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• Judicial practice regarding the compensation for personal injuries caused by the circumstances of penal institutions, violating the fundamental rights of convicts and detainees of other dues

  49-62

  Botond Nagy

  Views:

  299

  The studied topic is the judicial practice regarding the compensation for personal injuries caused by the circumstances of penal institutions, which violate the fundamental rights of convicts and detainees of other dues. Dual research questions have been posed because of the characteristics of the covered topic. The first one is related to civil law and is about demandants’, defendants’ and courts’ attitudes and tendencies relating to the topic in question. The second question, inseparably stemming from the previous one, is from the field of penal execution: what kind of traits can be abstracted from the judicial decisions when it comes to the condition of Hungarian penal institutions.  To answer these, empirical methodology must be applied. Accordingly, I examined 91 judicial decisions from 2014 to 2020. Thus, this study depicts the entirety of the relevant time range, meaning that the demandants’, defendants’ and courts’ characteristics are introduced in their arc of development, rather than pointwisely. In my study I delineate the demandants’ actions firstly: their claims, their supposedly violated rights and the ontological phenomena causing harm. Secondly, as displaying the defendants’ statements of defence, I specify the legal arguments brought on in order to support the claim that the penal institutions caused no harm to those held captive, or that they cannot be obliged to pay compensation. Afterwards, I examine the judicial practice. Firstly, I write about the ways courts treat the claims of ascertainment, namely whether or not the rights of those who are captivated were violated. Subsequently, I portray the claims of detain, about which I illustrate the relevant regime of liability and its partial requirements. Then I write about the matrix of the compensation for personal injury and the indemnification for the prison circumstances, the relation and the delimitation of the two. Finally, I answer the research questions. I draw an ideal model about the first question, in which the parties adduce correctly and make fair judgements.  By these the demandants can make sure that the violation of their rights is ascertained and that they are given compensation.  By following the model, the defendant can achieve the lowest amount of compensation possible, while the court can make the correct decision from a dogmatic point of view. As for the penal executive question, I give suggestions to solve the problem of the circumstances of penal institutions violating fundamental rights.

• Constitutional processes, a comparative study of the Hungarian constitutional processes (1989-2011)

  Éva Balogh

  Views:

  145

  In my research paper I study the Hungarian constitutional processes. The subjects of my analysis are three periods, namely the change of the political system in 1989, the constitutional attempts from 1994 to 1998, and the constitutional process between 2010 and 2011.

  The processes are examined on the basis of the two notions: “legality” and “legitimacy”. Under the concept “formal legality”, I mean the legal validity of the constitutional process; i.e. whether the constitutional process takes place in accordance with the current legislation. The concept of “legitimacy” has two aspects. On the one hand, empirical legitimacy investigates whether the citizens de facto accept the constitution and value it as respectable independently of the normative motives of its acceptance. On the other hand, normative legitimacy examines whether the constitution is based on justifiable principles and whether it might be considered as legally binding.

  The constitutional process in 1989 - aimed at establishing a democratic transition – took place within round-table discussions of the representatives of the old system and the strengthened opposition. As a result of the radical changes, the democratic Constitution was established in Hungary and the multi-party system also developed. The outcome of the discussions was the general supervision of the Constitution. Formally, there was only an amendment to the Constitution in 1989; however, as regard its content, a completely new norm was established.

  Since the change of the political system in 1989, the idea of creating a new constitution emerges again and again in the Hungarian public life. In the course of the elections in 2010, a party alliance (in which both parties represented the same political line) reached the required two-thirds majority in the Parliament, and aimed at establishing a new constitution. The result of the constitutional process is a completely new constitution (both the form and the content of the previous constitution were changed).

  All things considered, it can be stated that the amendment to the Constitution in 1989 was accepted lawfully by the Parliament of the old system, i.e. the constitutional process was legal, and in a normative sense, a legitimate Constitution was created. In 2011, the Fundamental Law of Hungary (Hungarian: Magyarország Alaptörvénye) was adopted on the basis of the procedure determined by the Constitution in 1989, i.e. the constitutional process was legal, though; the present research paper highlights some elements of the constitutional process that might be criticized. At present, the legitimacy of the Fundamental Law of Hungary is controversial from both sociological and normative perspectives.

• Functional Analysis of Damage Charges

  97-117.

  András Mátyus

  Views:

  196

  Replacing the legal institution for non-pecuniary damages burdensome by previous theoretical and practical contradictions, Act V of 2013 (Civil Code) introduces damage charges as a separate sanction for violation of personal rights, which has dual functions: on the one hand, it aims for the person being injured in its personal rights receive a monetary allowance that approximates or compensates for the non-material damage suffered. On the other hand, it can also be considered as a punishment under private law for the prevention of similar infringements, as a deterrent.

  According to the intended interpretation, the damage charge can only be applied if it is able to fulfill its function, i.e. if no non-pecuniary damage can be detected for which the damage charge is intended for proportional compensation (primarily), it has no place at all since in the case of infringements leaving the personality untouched, only the punitive function would be exercised, which is completely incompatible with the inherently remedial, corrective nature of private law. According to the unanimous opinion of the legal literature, the compensatory function should have priority and private punishment only take precedence of a secondary nature. On the basis of my work, it is noticeable that judges also consider damage charges as a legal instrument to repair the immaterial injuries suffered and to compensate for the lost pleasures of life, and to not order it upon preventive reasons solely, but in the plurality of cases, preventive function is being evaluated as a factor enhancing the amount of the damage. In my study, I wish to analyze from several aspects, how the dual function of the damage charge is assessed by the courts concerning present cases, by highlighting which nature is protruding concerning the amount or the legal basis. As the research is basically empirical, I will examine through as many judgments as possible, what aspects the courts evaluate in the framework of the compensational (e.g.: physical injuries, mental changes, age, family life of the victim, change in lifestyle, etc.) and of the preventive function (e.g. the gravity of the infringement, its protracted nature, etc.). Finally, I would like to answer the central question of my thesis: what function does practice attribute to the payment of damage charges.