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Thanking to the fact that numerous European countries have become more democratized, and to the practical experience based on common law legal system, from the middle of the XXth century some of the continental legal systems have begun to apply alternative procedures for solving disputes between parties, such as facilitation, arbitration or mediation. We can stress two important common features of these solutions. Firstly, if parties apply these ways, they can avoid the traditional judicial way (or, if the result of the chosen method is not satisfactory, these ways can be considered as the preliminary step before the judicial way). Secondly, these procedures have appeared firstly in labour law.

As we emphasized, applying these solutions parties try to avoid the judicial way, for this reason in this study we try to introduce the relationship between these methods and the basic right to turn a (traditional) court. Expert’s opinions in connection with these processes are very different, we introduce only the two farthest standpoint: on the one hand these ways can speed up the procedure between parties, and can increase the efficiency of it, and parties can agree with each other by amicable way. On the other hand, applying these ways some of the basic rights (for example the principle of independence of courts and the right of fair trial or the principle of contradictory) will be decreased.

In this study we try to examine the problem determined in the title, on the basis of the rules of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Constitution of Hungary. But, we have to examine not only the right of fair trial and turning to a (traditional) court, but the monopoly of courts in connection with solving legal disputes (as constitutional principle) in details. We utilize the orders of the Hungarian Constitutional Court as well as the theological and practical experience of these procedures. We have to emphasize that from the different alternative dispute-solving mechanisms we examine not all of the models, but only the model of New York, because only the procedures follow these model are relevant for us in this study.

Examining the history of copyright law, we can distinct two significant theories. The distinction is based upon the position of entitled parties. Two separated fields can be found among the rights of the author: personal and financial rights. It is no doubt that personal rights are inseparable from the author itself, these rights cannot become objects of commercial businesses. If we look at these rights a little bit closer, we can realize that personal rights of the author do not play significant role in earning money from an intellectual product. These rights ensure the integrity and originality of works. Separating the two theories we have to focus on financial rights. Trying to describe these rights we can see that no exact definition can be given to them because of the permanent development of printing and publishing technology. Due to the monist theory it can be said that financial rights are close to personal ones, they are inseparable from personality of the author. Transcribing this opinion to the language of law it means that the decent regulation should prohibit the transfer of these rights among living persons. In the Anglo-Saxon legal system experts think that financial rights have to take part in commercial trade if we want to acknowledge the achievement of authors.

In Hungary copyright law is on the point of the monist theory. The Act refers that financial rights of the author cannot be transferred and the author has no right to abandon them. If we get a closer look at the structure of the valid Act, we can say that monist theory is not consistent. It is possible to inherit financial rights. We need this rule if we would like to harmonize the system to the time of protection. The other relevant fact of crossing the prohibition is in connection with works created under labour frames. In this case the employer gets financial rights ex lege. To find the reason of this regulation we have to examine the nature and aim of labour relations. The employer gives payment to his employee, the author to establish and create works. In this situation it is natural that the author looses his financial rights. The problem is that in Hungary differences can be found between civil and labour law. If we try to give meaning to labour relations, misunderstandings and different point of views can reveal. The other problematic factor is that the Act does not bother with the question of succession.   

In my study I present the pros and cons of both theories and gather those significant practical and theoretical fields of copyright law that can be limits of monist theory. I examine special rules for special works, rules of civil and labour law in connection with authors and give a short historical overview to see what can be the main directions of future developments.

Since the change of the regime the economic role of advertisements has changed significantly. Advertising forms a considerable part of economic activities, the cost of which constitute a growing portion of the expenses of a given enterprise. The mass-appearance of advertisements has altered the relationship between consumers and advertisers, it has restructured consumption habits and the importance of advertising in media.

The most significant modification of the Hungarian Advertising Act occurred by (Act I of 2001), which was in large passed with the consent of the advertising profession. The modification introduced the concept of deceptive advertisements, apparent comparative advertisements and special offers. Comparative advertisements were also regulated in a satisfactory way. However, several legal institutions were introduced as well, which should have been included in competition law. In the last two decades actions against unlawful advertisements were largely based on competition law, which restricts advertising activities violating fair competition in general. Advertising Decree and later the Advertising Act regulated the restriction of advertisements of certain goods and services, or defined the restrictions on certain advertising activities. Due to the modification, the role of Competition Act became less significant, since Advertising Act also contains most prohibitions on advertising activities that were defined in the Competition Act. In addition, in the case of violation of regulations on deceptive and comparative advertisements, Advertising Act denoted the Bureau of Competition and the court as chief acting powers, whereas the violation of rules on apparent comparative advertisements falls in the scope of the Consumer Protection Authority.

What is more, the (Act I of 2001) “smuggled” the entire prohibition of tobacco advertisements into the Advertising Act, which totally contradicted with the opinion of advertising profession. Thus Hungary, similarly to France, joined the strictest practice in this question. It is also disputable whether such restrictions promote the fight against smoking, and it was certainly disadvantageous that legislation decided in the question without involving the profession, for which there had been no precedents so far.

