Search
Search Results
-
The Appearance, Development, and Reception of Danger to Society in Hungarian Criminal Law
105-120Views:153The concept of danger to society is perhaps the most controversial element of the Criminal Code's definition of crime. This concept plays a prominent role in the determination of criminal liability in domestic criminal law. In the 20th century, its necessity in our Criminal Code, which was in force at the time, was the subject of debate among jurists of repute in the field of criminal law.
In the socialist criminal law of the pre-communist era, the concept of danger to society was used to express the 'class nature' of criminal law. After the 1990s, this concept - in the science of criminal law, in legislation and in the application of law as well - was cleared of the content elements adopted from Soviet law to serve the aims of party-state policy. Nowadays, the definition of danger to society is so devoid of ideological, party-political connotations that it is regarded by a significant number of legal scholars in the field of criminal law and even by case law as the conceptual equivalent of material illegality, taken from German legal theory (ÚJVÁRI, 2003).
In this paper, I will present the emergence and reception of the concept of danger to society in Hungarian criminal law and criminal jurisprudence, from the preceding period – which applied formal illegality – to the Criminal Code of legal force.
-
Practical importance of error in danger to society with special respect to economic crimes
Views:45In this study I examined the error, one of the grounds for the preclusion and termination of punishability. Grounds for the preclusion of punishability and grounds for the termination of punishability, mean that punishability shall be precluded. Error, as an obstacle of the preclusion of punishability, doesn’t happened as usually as other grounds for the preclusion of punishability, for example: insane mental state, constraint and menace. The error means- 27. §- the perpetrator shall not be punishable for a fact, of which he was not aware on perpetration. The person, who commits an act in the erroneous hypothesis that it is not dangerous for society and who has reasonable ground for this hypothesis, shall not be punishable. Error shall not exclude punishability, if it is caused by negligence, and the law also punishes perpetration deriving from negligence. I examined how often the judge accept an error, if the person commit a crime, for example: tax fraud, practise usury, bribe somebody. Is it exceptional or not? When can the perpetrator of a crime refer to error? What examine judge?
-
Stations in legal history of error; focused on Nándor Bernolák’s thesis of error
Views:50I examine one of the grounds for the preclusion of culpability and grounds for the termination of culpability: error. Grounds for the preclusion of culpability are the followings: infancy, abnormal mental condition, constraint and menace, error, negligible degree of danger to society of an act, self-defence, extreme necessity (emergency), absence of private motion, other grounds defined in the Act. Grounds for the termination of culpability are: the death of the perpetrator, prescription, remission, cessation or becoming negligible of the dangerousness for society of the act, other grounds defined in the Act.
Grounds for the preclusion of culpability and grounds for the termination of culpability mean that culpability shall be precluded.
Error - as an obstacle of the preclusion of culpability – is not as usual as other grounds for the preclusion of culpability, for example: insane mental state, constraint or menace. Error means - 27. § of the Hungarian Criminal Code – that the perpetrator shall not be punishable for a fact of which he was not aware on perpetration. The person, who commits an act in the erroneous hypothesis that it is not dangerous for society and who has reasonable ground for this hypothesis, shall not be punishable. Error shall not exclude culpability, if it is caused by negligence and the law also punishes perpetration deriving from negligence.
I examine error’s ruling from Roman law to now days. One of the most important books was written by Nandor Bernolak: The Error doctrine. I succeeded Bernolak’s method to search how error was regulated in different ages. Bernolak wrote his essay in 1910, so he described the rules of error as it appeared in Code Csemegi. I follow his method during the examination of 1950.:II. Criminal Code of General Part, 1961. IV. Criminal Code and finally 1978. IV. Criminal Code.
I found many differences and similarities between Criminal Codes, Propositions, and finally I compiled a table about the changes of the development in error’s legal history.
There is a rule that is known generally from Roman law: „ignorantia facti, non iuris excusat”, which means: ignorance of the law means no excuse.
-
A tévedés jelentőségének egyes aspektusai az élet, testi épség elleni bűncselekmények körében
Views:48I examined one of the grounds for the preclusion of punishability and grounds for the termination of punishability, which is error. Grounds for the preclusion of punishability and grounds for the termination of punishability, mean that punishability shall be precluded.
The error means- 27.§- the perpetrator shall not be punishable for a fact, of which he was not aware on perpetration. The person, who commits an act in the erroneous hypothesis that it is not dangerous for society and who has reasonable ground for this hypothesis, shall not be punishable. Error shall not exclude punishability, if it is caused by negligence, and the law also punishes perpetration deriving from negligence.
I examined how often the judge accept an error, if the person believe that he’s in the right, because he was attecked, or direct emergency menace. Or maybe he believes, that he is in danger of his life. Is it exceptional or not? What examine judge? It isn’t only hypothetical question, because very complicated task for the judge.