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
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Contents

ILDIKÓ ASZTALOS MORELL: Workfare with a human face?.....	3
ZOLTÁN BERÉNYI: Seeking Diamond, But Finding Moissanite: A Case Study On Democratic Political Culture In Contemporary Hungary	25
KARL BRUCKMEIER: Social Conflicts in the 21st Century – the Shadows of Global Environmental Change	48
IBOLYA CZIBERE: Projects’ Social Effects: The Project Orientated Society	66
JUDIT CSOBA: Managing the unemployment in Hungary.....	78
VIDA GUDŽINSKIENĖ: The provision of day care services for the children in need....	91
FRANZ HAMBURGER: Dynamics of welfare – social work in the ascendant and under pressure.....	110
BALÁZS KRÉMER: Idiosyncrasies of recent growing inequalities in Hungarian income distribution	118
ANDREA RÁCZ: Child protection models for mainstreaming child’s rights.....	155
EDIT SCHRANZ: 'Who is in crisis? With reference to the debates about the 'crisis of masculinity', discuss about poverty, unemployment, or other social issues, and its effects on women'. But Whose crisis is it after all?	172
Authors	183

ILDIKÓ ASZTALOS MORELL

Workfare with a human face?

Innovative utilizations of public work in rural municipalities in Hungary¹

Introduction

Public work is currently the major national tool for the reintegration of the long-term unemployed into the world of labour in Hungary. As a result of the expansion of resources the government allotted to facilitate public work employment, labour statistics improved substantially. Nonetheless, public labour as an institution is objected to intense criticism. Since employment as public worker is not bound to citizenship rights, local municipalities have a large degree of discretion about selecting whom they hire. Criticism most often focuses on employment discrimination. In contrast, this research takes a progressive municipality, with anti-discriminatory profile as an example, where public work was adapted as a welfare, rather than purely workfare praxis. Uszka, a rural small-sized municipality, is characterized by high ethnified unemployment. Its politicians and administrators adapted varied strategies to help combat poverty and unemployment. The paper explores the place of public work in the context of social policy instruments and poverty reduction strategies applied and the degrees of freedom and limitations municipalities have in adapting state instruments.

Public work as a workfare strategy to counteract the welfare dependency of the long-term unemployed was first formulated in 1996. Municipalities became obliged to organize public work from 2000 onward. In the meantime, it became a central tool to counteract unemployment from 2009 as part of the “Way to work” [Út a munkába] strategy of the Socialist-Liberal coalition. The conservative government renamed this strategy START, thereby reducing the eligibilities attached to it several times between 2011 and 2015 (Csoba 2010; MSH 2014). Public work as a strategy to overcome long-term unemployment was subjected to an extensive and varied criticism (MSH 2014, Fazekas - Scharle 2012, Szabó 2013, Köllő - Scharle 2011), describing public work as a “cul de sac”, rather than leading out of exclusion from the labour market. It was accused of being both non-voluntary and having punitive features (Ferge 2012). Studies indicate that the rate of return to the labour market even decreased in villages while extensively utilizing public work programmes (Köllő - Scharle 2011).

Municipality strategies in small-size settlements adapting the Út a munkába (“Way to work”) programme showed a great variation (Udvari - Varga 2010). Paradoxically,

¹ The research conducted to this paper was supported by the Swedish Research Foundation: Vetenskapsrådet.

disciplinary potentials in the construction of public work were more likely to be utilized by prosperous municipalities, which on the other hand had more access to experts, thus allowing more resourceful adaptations of public work compared to the more disadvantaged settlements (Vida - Virág 2010).

Two major directions can be differentiated among strategies to combat poverty: those oriented to coping and those oriented towards the improvement of the capacities of marginalized groups, i.e. providing the fish or the net to learn how to fish (Asztalos Morell 2011). In this paper, I first explore to what degree public work projects and other complementary programmes initiated in Uszka focus on the provision of basic material goods, such as food and shelter (coping), or do they constitute instruments to improve the abilities and resources of the marginalized groups, i.e. capacity building? Second, a further aspect of poverty reduction strategies is in what way these involve the participation of the marginalized groups and their agency. Lastly, the paper will explore in what way poverty reduction strategies have contributed to the improvement of inter-ethnic relations.

Uszka is a small settlement that has increased from 228 inhabitants in 1989 to 419 inhabitants by 2012. This change was accompanied by a shift in the ethnic composition, in which the proportion of Romani is currently between 80-90%. Unemployment was the highest (43% according to Rácz (2008: 389) in the small Tiszahát region, only counting the officially registered unemployed.

The study was based on interviews, focus groups interviews and participant observations conducted during the winter of 2012 and spring of 2013. Among the interviewed are the local mayor since 1994, two vice mayors, one administrative leader, one public works brigade leader, six religious leaders from the local free-Christian denomination, one Protestant priest, one project leader, one local Hungarian- and a group of Roma residents, and made participant observations.

Deindustrialization, welfare state retrenchment and long-term unemployment

Post-socialist communities became a major site for the emergence of the precarious class. In Hungary, the post-socialist economic transition resulted in mass exclusion from the labour force. The employment rate has been 56.2% in 2011 compared to the EU 28 average of 64.1%, with only Greece having lower levels among the EU 28. The improvement of the employment level reached 61.7% by 2014 (OECD 2014), when six other EU 28 countries had lower rates and the average for the EU was 64.8%. This improvement has been attributed to an increase in public employment. During the post-socialist transformation, rural communities were hit the hardest: decollectivization, as well as deindustrialization following the integration into the global economy, contributed to a larger degree of loss of employment opportunities compared to urban areas, while household-based production, which had a central role in rural survival strategies has drastically declined (Kovách 2010). Globalization has transformed rural societies, disembedding local self-sufficiencies, integrating

production into global chains and transforming production societies into consumer societies. Especially hard hit were communities with a longer distance to employment opportunities (Váradí 2008, 2010). As an outcome, inequalities increased, dividing the population into categories characterized by widely divergent living conditions (Atal 1999, Ferge 2002, Szalai 2007). Poverty became widespread, and large sections of rural residents became welfare-dependent. The mass loss of employment following transition was to be counterbalanced by the developing welfare state. However, neither has the economy been able to reintegrate the displaced labour force, nor have past and present governments presented comprehensive and effective governmental strategies to reintegrate those in long-term unemployment into the main stream of the labour market (Krémer 2008), as the welfare dependency of those on the margins prevails. The increasing educational gap in society (Molnár - Dupcsik 2008) indicates a long-term trend. Moreover, the neo-liberal turn in welfare policies, enhanced by the demand of international monetary institutions such as the World Bank, applied pressure for welfare cuts.

Public work, which shares some features with other EU workfare strategies (Junestav 2004; Clasen & Clegg 2011), was streamlined after 2010 by the national conservative (Fidesz) government. The Fidesz government has further accentuated the principle of “work-based society”, incorporating the duty to work in the Constitution: “Every person shall be obliged to contribute to the enrichment of the community to their best ability and potential“, and turn to social benefits to be determined according to “the usefulness of the beneficiaries’ activities for the community”. Thus, Article 19 excludes “idle beneficiaries” from rights (Szikra 2014: 492). A new Labour Code was accepted and unemployment insurance was cut to three months (modification of Act IV/1991), social assistance was lowered to 15% of the average wage (modification of Act III/1993), social subsidies were made dependent on at least 30 days of work participation; the welfare client claimants had to accept employment opportunities regardless of educational level, while in the absence of such opportunities they had to participate in public works programmes (Act CVI/2011). Behaviour codes were required of claimants, requiring them to keep gardens tidy (Act III/1993), and since 2013 claimants can be excluded if their children are caught being truant from school. Meanwhile, the amount of labour hours for public work increased to eight hours per day, whereas public work has not been incorporated under the protection of the Labour Code. Payments are weekly and have been lowered to 70% of the minimum wage. Consequently, punitive elements of workfare have increased. As a result, municipalities are not obliged to provide public work for all unemployed. Exclusionary stipulations open for misuse by local municipalities, and examples of blatant racist misuse have been addressed by civil rights associations (TASZ 2013) and by the Ombudsman of Fundamental Rights (2012).

In Hungary, welfare provision is a municipal responsibility, while resource-weak municipalities lack long-term, viable instruments for fighting exclusion in the context of economic recession (Szalai 2007). The basic form of public work is financed to different degrees (between 70-90%) from the state budget to partially compensate municipalities. Nonetheless, resource-poor municipalities might not have the

resources to co-finance. Therefore, in settlements lacking viable enterprises capable of offering market-based employment in rural areas, municipalities have become the key agents for realizing the state ambitions of a new form of workfare, i.e. preconditioning welfare with work.

The START programme was initiated by the Fidesz government to fully finance public work projects by multiply disadvantaged regions with an unemployment rate over 14%. These opportunities cannot be simply applied for on the basis of some type of given normative standards. Municipalities have to actively create viable programmes for the employment of people that they ask state refunds for. However, not even these regions receive support corresponding to the total number of eligible unemployed. According to Cseres-Gergely and Molnár (2014), only 10% of those on public work programmes find market-based employment after public employment. The participants in the most optimistic cases could circulate between short-term START work and social security payments.

