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• Logos – in die Seele geschrieben (Zu Platons Schriftkritik im Phaidros)

  11–24

  Attila Simon

  Views:

  78

  In Plato’s Phaedrus, in the context of the ‘critique of writing’ the phrase ‘writing in the soul’ occurs twice (276a5, 278A3). Why did Plato use this metaphor, with positive connotation, in a context which criticises ’writing’ in everyday sense? On the basis of the Phaedrus, I argue that the content of logos inscribed in the soul is not a philosophical doctrine, formulated in propositions, but the continuous practice of dialectic as the philosophical way of life. On the basis of the broader context of 5th and 4th century literary texts, I argue that Plato uses this metaphor as a cliché which emphasizes the importance of the content that should be inscribed in the soul for remembrance, even though the phrase is somewhat at odds with the narrower context.

• The Island of Laws

  5–14

  György Németh

  Views:

  51

  According to the well-known opinion of Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Plato was not familiar with Cretan customs when he wrote the Laws. If we compare the text of Nomoi with Cretan law inscriptions from the 7th-5th centuries, we can conclude that Plato’s knowledge of the laws of Cretan poleis was more profound than it had been assumed. It is especially true in the case of the regulation of alcohol consumption on the basis of Laws 666a-b and an inscription form Eleutherna (Nomima II.98; Lupu 323).

• Honesty, Shame, Courage: Reconsidering the Socratic Elenchus

  197-206

  Giulia Fiore

  Views:

  189

  The elenchus (gr. ἔλεγχος, literally “argument of disproof”, “refutation”, “cross-examining”) is the core of the Socratic method represented by Plato in his early dialogues. This enquiring technique, employed by Socrates to question his interlocutors about the nature or definition of ethical concepts, is the object of a never-ending scholarly debate, concerning especially its primary purpose: is it a positive method, leading to knowledge, or is it rather a negative method, aiming exclusively at refuting the interlocutor’s belief? This paper, through the analysis of some key passages in Plato’s early dialogues, focuses on the structural features of the elenchus in order to understand how the elenctic refutation is developed, why Socrates chooses a dialectical method often ending in aporia, and whether the Socratic method can be considered, not merely an instrument aiming at the recognition of one’s ignorance, but primarily a positive search for knowledge.

• The enactment of moderation in Plato's "Charmides"

  5–34

  Gerald A. Press

  Views:

  138

  Plato’s dialogues are as much literary dramas as philosophical inquiries. In light of the scope and development of σωφροσύνη and the carefully crafted historical resonances of the dialogue’s dramatic date and cast of characters, it is argued here that σωφροσύνη is a foundational virtue, best understood as moderation, moderating one’s behavior, rather than on a par with other virtues. The Charmides is non-dogmatic, rather than skeptical or aporetic, and essentially political rather than ethical or epistemological, as often assumed. Rather than asserting any simple, propositional account of moderation, it enacts a complex moral and political view of moderation that unifies many strands of the term’s meanings in Greek through the persons and words of its characters and operating as much through the reader’s, imagination, and emotions as through reason and purely logical argument.