In Germany the new constitution published in 1919 established a brand new and democratically based state structure. Beside the traditional forum of administrative courts a new court system had been established in connection with public law jurisdiction. After Germany lost the first World War, general depression made a big impression on German state structure too. One of the most significant conflicts of this period had risen between the Empire and its biggest member state, Prussia. On 20th July 1932 president of the Empire suspended the Prussian autonomy and seized the power of directing the member state. The German Court of State had to verify this decision. Because of the fact that the court held its session in Lipche, this judgement is called as the famous judgement of Lipche. There are several really significant and dogmatically important factors in this decision, which help us understand the legal structure of that age in the German Empire.

In this study I examine extraordinary power of the monarch in the Republic of Weimar and its special control by the courts. Constitution gave the right to the sovereign to obtain the regulations of the constitution by force in member states. There was a special right that entitled him using uncommon orders in case of attack against public order and public security. These rules ensured the unity of the Empire.

The speciality of this judgement is that the Court qualified the order of the monarch unlawful because of the lack of the two circumstances mentioned above. To verify this decision court had to examine not only the nature of its procedure but the meaning of unity in the whole Empire, the aim of the constitution and these special rights of the monarch. The court focused on the examination of culpability in a member state. The conclusion is that intervention is legally based not only when a member state breaks the law with culpable behaviour but when breaking down of public order exists. In this special case the court split this practice and qualified the suspension of autonomy unlawful, but it found that other orders of the sovereign were acceptable. The result was that the autonomy was renovated but the Prussian government did not have the right in those cases, which were deprived by the monarch.

Általánosan elfogadott nézet, hogy egyetlen háború sem vívható meg anélkül, hogy ne ártana a természetnek, sőt, ne rombolná le azt; ennél fogva, hosszú időn át a háborúk e hatását elkerülhetetlen következménynek tekintették, melynek megakadályozására nem született átfogó, nemzetközi rezsim.

A nemzetközi közösségben, az 1990-es években kiteljesedő értékrendváltozás nyomán, azonban egyre erősödött az igény a környezet védelmének háborúk idejére való kiterjesztése iránt is. E folyamattal egyidejűleg a világ számos régiójában törtek ki fegyveres konfliktusok, melyek sajátos esettanulmányokként mutatják be a nemzetközi jogi szabályozás és annak gyakorlati érvényesülése közötti, gyakran ellentmondásos kapcsolatot.

A tanulmány középpontjába állított, a volt Jugoszlávia területén zajlott konfliktusok számos súlyos kérdésre és hiányosságra hívták fel a nemzetközi közvélemény figyelmét, elsősorban két területen: bizonyos, veszélyesnek tekinthető objektumok támadását, valamint a szegényített urániumot tartalmazó lövedékek használatát illetően, mindkét esetben felvetve a támadásokban közvetlenül érintett Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezetének (NATO), valamint tagállamainak esetleges nemzetközi jogi felelősségét.

A tanulmány első részében vizsgált veszélyes objektumok támadását illetően átfogó képet az UNEP által készített jelentés biztosít, mely azonban maga is több tekintetben árnyalt, olykor ellentmondásosnak tekinthető megállapítást is tartalmaz. A támadások pontos környezeti hatásának tisztázatlansága mellett számos további kérdést hagy nyitva a releváns nemzetközi jogi szabályozás is. Az 1949-es genfi egyezmények és 1977-s kiegészítő jegyzőkönyveik szabályai alapján ugyanis a támadott objektumok nem minősülnek veszélyesnek, ennél fogva kiemelten védettnek, annak ellenére, hogy támadásaik kimutatható környezeti károkat okoztak.

A tanulmány, és egyben a vizsgált jogterület kulcsproblémája azonban a jogsértés minimális határértékének tisztázatlansága, illetve ésszerűtlenül magasra helyezése, melynek révén csupán a rendkívül nagy területet érintő és páratlanul súlyos szennyezés minősül az egyezmények megsértésének. A szerző megítélése szerint e kritériumrendszer átértelmezése lehet az első lépés a környezet háborúk idején való hatékony védelme kidolgozásához.

A második vizsgált kérdésként vizsgált szegényített uránium tartalmú lövedékek használata a megosztott és kiforratlan tudományos álláspont miatt további jogbizonytalanságot eredményez.

Noha e lövedékek a hatályos nemzetközi hadijogi szabályozás alapján nem minősülnek kifejezetten tiltott fegyvereknek, az ilyen lövedéket alkalmazó feleket kifejezett körültekintési és elővigyázatossági kötelezettség terheli a polgári lakosságot érintő káros mellékhatásokat illetően.

E kérdés tehát továbbra is lezáratlan, azonban a szerző nem zárja ki annak lehetőségét, hogy amennyiben a jövőben e mellékhatások tudományos alapossággal is bebizonyosodnak, a NATO, illetve tagállamai nemzetközi jogi felelőssége felmerüljön.

Összefoglalóan megállapítható, hogy a hatályos szabályozás, az elmúlt évek fejlődési tendenciái ellenére továbbra is több hiányossággal küzd, különösen a felelősség megállapítása és a kikényszerítési eljárások tekintetében.

Noha az elkezdett folyamatok a jövőben kiteljesedhetnek, mindaddig, amíg a jelen nemzetközi rendszerben a háborúindítás továbbra is az államok gyakorlatának része, a környezet háborúk idején való védelmének lehetőségei korlátozottak maradnak.

Absztrakt nélkül.