In 2014, the public work wage was 77,300 Forints brutto, leaving 50,630 Forints after taxes. Those with higher qualifications were entitled to a higher payment. This wage was higher than social security payments (from 2012 called foglalkoztatást helyettesítő támogatás), which as of 2014 was 22,800 Ft. Public work wages constituted 78% of the minimum wage, which was 101,500 forints brutto and 66,480 Forints netto. Public work provides highly precarious life conditions since the provided work is typically short-term (5.1 months on average, Cseres-Gergely & Molnár 2014: 211). In 2013, 49.5% of public workers were employed within START programmes, 30.6% in long-term public work and 20.2% on national public work programmes (ibid: 214). Further restrictions have been implemented from 2015, which has taken away the obligation from municipalities to pay social security benefits.

Neo-liberal and social-conservative trends of welfare state transformation aggravate social differentiation, thereby facilitating exclusion along the lines of “deserving” and “underserving” poor while increasing social tensions between different sections of society. Moralizing between the deserving and undeserving poor obtained an ethnified dimension, in which Romaness and undeservingness often become unhappily associated (Schwartz 2012).

Enforced workfare results in new forms of precarious labour relations. The state support to the maintenance of workfare modifies market principles, since under these conditions labour does not have to be self-financing. Furthermore, workfare employment typically falls under specific labour security regulations. Because the eligibility to social welfare revenues has been preconditioned by participation in public labour prior to 2015, those enrolled in these programmes are in a dependent position on local notables and the judgement of local moral communities (Kay 2011). In the meantime, public workers constitute a close to free of charge labour for municipalities.

Regional enclaves of impoverished “rust pockets” and the ethnification of poverty

Among those living in poverty, Romani are strongly overrepresented (Tárki 2013, Fodor 2002, Ladányi & Szelényi 2004). Those Roma who live in peripheral rural communities can be seen as multiply marginalized. Due to a lower level of education compared to the majority society, they experience a higher level of exclusion from the labour market, and are often even subjected to exclusionary practices within their communities (Schwartz 2012).

The deprivation of Romani communities are seen as multi-causal and related to a combination of structural and cultural factors (Ladányi - Szelényi 2004, Dupcsik 2005) with path dependencies. Under state socialism, the marginal position of Romani was defined by politics as a social, rather than ethnic concern, hence promoting the conformity of the Roma population to the majority. Thus, the state socialist policy was assimilationist towards the Roma. This implied a participation in the labour force and an improvement in living conditions, even if integration into the labour force was not on equal terms and the independent minority status of the Roma was not acknowledged (Majtényi & Majtényi 2012). In the meantime, there were spontaneous processes of local integration (Szuhay 2005), such as an unfolding Roma peasantization in rural communities, which he judged as a social rather than ethnic assimilation.

Despite a process of assimilation into mainstream society through labour force participation, the Romani have remained being subjected to stigmatization, and their integration has been on unequal terms (Ladányi - Szelényi 2004). The Romani formed the unskilled labour force of the technically backward state socialist economy, and when inefficient mines and heavy industry closed down, the Romani lost their jobs to a larger degree than regular Hungarians. Lacking skills, they could not reintegrate into the new branches, which required more diversified skills (Emigh, Fodor - Szelényi 2001: 3). Unemployment is most concentrated in the so-called “rust pocket” regions of the country, where small-size village societies are the most affected (Kovács 2008). This marginal situation is passed down to subsequent generations, since the school system is not capable of lifting children out of poverty (Molnár - Dupcsik 2008).

Váradi (2010) connected Roma marginalization to rural geographic and demographic processes of counter selective mobility. Aging communities with lack of employment opportunities became the targets of mobility for a social stratum weak in resources. This counter-selective mobility has obtained ethnic dimensions since the Romani constitute a large segment of those hit hardest by transition, and belong to the long-term unemployed. Local communities impacted by a counter-selective mobility experience a transformation of the system of coexistence, characterizing them prior to population change (Kotics 2012, Szabó-Tóth 2012). Previously, the established harmonic co-existence has been challenged, and often the original Romani residents associate themselves with the local Hungarians in opposition to the newly immigrating Romani (Durst 2008). According to studies by Havas (1999: 174 in Kotics 2012: 76), the process of ethnic transformation most typically gets started in settlements in

which the immigration rate of Romani reached 20% for a local community. Several studies have documented that the abandoning of the local schools by Hungarian children is typically an indication of a process of counter-selective mobility, which often leads to Hungarians, as well as resourceful Romani, to abandon villages, turning these abandoned communities into isolated ethnic Romani enclaves (Ladányi - Szelényi 2004, Virág 2010, Durst 2008). The common characteristic of these ghetto-like communities is the total lack of working opportunities in the “first market”. Those working become dependent on the quasi-labour market generated by various short-term welfare jobs and the black economy. The ghetto-like settlements typically lose their pattern-setting socially mobile inhabitants, and are “destined for a life strategy with a kind of now-orientation focusing on pure survival. Breaking the norm is not unusual in these settlements” (Kovács 2010). For those left to themselves in these villages, the unmediated power of the “baron” and “millionaires” subordinate those poor, without alternative sources of livelihood (Durst 2008). Therefore, the importance of culture and identity has also been raised in the understanding of ethnified poverty. On the one hand, impoverished communities recreate dysfunctional cultures of poverty, whereas on the other, the discriminatory practices of the majority society contribute to the reproduction of marginal positions.

Szalai (2007) identified the “municipalization of welfare” as one key structural explanatory factor for the reproduction of poverty. Following the transition social welfare has been designated as the concern of resource-poor municipalities strengthening the role of local particularities in forming the conditions of social citizenship in local welfare regimes (Asztalos Morell 2008): “poverty, as a social problem becomes a small community issue” ... “the conflict between poor and not poor appears as the malfunction of the local communities” (Szalai 2002: 39).

The decentralization of welfare to the community level gave power to local officials to negotiate entitlements to benefits. Moreover, these negotiations often led to ethnified differentiation among the “deserving” and “undeserving poor” on the basis of judgments made on belonging to “moral communities”, the workings of which are well documented in by case studies (Thelen 2012, Schwartz 2012). Neo-liberal arguments of self-sufficiency and personal responsibility mix with Soviet-style references to work morality in drawing the limits of these excluding moral communities. Theories on the role of ethnicity for entitlements emphasize the dynamics between majority and minority societies and the role of institutions: “Existence and maintenance of poverty and exclusion ... is not only rooted in commonly known structural factors, but also results from the working methods of educational and social security institution” (Schwartz 2012: 101).

Public work as a road for empowerment?

Workfare strategies emerged from the critique of social benefits, which were seen to passivize benefit receivers. Monetary transfers were seen to help the long-term unemployed to cope and secure access to basic consumption goods, yet did not improve the abilities necessary to achieve a better self-sufficiency. Some kind of improvement of abilities is necessary for breaking out of dependency and poverty (Sen 1984, Sätre 2014). To use Bourdieu's theory (1986), economic resources alone are not sufficient to break the reproduction of inequalities. The accumulation of and transfer of immaterial assets (human, cultural and social capital) is required for changing the vicious circles of poverty reproduction and marginalization. Bourdieu (1986) differentiates between materialized cultural capital (also called human capital, in the form of educational achievements) and embodied cultural capital (also referred to as habitus). Educational credits (human capital) open access to the labour market. Nonetheless, credentials might not suffice in cases of discrimination or a lack of contacts or trust (also referred to as lack of social capital). Habitus encompasses a set of orientations towards the world and ways of attributing its goods. In contrast to the autonomous risk-taking entrepreneurial habitus (Kováč 1988, Asztalos Morell 1999), welfare dependency (Kovács 2008) or a wage worker habitus is also associated with a kind of lost ability for independent agency (Swain 2003). Theories of the culture of poverty also help explain the reproduction of poverty to a combination of habitus (embodied cultural capital) associated with an acute present orientation and a general lack of interest in the future, and the lack of trusting social relations (Ladányi - Szelényi 2004).

While social capital is seen as a crucial asset, the lack of which enforces poverty, how one defines social capital varies. Bourdieu identified social capital as an asset that the individual accumulates through social contacts that can be transferred into other assets, such as jobs or market contacts. Following Bourdieu, Swain (2003) and Thelen (2001) argued that in-group social-contacts of the poor are only "shackles to break". However, as shown by Asztalos Morell (2014), under certain conditions even kin and neighbourhood-based contacts are important for the accumulation of assets, and can contribute to breaking out of poverty. Micro-finance projects build also on strong local networks in the effort to overcome poverty (Yunus 2007). Nonetheless, most scholars agree on the importance attributed to what Putnam (2000) differentiates as bridging social capital, i.e. social capital based on contacts between socially different groups, as compared to "bonding social capital", i.e. capital based on contacts within socially enclosed groups - for the accumulation of assets necessary for breaking out of poverty. Putnam (2000) also elucidates trust as a crucial feature of social capital, and views it as an asset realized in the sum of positive relations and the kind of climate of trustfulness in society it creates, rather than simply a sum of concrete helping contacts.

