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• Basic Trial Rights and Trial Ethics in Criminal Proceedings

  32-55

  Viktor Bérces

  Views:

  194

  The number of criminal court trials is constantly decreasing, as the domestic legislature has introduced a number of legal institutions aimed at diverting criminal cases from the court system, or avoiding charging. Nevertheless, there will always be crimes, the adjudication of which cannot dispense with impeachment based on direct judicial investigation. The trial is undoubtedly the "highlight" of the criminal proceedings, since it is here that the adversarial process takes place in its entirety, and here the defense counsel and the prosecutor have the opportunity to form opinions on factual and legal issues in each other's personal presence. The amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act naturally raised many questions, such as who in the near future will actually control the evidence taken in court proceedings, and what basic procedural rights should be provided to the participants of the proceedings. In this study, I would like to reflect primarily on these questions, based on some ECtHR decisions.

• A Philosophical Approach to Law

  11-22

  Bjarne Melkevik

  Paksy Máté(Translator)

  Views:

  171

  Bjarne Melkevik’s book is one of the best comprehensive treatments of legal philosophy currently available in Canada. First of all, the reader will find in the form of a long introduction a bookchapter translated into Hungarian, which is a general description of Melkevik’s jurisprudential views, provided by Mate Paksy. The chosen chapter organizes the reflexions on legal philosophy into three interrelated ques- tions. Melkevik’s first, thought-provoking question is as follows: why do we need legal philosophy? He views legal philosophy not as foundational legal scholarship, but mainly as an elucidation of public, reflexive argumentation on law which isn’t at

  odds either with an empirical methodology. The second question concerns whether studying legal philosophy is useful for lawyers. Here Melkevik endorses again a post-positivist position according to which both law and legal philosophy are essentially practical discourses. Though the third part of the paper is heavy with disciplinary boundary-drawing, which emerges from questioning the place of legal scholarship vis-à-vis other, more empirical branches of social sciences such as history or anthropology, Melkevik’s reflexions here are still inspired by a sort of Neo-Kantian legal philosophy and Habermas’ communicative ethics.