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• On the Manifold Identities of John Corvinus: The Question of Origins in Political Power Play at the End of the Fifteenth Century

  31-38

  Suzana Simon

  Views:

  157

  According to the wishes of his father, King Matthias, John Corvinus should have become king of Hungary (the ideal dynastic case) or at least king of Bosnia (and maybe Croatia), in agreement with the House of Habsburg. Nothing came of it, as it is well-known. The co-king of Bohemia, Ladislaus II Jagiellon, was elected king of Hungary and John had to concede defeat and, gradually, “make a living” at the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

  By mid-1497, John Corvinus had reached agreements with Maximilian I of Habsburg, king of the Romans and co-king of Hungary, and with the Republic of Venice, becoming a citizen and a noblemen of the “strange ally” of late Matthias. John, however, did not renounce his allegiance to Ladislaus II, as the rightful (de iure) king of Hungary. As a result, for the final seven years of his life (1497–1504), John Corvinus seemingly had three “masters”: Ladislaus, Maximilian and Venice. The presentation aims to explore the impact of these political ties on the (royal) territories under the administration of John Corvinus and on his “other family”, by marriage (since 1496), the Frankopans (the Frangepans).

• The Wagenburg-warfare in the Army of King Matthias

  93–110

  Dominik Tóth

  Views:

  69

  This article re-examines the adoption of Hussite Wagenburg-warfare in the army of King Matthias of Hungary. While Hungarian historiography traditionally assumes the transfer of both war wagons and their associated tactical system, this study argues that only the device, not the method, was adopted. By analysing key engagements from the eras of John Hunyadi and Matthias – including the Battle of Varna (1444), Kosovo Polje (1448), Baia (1467), and the Breslau campaign (1474) – it demonstrates that wagon forts consistently played a secondary, primarily defensive role. Rather than functioning as an integrated tactical framework, they served as mobile fortifications. The presence of experienced mercenary commanders further suggests that this limited adoption cannot be explained by a lack of technical knowledge.