Uszka: From black collar commuter settlement to unemployment

Under state socialism, work was not only a right but also a duty, and those who were found to be without official work were punished. Both Roma and non-Roma alike had paid labour, and beyond the local agricultural cooperative most of the Roma of the village commuted to Székesfehérvár and Budapest to work on road construction. Those first people who lost their jobs due to the shutting down of industries felt ashamed:

“I do recall very clearly Uncle D. and K. [both of Roma origin], how their tears ran, since they came ashamed: “We came home, because our workplace shut down. We are going to be unemployed. What is going to happen with us?” They felt ashamed because they had no job left to go to.” (Ibolya)

The majority of the work opportunities disappeared by the early 1990s. Today, there are no viable employers in the vicinity of the municipality. Fehérgyarmat is the closest settlement with city status 37 kms away, and the two last sizeable private employers here, the spoon factory and a mechanical centre, resulted in the loss of 300-400 jobs. There is a conservation factory, which seasonally employs three shifts at the minimal wage level, which was 93,000 Forints brutto, with netto being a little above 60,000 Forints. Taking a job at a distance entails travel costs and extra food expenses. Therefore, even though there were attempts to organize a bus to fetch the workers, it was not seen as being viable to commute for the locals, according to the municipality administration. Hence, close to the entire active age population is without employment through the market sector, instead relying for subsistence on alternative incomes. The main provider is the municipality.

The kinds of jobs that men in particular could take are in the building industry. However, many had bad experiences from Uszka. As one of my interviewees, Nándor, explained: “People were locked away with promises, and after two months of work they did not receive either their regular pay or their social security employer fees.” This was also the case with entrepreneurs in the building industry, insofar as the company they had contracted work with had not paid them. People have a suspicion about jobs a long distance away. This stands in contrast with the experiences of the older generation, many of whom worked in another part of Hungary in Székesfehérvár. They were fetched by busses and lived in workers’ hotels working at construction sites.

Poverty relief or Workfare: Public work as access to social benefits

Public work as a social security instrument in the municipal government became first promoted by the socialist/liberal Horn government (1994-1998). The mayor, who has been in office since 1994, expanded the utilization of public work. As the administrative chief in Uszka explained: “Prior to 1994, the municipality employed only those who they needed. The former mayor did not want to employ more people than he needed, as he wondered: ‘What kind of job could he give to these?’” (Ibolya). The new mayor’s goal was to incorporate everyone into different public work projects to secure an income for everyone, which was the prevailing goal, even at the time of the interview: “Nobody should be left without benefits... we pay attention that everybody should get at least the 22,500 Forints” (Veronika).

The mayor remembers that:

“When I started in 1994, I found that there were barely a few people who had a safe income. To the contrary, they were not even eligible to receive social benefits or unemployment insurance since they could not show enough number of work months. ... They had to start from zero.”

The mayor introduced a strategy through which he could move the people back into the social security system:

“We tried to press for public work opportunities. We started to apply for these. And in this way, we turned the people into the system during a period of 3-4-5-6 years, so that everybody should have at least one year of an employment relationship, so they would become part of the social benefit system.”

In 2012, there are 140 capable working age people. Out of this, 100 were without employment. “Out of these we can occupy 60 people through the START programme during this year. Right now, we have 25-30 active.” This high participation rate in the START programme was made possible since Uszka qualified as a multiply disadvantaged region in the classificatory system. Such regions are eligible for a higher allotment of public work support from the state without municipality contribution to the wages. However, the length of employment varies. According to the brigade leader Nándor, two-month-long contracts were signed at a time, but as one focus group participant expressed: “We hope it will be extended to nine months.”

Work under the START programme pays 71,800 Forints brutto, leaving 47,000 after taxes. Those with higher qualifications are entitled for a higher payment. This sum is very low and not sufficient to live on. Nonetheless, this sum is still higher than social security, and people are interested in obtaining the positions.

According to the administrative chief, social considerations are central in decisions on selecting participants in the programmes: “Those are chosen who have no other income, i.e. have already lost eligibility to social benefits Families with children are prioritized. However, not all who want can get appointed” (Ibolya). This intentions is

only partially corroborated in one of the interviews, in which an eighteen-year-old father with two children complained about not having been admitted into the public work programme. He felt that “some are favoured over others”. In the meantime, he was not without social benefit thanks to previous public work employment. A social benefit system, in which the available means (number of public work opportunities provided by the state) do not cover all the needy (those without employment and ready to work), puts pressure on municipalities to make choices. As a result, feelings of discontent can emerge despite alleged intentions to work for a socially sensitive distribution.

Public work in public areas and municipal institutions

Municipalities most commonly utilize public work to clean public areas and produce for the benefit of public institutions. In Uszka the 60 public workers were divided into brigades. One of the brigades worked with cleaning the irrigation ditches for polder and fixing the inland inundation system, whereas another brigade cleaned five hectares of land of bushes and trees. The rehabilitated land was utilized for sowing maize and potatoes by the municipality’s tractor. The third brigade worked with the reparation of a bicycle path and the fourth in the day activity centre for the elderly. Lastly, a brigade consisting of five members was assigned to building renovation and maintenance work and, among others, painted the elderly home in the winter season:

“I asked him. Give us at least five people. I was bargaining with him, like the kofák [outspoken saleswomen] on the market. He checked how many quadrat meters and then asked me if there was something else to paint. I said the funeral (catafalque) room.... We got support for five people for two months.”
(Ibolya)

During 2012, Uszka applied for the implementation of a renewable energy-based furnace utilizing biomass that people would collect along the roads and cut into small pieces. This could employ two heaters throughout the entire year.

Municipal agency and public work projects

According to the municipality administrator, the application for START support requires an active agency from the municipalities, and those mayors who apply for it are taking a risk because the type of work they claim to provide is controlled by the authorities. It has to be work and activity that fulfils EU and national standards, as well as being an activity that is possible to carry out on the sites of the municipality. Municipalities are not entitled to apply for material expenses, i.e. they have to provide buildings and equipment. According to the municipal administrator of projects, this involves a large risk-taking by the mayors:

“Truly, what kind of eight-hour work can one provide for 150 people? To clean the sidewalks or slash hay in December? But the mayors take on the task, simply to be able to ensure people 47,000 and not 22,800 Forints [income a month]. And there are some people with ill will. It is enough that someone makes an ill-willed accusation to the authorities. If a controller comes out, we have to prove what the people were working with.” (Ibolya)

For example, the municipality tried to initiate local pasta production. However, the controller from the Ministry of Internal Affairs found that they had no proper kitchen that would meet the standards required by ÁNTSZ (Állami Népegészségügyi és Tisztiorvosi Szolgálat: National Health Institute). Although they had a kitchen in the elderly club, this was only certified to warm food. Consequently, before being able to produce pasta and receive START work support for it, they first needed to find resources to upgrade the kitchen. The municipality does not own many buildings, and those they own are not in the best condition. One planned solution was to apply for additional support through the Settlement programme to upgrade the cultural house, thereby making it suitable for a workplace for public winter work.

Furthermore, the controller wanted to know what they wanted to do with the pasta, since the municipality does not run day-care centres, schools or institutions where the pasta could be utilized. The administrator’s suggestion to sell it at the nearby city market was received with laughter:

“I suggested that we take it to the market and sell it. The notary was sitting beside me, and he was holding his stomach, he was laughing so hard. ‘What kind of ideas are you making up?!’ ‘No I said. I am not making up ideas. It is indeed so. We could pack it nicely in small packages. They would take it as sugar.’” (Ibolya)

The municipal administrator describes her agency as being a saleswoman, “pressing and bargaining” with governmental officials. Nevertheless, the critique had to be taken seriously since the production of food has to meet hygienic standards, and in the end they did not receive permission to produce pasta.

Beneficiaries of public work production

The usufruct of public work is commonly aimed to benefit the local municipalities, which was corroborated by four other fieldwork sites. However, Uszka is too small to run its own larger institutions, such as schools or day-care centres. The only institution left is a limited-function elderly club and homecare service. This is too limited to be able to provide supply needs to make production in a municipal regime feasible. Therefore, part of the yield was given to the day-care centre and the school located in the neighbouring communities.

In Uszka, the usufruct of agricultural production remaining after allotments to the public institutions was divided between 68 families below minimum income. The eligible received 10 kg of maize. There were 10 families, those receiving pensions, who were just above the minimum income. Finally, the representatives decided to give something to everybody: "Even these are poor. They only earn a bit above the minimum... That would only create tension in the community", argued one of the vice mayors, a Roma man, who was also a leader for one of the brigades.

Another fringe benefit of agricultural production is the spread of know-how, which is expected to stimulate household-based production.

Alternative municipality strategies beyond public work

Through initiation of a project financed by the Social land programme 10 years ago a number of families started to grow cucumbers. This activity expanded in a way that today one-fifth of the families participate in petty commodity production. The municipality continues to assist the producers. The growers have also found integrators pre-financing part of the expenses of the production and who also buy up the products. Some of these families became also seasonal employers of day-labour. The municipality plans also to assist with the conservation of the cucumbers to increase the independence of producers.

