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Constitutional processes, a comparative study of the Hungarian constitutional processes (1989-2011)
Views:298In my research paper I study the Hungarian constitutional processes. The subjects of my analysis are three periods, namely the change of the political system in 1989, the constitutional attempts from 1994 to 1998, and the constitutional process between 2010 and 2011.
The processes are examined on the basis of the two notions: “legality” and “legitimacy”. Under the concept “formal legality”, I mean the legal validity of the constitutional process; i.e. whether the constitutional process takes place in accordance with the current legislation. The concept of “legitimacy” has two aspects. On the one hand, empirical legitimacy investigates whether the citizens de facto accept the constitution and value it as respectable independently of the normative motives of its acceptance. On the other hand, normative legitimacy examines whether the constitution is based on justifiable principles and whether it might be considered as legally binding.
The constitutional process in 1989 - aimed at establishing a democratic transition – took place within round-table discussions of the representatives of the old system and the strengthened opposition. As a result of the radical changes, the democratic Constitution was established in Hungary and the multi-party system also developed. The outcome of the discussions was the general supervision of the Constitution. Formally, there was only an amendment to the Constitution in 1989; however, as regard its content, a completely new norm was established.
Since the change of the political system in 1989, the idea of creating a new constitution emerges again and again in the Hungarian public life. In the course of the elections in 2010, a party alliance (in which both parties represented the same political line) reached the required two-thirds majority in the Parliament, and aimed at establishing a new constitution. The result of the constitutional process is a completely new constitution (both the form and the content of the previous constitution were changed).
All things considered, it can be stated that the amendment to the Constitution in 1989 was accepted lawfully by the Parliament of the old system, i.e. the constitutional process was legal, and in a normative sense, a legitimate Constitution was created. In 2011, the Fundamental Law of Hungary (Hungarian: Magyarország Alaptörvénye) was adopted on the basis of the procedure determined by the Constitution in 1989, i.e. the constitutional process was legal, though; the present research paper highlights some elements of the constitutional process that might be criticized. At present, the legitimacy of the Fundamental Law of Hungary is controversial from both sociological and normative perspectives.
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Constitutional content of freedom of expression in the criminal adjudication
71-100Views:0The freedom of expression in democratic countries’ legal system, applied in certain branches of law, is a constitutional foundation. After the regime change, the constitutional content of freedom of expression and the aspects investigated during a criminal dispute were explained in the decisions of the Constitutional Court, which were hard to implement into the substantive law's dogmatics. The courts started to follow the instructions. The Constitutional Court either agreed or annulled the courts' substantive decisions, without engaging in legal issues. Cases and legal disputes constantly arise in legal practice, which makes the Constitutional Court's intervention essential, because the constitutional right of freedom of expression could conflict with other fundamental rights. The study aims to present the nature of the legal conflict.
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Lack of Balance In Contract Law: the State as Contractual Party
Views:420Contractual relations mean balanced cooperation between the parties. Right and obligations on both sides are equal. This seems to be a classic essential of contracts. As of many among the terms and condition in contract law, special situations clam for a different perspective. This essay is about a unique problem in contract law that origins from the ancient dilemma about the role of the state in private law relations.
State as a sovereign has original power and hierarchic connection to citizens. In the field of constitutional law, public administration law, criminal law it is necessary to transfer certain right to the state and allow it determining one-sided obligations that cannot be changed in a particular relation. The theory of state immunity failed in the 20th century in private law. Since jurisprudence makes a difference between the role of the state as a merchant and a sovereign, we cannot maintain the old immunity rights of the state anymore.
In the essay we examine three specific questions in connection with state participation in contracts. The first part of our study analyzes the strange legal arguments in a famous Hungarian case, called the Subway case. In this case the reasoning of the Supreme Court denied the balanced elements in a private contract and accepted a redefined theory of state immunity in private relations. Although there is a strong political content in the story and right after the criticized decision the Hungarian Civil Code was modified to clear the facts, we want to prove that even today state participation can cause interferences in the coherent theory of contracts.
A specific contract type is examined in the second chapter of the essay, the concession agreement. This contract is far from the balanced theory of party positions due to its unique nature and content. We emphasize many different aspects in mixing private and public law nature of provisions and rules. Concession agreement is an excellent example to demonstrate extra-rights on the side of the state.
Finally we spare some words on authority contracts in which state authorities can manage debates in public administration procedures with using the private law nature of contracts.