taken into account by positive law, if humanity wants to reach fulfillment within the ecological limits of the Earth.

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• A Philosophical Approach to Law

  11-22

  Bjarne Melkevik

  Paksy Máté(Translator)

  Views:

  154

  Bjarne Melkevik’s book is one of the best comprehensive treatments of legal philosophy currently available in Canada. First of all, the reader will find in the form of a long introduction a bookchapter translated into Hungarian, which is a general description of Melkevik’s jurisprudential views, provided by Mate Paksy. The chosen chapter organizes the reflexions on legal philosophy into three interrelated ques- tions. Melkevik’s first, thought-provoking question is as follows: why do we need legal philosophy? He views legal philosophy not as foundational legal scholarship, but mainly as an elucidation of public, reflexive argumentation on law which isn’t at

  odds either with an empirical methodology. The second question concerns whether studying legal philosophy is useful for lawyers. Here Melkevik endorses again a post-positivist position according to which both law and legal philosophy are essentially practical discourses. Though the third part of the paper is heavy with disciplinary boundary-drawing, which emerges from questioning the place of legal scholarship vis-à-vis other, more empirical branches of social sciences such as history or anthropology, Melkevik’s reflexions here are still inspired by a sort of Neo-Kantian legal philosophy and Habermas’ communicative ethics.