While cucumber production is promoting a smaller elite group in the community, the municipality is also active in attracting support for the needy. Despite of the active policy to include the whole community into the social security system, social transfer are not sufficient to guarantee incomes sufficient to satisfy basic needs. Uszka municipality tries to complement the meagre transfers with deliveries of aid originating from charity. When I visited, they had just distributed help from the Child Food Foundation with biscuits, flour, sugar and pasta. "The people would be starving without these" (Ibolya). Receiving aid assumes the active agency of the municipality. They have also applied for donations from the Maltese Order, the Protection Alliance and the Food Bank. My visit was prior to Christmas. In order to be able to give Christmas packages to the needy, the administrative leader of the municipality tried to utilize all opportunities, having just written to four foundations asking for Christmas donations: "I throw myself after everything!" (Ibolya). They are in daily contact with the foundation Every Child Should be Fed.

Despite of comprehensive efforts to hinder poverty, there is a documented involvement with informal boarder trade corroborated also by previous research (Rácz 2008). The municipality tries to hinder the activity of usurers. Usurers are the typical usurpers of poverty (Béres - Lukács 2008). Based on the interviews it appears that while the municipality has a zero tolerance profile against usury, one of the administrative leaders attributes it to her personal agency to prevent usurers in Uszka. She provides a personal guaranty for those in need when buying from vendors that bills are to be cleared by and agreed deadline.

A central community forming force has been the local free Christian denomination with roots back to the 1970s. Although the denomination was founded by a Hungarian Baptist couple, by today a second generation of Roma teachers are leading the congregations (Kopasz 2011, Turcsány 1972). Religious rebirth is associated with strict moral obligations and community and family orientation, which has benefited the reborn members to fight asocial behavior cut on alcohol consumption and strengthen the obligations to provide for their families. The presence of the denomination has been a strong base for the municipal efforts. The mayor agrees that, “I have received this ready-made,” since the religious renewal had changed the local society by the time of his arrival. However, as he formulates: “I gave worldly legitimation to it.”

Community processes: Municipal representation and inter-ethnic relations

Some 30 years ago, alcoholism was often the cause of fights and atrocities between Hungarian and Roma men. At that time, Hungarians were in the majority and the Hungarian men fought with the Roma: “Those big men, Gy and P... There were many in the pub. And I saw how they were kicking my brothers.” Today the inter-ethnic relations between the Hungarians and Roma are seen by both the Hungarian and Roma informants I met as being mutually harmonious: “the most important change was when we, the Roma, converted.” Meanwhile, most of the descendants of the Hungarian peasant families have moved away from the village, leaving the elderly behind. Today, 80-90% of the inhabitants are of Roma origin. Consequently, Uszka is an example of Romanizing communities with counter-selective mobility and high degree of segregation. However, as argued above, the social development patterns of Uszka do not corroborate the association of ethnic segregation with the negative aspects of ghettoized communities documented in the literature (Váradi 2008), since the new pattern of giving families are of Roma origin.

Beyond the influence of the religious revival, the current leadership partly claims the virtues for the improvement of interethnic relations. Prior to the current mayor, the municipal council had no Roma representative, even if the majority of the inhabitants were of Roma origin by that time. The mayor has radically changed this practice. At the time of my visit at the end of 2012, there were six members in the council, out of this three are of Roma origin and one is half Roma/half Hungarian. It is crucial for him to work together for goals: “We should choose the goals together. Work for the goals together. If we succeed, we should be happy for it together. If we do not succeed, we should feel sorrow together.”

The mayor describes his principles in leadership as being guided by the triple rule of minority politics:

“Maximal tolerance in relation to otherness and positive actions for the needy, independent of the ethnicity of the needy, whether it be Roma or Hungarian or Ukrainian. Finally, zero tolerance against asocial behaviour. These three things have to be done together.”

The mayor agrees that, “I have received this ready-made,” since the religious renewal had changed the local society by the time of his arrival. However, as he formulates: “I gave worldly legitimation to it.”

His policy orientation towards the Roma minority was considered to be deviant during the 1990s:

“I was the subject of public hatred. What does he want with the Gypsies? What a traitor, he is fraternizing with the Roma. They were teasing me: He goes to bed with Gypsies and wakes up with fleas.”

However, the attitudes changed radically after 1997, when developmental means became targeted toward improvement of the conditions for the Roma. They realized the potential and started to call the mayor and ask for advice. By now, the mayor finds that the region is full of pro-Roma mayors, independent of their political status. He argues that beyond the availability of resources, the politicians also have a personal interest in promoting the minority. In the region, most mayoral candidates are Hungarians, who originate from their own villages. The two-three local candidates have their own family and supporters who normally give a similar amount of votes. The winner is the one who can address the Roma minority and gain their vote. Nevertheless, some mayors can fall on the other side of shifting norms and avoid the punishment of the Roma with antisocial behaviour, fearing their responses. The mayor brings a recent example, when he has fired a public worker who had not come to work for two weeks.

“I did not mind losing his vote. I wanted to demonstrate the zero tolerance principle. Because it is when you leave holes that the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) is coming and marching.”

Tolerance towards otherness is a complex issue involving respect for differences in preferences, style and readiness to understand the meaning of otherness. The neighbouring mayors were complaining why the houses are painted in all kinds of bright colours, including lilac: “This village would be fine ... if the houses were not painted gimcrack.” “The style of Roma is often loud, which many interpret as aggressive. One turns them against if you react as if it was aggressiveness.”

Meanwhile, one has to be proactive with the issues of poverty and need. The municipality applied for the so-called Settlement Programme, through which 67 houses were to be renovated between 2007 and 2008. The project was created for the improvement of the housing conditions of Roma communities. When they presented the project at the village forum, the Roma residents were complaining. They did not

want to be privileged compared to their Hungarian neighbours, who they perceived as having been in just as much need as they themselves were. Lastly, the municipal leadership returned to the ministry and applied for being able to incorporate even the Hungarian houses. “They were even cleverer than me. It was not my idea. They came up with this, the people at the Forum.”

Public work and the development of social and cultural capital

In 2008, the municipality applied for a project to improve the educational level of the inhabitants. As a result, 24 of those who did not complete their eight-year-long primary school could finally complete it, and those willing to complete the gymnasium could also do so. They employed a teacher from Tiszavasvári of Roma origin. The municipality also had a Tanoda, where gymnasium-educated Roma educator helped schoolchildren with their studies, although at the time of my interviews they were not in operation.

Even so, education was not valued by all of my informants. A young 18-year-old father had only completed eight years of primary school, and did not see it as being worthwhile to continue his studies. “Even those who have skills are without work” he argued, and his father supported his son. For these young men, to obtain public work was the best opportunity at hand. By contrast, another 50-year-old informant was proud to have completed gymnasium 10 years ago, thanks to adult educational opportunities.

According to my informants, the municipality had difficulties in influencing the kind of educational programmes made available through START programmes. This was a condition that limited the ability to launch activities demanding skills. Since public work programmes typically were underfinanced and assumed the replacement of technology by manual labour power, rather than the opposite, most activities were restricted to a low technological level. Therefore, public work seems to block rather than promote the development of skills. Even municipalities, like Uszka, which intend to promote skills, face hindrances to find viable educational opportunities for participants that these could capitalise on the open labour market.

Public work proved instrumental to move villagers back into the social security system. Public work provided also a social context beyond isolation. Thanks to the creative engagement of the local administration it has also been filled with meaningful tasks contributing to the improvement of local institutions, to the supply of food to these and to the members of the municipality. It has also strengthened community cohesion, since public workers could influence the ways how the surplus products of the work became distributed. By deciding to divide the produce to all residents, including poor Hungarian pensioners beyond those on the lowest income levels, who were mainly of Roma origin, they have strengthened the feeling of community solidarity. While public work in its form applied in Uszka has definitely strengthened social cohesion, it has not been increasing the contacts of locals beyond those in their

own situation, with the exception of those participating in trainings. Therefore, it could be seen to reproduce rather than brake the forces of local isolation.

Conclusion: Potential and shortcomings of workfare based programs

As argued above, municipalities have a substantial space for action to influence the conditions for the eligibility of individual people to receive social benefits. They also have a space of action in terms of creating opportunities for local citizens to cope with expenses and improve their resources, the creation of which provides them with opportunities to assume an active agency from their side.

The utility of public work for the marginalized had been closely related to the agency of local power holders and the local forces working for community cohesion. Municipal leaders and administrators in Uszka based their agency on the “triple principle” formulated by the mayor: positive actions to combat poverty, tolerance towards ethnic differences and zero-tolerance against asocial behavior.

Firstly, public work has been a major strategy from 1994 onwards utilized in Uszka to incorporate the long-term unemployed into the social security system. This was achieved by prioritizing the employment of those who otherwise would not have been eligible for social security payment and those with children to support. Furthermore, public work opportunities provided locally were filled with activities that benefited the community and contributed to the functioning of local institutions and public spaces.

