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• The comparison of the civil law liability for the actions of courts and the civil law liability of attorneys in view of the standard of attributability

  128-148.

  Zsolt Zsurzsa

  Views:

  158

  It is a basic requirement of society that those who are infringed upon in exercising their rights, may enforce the sanctions of the infringement in a judicial process. This process is mainly executed by state courts in most legal systems, which are supposed to settle legal disputes by interpreting the relevant laws, and by taking the relevant case law into consideration. However, this is a complex process that requires professional legal knowledge from the parties. Attorneys are meant to be those professionals, who help people seeking justice to obtain their respective compensation, and also with other problems requiring legal expertise. The attorneys shall also execute this ask to the best of their knowledge. In some cases, however, this legal enforcement process may fail, which may result in the person seeking legal advice or compensation to lose its opportunity to pursue its claim permanently.
  This case might happen as a result of the actions or omissions of courts, or that of attorneys. In these cases, it is logical that the liability of these two actors of justice for the parties’ damages may be decided upon by assessing the quality of work that has led to a person suffering material damages. It would be easy to assume that the standard for the reasonable conduct for both actors is very high. However, apparently the standard for the reasonable conduct of courts seems to be a lot lower than that of attorneys in the judicial practice. In practice, only in case of the most severe infringements of courts may the injured parties receive compensation for damages, while a lot less severe infringement – or even quite the same infringements – may result in the attribution of the attorney’s liability.
  I intend to analyze this difference in the civil liability of the two actors in the light of the legal background, legal practice and the different tasks of courts and attorneys as well as the reasons of this phenomenon, and form an opinion on whether it can be justified or this practice should be discouraged. To do so, I analyze the relevant Hungarian judicial practice and legal science, and cite some foreign examples as well.

• Judicial practice regarding the compensation for personal injuries caused by the circumstances of penal institutions, violating the fundamental rights of convicts and detainees of other dues

  49-62

  Botond Nagy

  Views:

  316

  The studied topic is the judicial practice regarding the compensation for personal injuries caused by the circumstances of penal institutions, which violate the fundamental rights of convicts and detainees of other dues. Dual research questions have been posed because of the characteristics of the covered topic. The first one is related to civil law and is about demandants’, defendants’ and courts’ attitudes and tendencies relating to the topic in question. The second question, inseparably stemming from the previous one, is from the field of penal execution: what kind of traits can be abstracted from the judicial decisions when it comes to the condition of Hungarian penal institutions.  To answer these, empirical methodology must be applied. Accordingly, I examined 91 judicial decisions from 2014 to 2020. Thus, this study depicts the entirety of the relevant time range, meaning that the demandants’, defendants’ and courts’ characteristics are introduced in their arc of development, rather than pointwisely. In my study I delineate the demandants’ actions firstly: their claims, their supposedly violated rights and the ontological phenomena causing harm. Secondly, as displaying the defendants’ statements of defence, I specify the legal arguments brought on in order to support the claim that the penal institutions caused no harm to those held captive, or that they cannot be obliged to pay compensation. Afterwards, I examine the judicial practice. Firstly, I write about the ways courts treat the claims of ascertainment, namely whether or not the rights of those who are captivated were violated. Subsequently, I portray the claims of detain, about which I illustrate the relevant regime of liability and its partial requirements. Then I write about the matrix of the compensation for personal injury and the indemnification for the prison circumstances, the relation and the delimitation of the two. Finally, I answer the research questions. I draw an ideal model about the first question, in which the parties adduce correctly and make fair judgements.  By these the demandants can make sure that the violation of their rights is ascertained and that they are given compensation.  By following the model, the defendant can achieve the lowest amount of compensation possible, while the court can make the correct decision from a dogmatic point of view. As for the penal executive question, I give suggestions to solve the problem of the circumstances of penal institutions violating fundamental rights.