However, public work alone could not solve the social needs of long-term unemployed. On the one hand, the municipality facilitates the emergence of entrepreneurial activities. As an example social land programmes helped to facilitate the growth of market-oriented cucumber growing, which led to the rise of a few entrepreneurial families who could offer alternative models in facing the destructive tendencies of alcoholism and the power of usurers. On the other hand, the municipality is active in attracting aid through diverse charity organisations to ease the situation of the needy.

Secondly, inter-ethnic tolerance was strengthened by universalistic principles of distribution. Differences between those above and below the poverty line are minimal in the community. Even those pensioners just above the poverty line, most of who are of Hungarian origin, live under severe constraints. Therefore, an innovative component of the local welfare state was the implementation of a universalistic distribution of the surplus food produced through the help of public work, rather than distributing according to strictly enforced means tested boundaries of poverty. This form of distribution was based on a decision made in consultation with the public workers, most of who are of Roma origin. Universalistic distribution contributed to inter-ethnic community cohesion and solidarity and gave meaning to public work for the participants.

Thirdly, the zero-tolerance principle against asocial behaviour increased the trust and credibility of the municipality externally as well as internally contributing to the improvement of work discipline.

It is important to add that, beyond municipal efforts, community cohesion emerged from the free Christian domination working in the municipality as early as in the 1970s. Belonging to the church also improved the trust vested in the community.

Municipality strategies in Uszka corroborate with what Rácz (2008) identified as a model of “producing municipalities taking over former agricultural cooperative functions”. Agricultural cooperatives under state socialism functioned as both large-scale producer organizations, but also as coordinators of small-scale agricultural production for their members and for the residents of the municipalities where they were functioning (Asztalos Morell, 1999). State transfers for public work are used innovatively in Uszka, a praxis that is in tune with what Rácz (2008) described in neighbouring municipalities. Lacking alternative investment opportunities, municipal leadership utilizes public work to expand the cultivation of abandoned agricultural land. In the meantime, agricultural know-how and support is extended to the households. As a third component, the market production of small producers is promoted.

Despite of the positive practices and achievements public work as an instrument to work against long-term unemployment has serious limitations. Local municipal administrations are restricted in their agency. Prevailing regulations and a lack of flexibility in access to developmental means, whether it be in relation to technological investments, local development or educational needs, does not give the potential of public labour to lead to either production capable of meeting concurrence or to the emergence of labour power with qualities ready to enter the open labour market.

Lastly, despite the socially sensitive utilization of public work by local municipalities, this institution in its current form and terms is not capable of functioning as an instrument of social security alone. The number of long-term unemployed exceeds by many times the number of available public labour positions. It can only be offered for a few months at a time, thereby providing an income below minimum wage. Socially sensitive municipalities such as Uszka need to lobby for further support, either from EU funding, alternative civil organizations or private donations, which indicates the dismantlement of the welfare state towards a rudimental neo-liberal and conservative form.

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ZOLTÁN BERÉNYI

Seeking Diamond, But Finding Moissanite: A Case Study On Democratic Political Culture In Contemporary Hungary¹

Introduction

Although since 1990 the indispensable institutional requirements of democracy have been in place in Hungary, studies revealed that Hungarian society in the past 25 years failed to gain sufficiently strong attachment to the norms and values a well functioning democracy requires. Other studies also indicated that these signs, indicating serious shortcomings in democratic political socialization are especially evident in the young generation. In looking for an explanation of this troubling phenomenon political scientists theorised that the low adherence to these values could be the consequence of citizens' low level of activity in voluntary organizations. Could active participation in a voluntary organization reduce the deficits in democratic political socialization?

In order to answer this question, this paper set out to examine to what extent the shortcomings of democratic political socialization could be detected among members of a student association ('Depolit') at the University of Debrecen, Hungary.

The institutional requirements of a working democracy

In their classic work 'The Civic Culture' Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have defined democracy as a political system in which ordinary citizens exercise control over elites, that is, when the government is held responsible to the citizenry, or in other words, when citizens can control the government through institutional channels based on mass participation (Almond and Verba 1965: 326). For control over elites to be possible, institutional means facilitating such restrictions on governmental power are expected to exist and codified by the legal system. Thus, fundamental human rights must be guaranteed by a legal system independent of the government, suffrage must be universal and equal, the state administration has to be accountable to the parliament whose members must be elected in free, fair and regularly held competitive elections. These requirements and institutional means are indeed indispensable and serve as the 'hardware' of democracy.

¹This paper is a short version of the research report prepared in 2014 within the framework of the 'MYPLACE: Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement' SSH-2010-5.1-1 FP7 research project

Almond and Verba have also emphasised that a democratic political system must provide opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making processes and to ensure that the government is held accountable by the citizenry (Almond and Verba 1965: 326). Other scholars have also argued that a democratic political system must provide full opportunities for citizens to represent their interest in a public setting and to channel those into decision making centres (Schattschneider 1960: 141; Dahl 1971; Verba et al. 1978; Barnes and Kaase 1979). Political scientists (Dahl 1971; Verba, Norman and Kim 1978: 1-2; Barnes, et al., 1979) have also emphasised that democracy must provide full opportunities for citizens to manifest their interests through individual and collective action.

A working democracy also requires citizens' attachment to democratic norms and values

In democratic political systems, it is of crucial importance that citizens have to perceive that the government could be held accountable and that they indeed can channel their interests into the decision-making centres (Finer, 1979; Mason 1995; Reisinger, 1997). Robert Putnam, in his book, 'Making Democracy Work' (1993) pointed out that it is the citizens who can make democracy work. That is, the mere existence of the formal institutional structure of democracy itself neither guarantees that people will be willing to use its institutions, nor ensures that these institutions will be used for the right purpose: to carry out restrictions on the power of governing elites. There are numerous examples in history when institutions of democracy were misused and abused by citizens who showed preference to anti-democratic over democratic norms in their interactions.

To put it bluntly, although the institutional requirements of democracy are indeed indispensable, for a system of democratic institutions to work, the values and norms of democracy requires must be deeply embedded in the citizenry. In their everyday interactions citizens must follow democratic norms, their actions and behaviour must be based on democratic values. Without a democratic political culture, the 'software of democracy', the 'hardware of democracy' the institutional machinery of democracy could not work.

Democratic political socialization

However, as McClosky (1964: 375-76) has pointed out, we are not born with democratic values. These elements of the democratic political culture could only be acquired in the process of political socialization. But where can democratic values most effectively be learned? What are the primary spheres of political socialization?

In a classical work about American democracy Alexis de Tocqueville emphasised that for democracy to work a number of non-governmental sub-political institutions are also required through which the citizenry can learn democratic values, that is, these organisations can be the schools of democracy (Tocqueville 1966: 485-488). In the field of democratic political socialization several studies has pointed out that there is a tight reciprocal relationship between levels of civic engagement in voluntary organizations and the attachment to democratic values (Stolle and Rochon 1998; Putnam 1993; Brehm and Rahn 1997). The greater trust that citizens hold for others, the more likely they are to participate; the more citizens participate in their communities, the more they learn to trust others. People who participate extensively in their communities are likely to have highly positive beliefs about the helpfulness, trustworthiness and fairness of others. Moreover, there are scholars who argue that trust in other people and democratic institutions go together (Inglehart 1990; Muller and Seligson 1994).

The deficits of democratic political socialization in post-1989 Hungary

After the establishment of constitutional democracy in Hungary, it was expected that the appropriate environment for democratic political socialization will ensure the increasing attachment of citizens to democratic norms and values. Studies have revealed that Hungarian society in the past 23 years has shown a consistently low level of adherence to the norms of reciprocity and assistance. Members of Hungarian society showed low level of tolerance; low level of willingness to restrain ego-centric behaviour; low level of willingness to engage in cooperation; low level of acceptance of the equitable treatment of others; low level of interpersonal and institutional trust; low level of trust in the horizontal networks of social interaction; low level of respect for the law and high level of dissatisfaction with democracy (Berényi 2001; 2007; Giczi and Sik 2009; Plasser and Ulram 1996). In other words, attachment to democratic values remained consistently low in Hungary. Moreover, in the past 7 years a significant and growing proportion of citizens even started to show preference to non-democratic set of values. These data have clearly indicated the significant shortcomings of democratic political socialization in Hungary. This recent phenomenon has seemed to validate those earlier studies that warned about the

detrimental effects of the extremely low level of activity of citizens in civil organizations on the democratic political socialization in Hungary (Berényi 1999; 2001).

An international comparative research has found in 2009 that in Europe Hungarians have the second lowest participation and activity rate in civil organizations (Giczi and Sik 2009). Although the number of registered civil organizations has increased in post-1989 Hungary, these play insignificant role in the political socialization of the young generation. As Hungarian scholars have pointed out, only a very small fraction, 6-10% of the young generation is a member of either registered civil organizations or member of communities and 70% of young people do not even have informal connections to registered civil organizations. Studies have also revealed that the shortcomings of democratic political socialization are even more apparent in the younger generation (Stumpf 1995: 110–121; Szabó and Örkény 1998: 95–128; Gázsó 2003; Csákó et. al 2000).

The research objectives of this paper

The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether the significant shortcomings of democratic political socialization in the young generation in Hungary could be detected among the members of a voluntary organization formed by political science students of the second largest university, the University of Debrecen. More specifically, the research was carried out to explore how group members relate to the following values: tolerance; reciprocity and assistance; self-restraining of egocentric behaviour; cooperation and compromise; rule of the law; equitable treatment of others; solidarity and interest towards public affairs; trust (personal and institutional).

The secondary objective of the research was to explore how Depolit members see significant events in Hungarian history and evaluate the democratic conditions and institutional processes within the institutional framework of the post-1990 Hungarian constitutional democracy.

Several national scale researches in Hungary have indicated that the level of activity of young Hungarians in civil organizations is even lower that of the level activity of the adult population (Gázsó and Laki 2004; Bauer et al, 2005). In 2005, a national scale research found that less than 15% of young people were a member of organizations in Hungary and only 2% of them was participating in the activities of the student organization or trade unions (Bauer et al, 2005). 2007 researches on participation of young Hungarians in organizations found that 70 per cent of them have not had any contact with organizations. Those young people who were members of organizations mostly participated in sport associations and student organizations (Gáti 2010).

Considering that, it could be stated that Depolit members belong to the fraction of those young Hungarians who are active members of a voluntary organization. As it was earlier noted, political scientists argue that activity in civil organizations could improve one's attachment to democratic norms and values. The main reason for selecting this group for the subject of the research was that the examination of the

level of attachment of Depolit members to these values and norms offered a good opportunity to test this theory.

Methods

The name of the voluntary organization group is: Depolit (Association of University Students Studying Political Science in Debrecen). The Depolit was founded in 2005 and operated continuously ever since. The number of members of Depolit has fluctuated around 25-30 in the past years. Today the association has 28 members. The association is not affiliated with any political party of Hungary.

Contact with the leadership of Depolit was made in May 2012. However, fieldwork started later than it was originally planned. Instead of July 2012, it has actually started only in September 2012. During the summer of 2012, there was no activity in Depolit. I contacted the leadership of the group in August 2012. They were very approachable. They also showed interest in the participation in the research.

At their invitation, I have participated at their earliest official meeting in September 2012, where I was given the opportunity to introduce the MyPlace EU 7th Framework project to Depolit members. The reaction of the members of the group was supportive. They all agreed to cooperate. They allowed me to be present at their meetings. I was also authorised to make recordings as well. During the course of the research, no serious drawback in cooperation was experienced. The prevailing method of the investigation was participant observation. I have attended their meetings, I was also frequently present at their everyday conversations at the university. I have also conducted a series of semi-structured interviews. All audio records of the semi-structured interviews were transcribed. After the collection of data, a qualitative analysis was carried out.

The group has organised numerous successful public meetings and lectures so far at the university; attended a national commemoration of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest. They have invited renowned politicians and held shared discussions with them. Members of the group have also participated in discussions and student demonstrations related to the end of 2013 student protests in Hungary.

In order to reveal, to what extent the shortcomings of democratic political socialization of young Hungarians could be detected among the members of Depolit a number of semi-structured interviews were conducted. In agreement with the interviewed persons, their names were fictionalized and in the latter sections of this paper, these fictional names are used. Interviews were carried out to explore the interviewed person's view on the following topics:

- Own participation in Depolit
- The evaluation of the activity of Depolit by the interviewed person
- Links between the interviewed person's own activism and that of his/her parents, siblings, and the extended family.

- Political heritage/legacies
- Definition of the Hungarian nation
- Norm-breaking behaviour; social justice
- Political institutions and freedom

The preliminary analysis of the data acquired in 2012 has indicated that, on the one hand, members of Depolit show strong attachment to democratic norms and values. On the other hand, results of the data analysis also revealed that Depolit members are very critical of the post-1990 Hungarian political and economic system.

In order to acquire more in-depth information about the basis of that criticism, a subsequent round of semi-structured interviews was conducted. The objective of these interviews was to reveal more details of the views of Depolit members on the democratic conditions and institutional processes of the contemporary Hungarian political system. With this objective in mind, the following themes were explored:

- Critical media
- Civil society
- Civil society participatory environment
- Freedom of speech
- Respect for law
- Access to justice

The University of Debrecen is the second largest university both in size of students and staff in Hungary. It has about 35.000 students. Most of these students are coming to the university from the settlements of Northern and Eastern Hungary, where in the past 24 years the average income of families has been 15-20% lower and unemployment higher than the national average. The majority of students are coming from lower middle class families that were most hard hit by the 2008 economic crisis. As most of the members of Depolit are studying for a BA in Political Science, they meet almost every day of the week. They also frequently go out in smaller groups during their free time.

Key Findings

In the following, the main findings revealed by the analysis of the collected data will be outlined.

Participation and activity of Depolit members

The majority of the members of the group do not participate in other voluntary organisations. Some of them had participated in student organisations in their secondary school. The reasons why the majority of them decided to participate in the activities of the Depolit were that they are all interested in politics and want to get

involved somehow in public affairs. Besides, they also want to join a group that would provide good company. As Ilknur put it: 'I think, it is a good thing to be a part of an organisation because this would give you a sense of belonging'. Jenke has also expressed this opinion in a similar way: 'Being a member [of an organisation] is healthier than not being [a member]. I feel I know more about public affairs [because I am a member of Depolit]'

Although the group has a Facebook page and they are using it for keeping contact with group members, the dominant form of participation in Depolit is face-to-face. Since the majority of the members of the group study political science at the University of Debrecen, they meet almost every day of the week. They also discuss with one another current political events almost every day of the week. More formal meetings of the group are less frequent. The frequency of those formal meetings depends on the actual scheduling of events organised by the group. On average, in every month there is at least one formal occasion when they meet one another. These could be discussions with guests invited by the group, organisational meetings of the Depolit, field trips or participation in important political or social events.

Depolit as an organization in the eyes of its members

Depolit members generally think that their organization is democratic. There is a formal hierarchy of leadership in the group. Depolit leaders are elected democratically. None of the respondents was able to mention even one occasion when those in the leadership attempted to use their position for personal advancement or tried to force something on the group. They are all convinced that applying democratic principles in the organization and management of the affairs of the group is the best possible method. Depolit maintains contacts with the national level association of political science students. However, according to current Depolit leaders and formal Depolit organisers, this contact has always been very loose and weak. In their experience, those in the leadership of the national association are frequently treating organizations in the countryside with some aristocratic disdain. As a consequence contact with the national association is limited to the leader's occasional visit to the annual meetings in Budapest. Depolit's leadership almost proudly stated that they never received any assistance from the national association, and they do not expect to do so any time in the future.

All interviewed group members emphasised that the democratic atmosphere in the group is very strong. None of the new members have mentioned anything that would have suggested that the older members of the group tend to be distrustful towards them. On the contrary, they emphasised that new members are accepted very easily, and the leadership of the group is very responsive to occasional criticism. They all claimed to be proud members of Depolit. All of them maintained that members of their family clearly approve their participation. Only one member indicated that his

family is indifferent about his membership. Two of the respondents have mentioned that their family has encouraged them to be a member of other voluntary organizations as well.

All of the respondents said they definitely trust their fellow Depolit members. As Kartal noted: 'Most of us [in Depolit] are good buddies here. If you meet almost every day of the week you get to know each other. Trust? Yes, I trust them, but not blindly, of course'. However, to the question whether their participation in the Depolit increased either the level of their general interpersonal trust, or their trust in institutions in Hungary, none of them answered positively. Tarhos, for instance, when talking about problems in contemporary Hungary has succinctly defined his criteria of placing trust in state institutions: 'People only trust the state and the justice system when they consider to be just and effective. This is not true in Hungary' (Tarhos). This would suggest that the positive experiences accumulated in the participation of Depolit are insufficient for increasing their general trust in people and institutions. Depolit members were also very unconvinced about the importance of their activity for the local community of Debrecen. They frequently mentioned in the interviews that they see Depolit to be an organization that is too small for exerting an effect on the local community of the university or the local society of Debrecen. The opinion of Bars is a typical representation of such view: 'We are a small organization. If I may say so, we are just too small to influence anything, be it either in the university or in Debrecen'.

Depolit members on Hungarian society

In the interviews, Depolit members have expressed grave concerns about social tensions and problems in contemporary Hungarian society. Several quotes from the interviews clearly indicate this: 'Hungarian society is disintegrating, inequalities are extreme, tensions are very high' (Zovát); Many of the respondents have specifically indicated that they also concerned about the general negative atmosphere they perceived in Hungary: 'Crime rate is very high, people are brutally pessimist, I saw videos in the news and I was horrified [by what I saw]' (Géla); 'There is no trust in the future, nobody smiles on the streets, may be one out of a hundred people is smiling. Only foreigners are happy and smiling' (Arika); 'Teenagers, ... people are depressed, apathetic' (Estilla).

Some of the respondents clearly realized that a more cohesive Hungarian society would require a higher level of interpersonal and inter group trust, and a higher level of tolerance. By arguing that compromise-oriented attitude is preferable, Dele stated: 'being oriented for a compromise would be reasonable. After all, the basis of political democracy is the willingness to reach a compromise. We are all making mistakes sometimes. In this way, we will be able to learn from our mistakes and find better solutions to problems'. Estilla has also pointed out to the desirability of such an attitude:

Politicians must be able to carry out a compromise with one another. On the other hand, I do not know why people expect that. In their everyday life, they seem to be unable to make compromises. People are very individualistic. Politicians should be a good example for society by showing that they can make a compromise. This could be a positive example for society. It would help the common people to cooperate with one another.

Csenge, talking about the frequent occurrence of selfish behaviour in contemporary Hungary, noted: 'We do not care about one another'. Other members of the group also emphasised: 'People neither trust one another, nor the institutions. The government does not trust the people and I can understand why' (Jenke); 'If my horse died, let's kill the horse of my neighbour as well – that is the common attitude [of the people]' (Kartal); 'The value system is upside down. If a kid gets an F in school his father does not discipline him but goes to the school to beat the teacher' (Ilknur); 'It is our great mistake that they [elites in power] let the Hungarian people to become less intelligent and economic problems are nothing compared to social problems ... and unfortunately, people today [in Hungary] are lazy and passive' (Dele). 'The Hungarian justice system is neither just, not effective and it is very slow. You might rather call it the Hungarian "injustice system"'.

Today people in Hungary and ... especially young people are extremely passive and this is a bad thing. Everybody is worried about something, people struggle with numerous problems. They keep complaining about everything. However, on the other hand they do not participate in anything, they do not try to resist ... in my view Hungarian society is sick' (Estilla).

One of the most noticeable characteristic feature of such views is that the respondents clearly blame Hungarian citizens for their harmful attitudes towards each other. In none of these views appears the 'the decent people vs the evil state' simplified view. On the contrary: in these typical views the citizens appear as inactive, lazy and unintelligent, who are incapable of understanding that without cooperation they could not possibly hope to change things for the better. These views also reflect the high level of frustration of Depolit members.

All group members have indicated that they despise racism. As Csenge, talking about anti-semitism noted: 'When I hear that some idiot people say, "dirty Jew" I feel [so disgusted by that attitude] that I feel I have to vomit'. However, generalised prejudice towards Roma people was also detected among group members: 'Gypsies generally speaking do not want to assimilate to the Hungarian society. They do not want to do that' (Estilla); 'Gypsies learned to speak Hungarian, learned how to read but not to write. They will never – and I mean, a majority of them – write' (Petend); 'Americans and Europeans think that Gypsies are originated from Hungary and this is very frustrating' (Csenge);

When I have asked them about their reasons behind such statements, all of them brought up numerous negative personal experiences. Ilknur was one of them who was especially emotional:

Gypsies are being discriminated in Hungary? That is simply ridiculous! I grew up on a street full of Gypsy families. We [she and her family] still live there. Don't anyone tell me that they [Gypsies] have not had the same choices to learn ... and now I attend a university ... [but] none of the kids from our street went even to secondary education. The thing is... that they are lazy. I am very irritated, when I hear [from Gypsies] that why should I work, I will rather have one more baby and I will live on social benefits. It disgusts me, because my parents never thought [about] that, they were working in their entire life. And I don't consider myself a racist by saying that.

Her opinion reflects strong statements about Roma people. Her last sentence indicates that she did not realise that regardless of how valid a personal experience might be, it could never serve as a basis for a generalised evaluation of all people in the group. In other words, she did not realise the amount of prejudice hidden in her opinion towards Roma.

The analysis of the data has also revealed a high level of frustration among Depolit members. This attitude on the one hand was primarily related to the perceived weak presence of meritocratic principles: 'If you have enough money, you can commit any crime and you will surely get away with it – as Ferenc Gyurcsány [former PM, who became rich in 1990]. There are no ethical standards [in use in contemporary Hungary]' (Rova). Frustration was also detectable in connection with low level of political efficacy and low level of respect for the law: 'As things are ... today [in Hungary] you can break the law if it promotes your individual achievement – the only thing is that you have to be careful' (Taros). On the other hand, frustration was associated with the feeling of powerlessness and a feeling of being ignorant about how to improve things: 'Parties here see each other not as competitors [for votes], but as enemies trying to destroy one another – it is frightening, they tear Hungarian society apart and I don't know how to stop that' (Estilla); 'People [in a democracy] must not be kept in stupidity. This is certainly not the case in Hungary today though. People are not intelligent enough [and] it serves the interest of politicians. Unintelligent people could be more easily manipulated' (Dele); 'I do not really trust that things will improve, I do not know what to do to improve things' (Géla); 'I don't know how a proper democracy could work really' (Jenke). 'We could not possibly know [from the news] what is happening around us, really. We do not actually know what is happening in the economy' (Arika).

These views indicate that the respondents believe that for a democratic system to work, citizens have to be well informed and intelligent. In the opinion of the interviewed these are primarily required to avoid being manipulated and being turned on one another by the political elites. However, these views also strongly suggest that

the responders themselves feel being uninformed and manipulated by the governing elites.

Depolit members on history and political heritage

All members of Depolit show significant interest in history and political science. However, all of them were very reluctant to give an answer to the question of what periods in Hungarian history would they mark out as good or bad ones. The majority of them used the following argument for avoiding a straight answer: since measuring what is good or bad is relative, as it depends on the value system and knowledge of the respondent, it makes no sense to mark a period in history as a good one. As one of them argued, 'What seems to be bad for a 21st century person was not necessarily considered to be bad for a 14th century person' (Bátor). Although their argument seems plausible at first, but they seemed to forget that there are universal human values by which it is indeed possible to evaluate whether a historical period was good or bad. e.g. being free and living in security is always better than the opposite, no matter of the historical circumstances.

Those who made references to good periods in Hungarian history almost exclusively mentioned the Middle Ages and justified their choice by the greatness of the Kingdom of Hungary. Few mentioned the end of the 19th century as an example, on the basis that it was an era of exceptional economic growth and modernisation. However, it is notable that none of them mentioned either the post-1990 era of constitutional democracy or periods in the 20th century. Some of them clearly stated that the 20th century was a grievous period in Hungarian history. As examples of particular catastrophic events, the Soviet crushing of the 1956 revolution and the Second World War was mentioned several times. Some of the respondents have also referred to the 1950s as the decade of Stalinism and cruel dictatorship in Hungary. As political science students, Depolit members have learned more about the communist era in Hungary than the majority of young people in Hungary. Yet, when having a discussion with them about the communist period in Hungarian history, some of them have not rejected that era of communist dictatorship. As Estilla put it: 'They say that the communist era was terrible, people had fewer rights. But at that time everybody had jobs; you were able to raise your kids. Safety takes precedence over freedom'. Zovát has put it in the following way: 'At that time there were at least full employment, security and order. I feel more sympathy towards the Kádár-era than towards the post-1990 era'.

The fact that (with the exception of Estilla and Zovát) almost all of them preferred to avoid identifying good periods in Hungarian history indicates that their otherwise openly declared attachment to democratic values and norms is not strong enough to apply them to the general evaluation of conditions required for acceptable human existence. In the case of Estilla and Zovát it became obvious when they, not realising

the interdependent nature of values, clearly declared that they prefer security and order to freedom. This superficial attachment to democratic values and norm became apparent when their evaluation of these values was placed in a historical context.

Many of the respondents indicated that the 'change of the regime' of 1990 is incomplete in Hungary and the corrupt elite of the communist era has managed to reproduce itself in the post-communist era. Some of the interviewed openly claimed that real change has not happened: 'There was no change of the regime in 1990' (Kartal). Another respondent also stated it with high emotional content:

You really believe that there was a change of the regime in 1990? After 45 years of communist dictatorship they changed a flag and proclaimed democracy. Great! I only laugh at people who believe that crap. There was only the change in the methodology [of ruling society], but nothing fundamental has happened (Tarhos)

Yet another member of the group expressed a similar opinion: 'In my village after 1990 the head of the communist agricultural cooperative became the new giant landowner; the former party secretary became the richest man in the village. The top leadership may have changed, but the whole clientelistic structure remained' (Kartal).

Depolit members on the post-1990 Hungarian political system

As it was already mentioned, practically all members of Depolit study political science or already acquired a degree in political science. They are familiar with the meaning of such notions as: political extremism, liberalism, conservatism, communism, social democracy, and fascism. However, many of them seriously doubted that the main characteristics of contemporary political movements in Hungary could be captured with these notions. Group members were also extremely cautious not to reveal their sympathy towards a particular political party or parties. Statements as 'I would rather not discuss that' (Géla); or 'Let's skip that' (Kartal); 'It is very difficult to express that by using the traditional political scale and terminology' (Bátor) were quite common. As a matter of fact, none of the group members revealed proudly his or her attachment to either of the current Hungarian political parties. It is probably not a coincidence that the majority of them do not like those movies and books that apparently carry intended political messages. In many of the discussions, the subject of how the modern media influence the political beliefs and behaviour of people has frequently come to the surface. When talking about the phenomena of mass emigration of job-seeking young Hungarians to the older member states of the European Union, Csenge has expressed her suspicion about the media: 'I feel that this is... artificially generated both by the media and certain elites ... to make people leave Hungary'. When talking about the typical attitudes of the citizens in Hungary Estilla has also noted: 'I sometimes think that people are intentionally shocked by the media'.

The analysis of the data uncovered that they are well aware of the formal, indispensable institutional requirements of democracy. Considering that it is notable that the majority of the respondents are aware that a working democracy requires more than just the presence of the indispensable institutional structure. They clearly expressed their doubts whether the current political system in Hungary satisfies those additional requirements. 'It does not matter, that our constitution is democratic – the government is not for the people, but only for themselves' (Rova). Zovát has put it the following way:

There is a genuine democracy today in Hungary? You must be joking... A well functioning [democratic] state would require a strong middle class, but there is no middle class in Hungary today, only very rich and very poor people. And poor people are especially afraid to protest, because they will lose their jobs.

Taros, expressing a similar view, also noted: 'Yes, you can go to vote – but in reality there is no selection of choice of political parties'. Giving voice to overt pessimism, Bars has also maintained: 'Things are not getting better. Things are getting worse in Hungary. If you look behind the screen, there is no democracy in Hungary – there never was'.

These views not only indicate that they would want a working democracy and see a serious problem of the post-1990 political system falling short of its requirements but also that they are very disappointed because of that. When I asked them about what, in their view, is the main reason that citizens are unable to control governmental elites, many of the respondents indicated that the political elite and political parties in Hungary have much more power and influence than they should have. Many of the Depolit members maintained that although a competitive party system is an indispensable requirement for a democracy, parties exert a very negative effect on the cohesion of Hungarian society and they are looking at parties with aversion for that. The following two citations well illustrate this sentiment: 'Political parties dominate everything in Hungarian society, they want to control everything – everything is over-politicised and it is disgusting' (Ilknur); 'Parties here see each other not as competitors [for votes], but as enemies trying to destroy one another – it is frightening, they tear Hungarian society apart and I don't know how to stop that' (Arika).

The preliminary analysis of the initial amount of data in early 2013 has indicated that Depolit members have grave doubts about the democratic nature of the post-1990 Hungarian political system. For further investigating the views of Depolit members during the spring of 2013 a subsequent round of data collection was designed and completed. It involved audio-recordings of discussions and semi-structured interviews. The specific objective of these was to acquire more in depth knowledge of the opinions of Depolit members on the democratic conditions and institutional processes of today's Hungary. The results of the analysis of this data will be outlined in the following sections.

Depolit members on critical media

The objective of examining this topic was to reveal how Depolit members see that of the major media institutions, how many routinely criticize the government. The dominant opinion of Depolit members was that some important media institutions routinely criticise the government but there are other important outlets that never do: 'Every government has a media of its own that glorifies it, regardless of governmental actions' (Ilknur); 'All government has a media of its own, but this is not good, even those journalists who work for them should not be impartial' (Géla); 'There are media that continuously criticise the government, e.g. ATV, Nepszava' (Bátor).

Some Depolit members also gave voice to their concern about unconditional censorship: 'All government would need a vigorous critique'. (Tarhos). 'If there is a media that nods to everything, that ... endangers appropriate criticism, since it influences the audience' (Csenge).

What we would need is a genuine freedom of speech and opinion. For a proper decision, I would like to know the major motives behind actions. To get to know opposing views on issues would increase transparency and it is also badly needed ... news are always shaped by the view of the journalist. However, the higher the number of available sources [of information] ... the broader the scale of opinions is ... and [media] consumers need those opinions to evaluate those different viewpoints (Arika)

Depolit members on civil society

The members of the group have several times expressed that in their view in a democracy it would be very important that civil organizations be able to control the governing elites. 'The government should have nothing to do with civil organisations. Civil organisations should control the political sphere. Democracy is about the people and the people should have the opportunity to realise their interest' (Bars); 'Society should be allowed to organise itself as freely as possible' (Tarhos); 'In a democratic political culture it would be best if the widest possible varieties of civil organizations would be able to exist and operate' (Csenge).

The objective of the examination of this topic was to reveal the views of Depolit members on whether major civil society organizations were routinely consulted by policy-makers on policies relevant to their members. Respondents clearly stated that providing opportunities for civil organizations to channel their opinion into decision making centres would be desirable: 'Listening to the voice of the experts would definitely help politicians to draft better policy proposals' (Bars); 'The best thing would be to take into consideration the relevant expert opinions and not political considerations' (Tarhos); 'The important thing would be to allow open channels for

the opinion of experts to decision-making centres because only in this way could citizens influence decision-making processes' (Rova); 'There are some decisions what society accepts without questioning. If civic organisations would be able to participate in decision-making processes than the transparency of matters would-be improved' (Kartal). Arika pointed out the value of such input for decision-making by claiming:

I disagree with those who say that asking the opinion of numerous civil organisations on issues is not a good thing because it makes decision-making long and difficult. Of course, it is true that these organisations could look at problems from their own point of view. However, judging a problem from different points of view improves our chances to find the best solution for a problem. And they must not forget that there is also a difference of opinions among experts. In any case, finding a good solution for the problems requires examining issues from different points of view.

Depolit members also frequently mentioned that civil society is weak and unable to perform this task in Hungary. The following citation from Ilknur characteristically represents such an opinion:

It is not clear for me that civil organizations in Hungary are weak and die in a relatively short period of time because they lack persistence and do not persevere or because the government kills them? It is not clear to me why is that there is no strong civil society in Hungary, but the fact is, that it is very weak.

Some of the respondents believed that the cause of the weakness of civil society is that governments in post-1990 Hungary prevent them to channel the interest of their members into the decision-making centres. Bars saw in that the continuity of general practice of the communist era: 'In post-communist countries it is very characteristic that previously the state did everything [and] that practice is what is left to us'. The dominant opinion of Depolit members was that there is a high degree of insulation of the government from societal input in Hungary: 'I don't think that expert civic organisations are able to influence decision-making processes' (Tarhos); 'I think, it will be the best to consider the opinion of those civic organisations which have competence. However, in many cases in Hungary the opinion of those organisations matter which have the most money... and it does not matter that some of them are full of real idiots' (Dele); 'I don't think that it is a good thing when the size and the wealth of organisations and not their expertise determines their ability to influence politicians' (Csenge).

Kartal and Zovát have both expressed their views using sarcasm: 'Well, they surely ask the experts, but in reality, they don't give a shit. I mean, there is no guarantee that the opinion of experts will be taken into consideration' (Kartal); 'Sometimes something

extraordinary happens: the political leadership becomes curious, what experts might think' (Zovát). Others also expressed similar views: 'There is always something the government refers to, but they do not really take into consideration all expert opinions' (Tarhos); 'Yes of course [they say] that the opinions of civil organizations are taken into consideration, but it does not interest them [the government] really' (Estilla). 'I don't think, that there is an open forum for public discussions in Hungary. However, if these do exist, they do not work. Anyway, the voice of the people is not taken into account' (Arika). 'Government elite only consults with their own people and hardly with others' (Bátor).

Depolit members on civil society as a participatory environment

The objective of the examination of this topic was to reveal how Depolit members see the participatory attitude of citizens towards civil society organizations. The dominant opinion of Depolit members was that there are many diverse voluntary associations, political and non political, but the majority of adult citizens are not active in them: 'Civic organisations should be set up voluntarily. If these organisations are set up, but after that nobody is active in them, then in reality, they don't do anything' (Kartal). 'Unlike in Hungary, people in Western Europe are more active in civic organisations' (Arika).

It was just yesterday that I happened to see statistical information on that. According to that, young people in Hungary between the age of 18 and 29 are not active at all. This is a sad thing, because this would be the generation with the highest activity. Usually, after people get older than 29 years, they start a family and [their] family will take up most of their time (Bars).

In general, we see in Hungary today that the political parties dominate everything in society. However, the reason for that is that people are passive. Most of them are not interested in public affairs and even if they do, they don't do anything for the establishment of a really democratic state (Csenge).

Depolit members would favour a situation when there are many diverse voluntary associations, political and non -political exist and whe
adult citizens to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them, if not more. In the following, quotes are provided to illustrate some of their views: 'Having a dense network of civic organisations improves social cohesion. In addition to that, life is more stimulating in such a society. A dense network of civil organizations also improves people's tolerance' (Dele); 'Democratic political socialisation would require people to be active in these organisations' (Tarhos).

Depolit members on freedom of speech

The objective of the examination of this topic was to reveal what Depolit members think about freedom of speech in Hungary, more specifically, the opportunities for citizens to discuss openly political issues in private homes and in public spaces. Depolit members were all aware of how indispensable is the freedom of speech in a democracy. As Kartal noted: 'Expressions of political opinions should be fully respected by the government. Freedom of speech among private citizens in their homes and in public spaces must not be restricted for any criticism to appear openly'. The dominant opinion of Depolit members was that there are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, but these are predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. However, as a rule, there are no interventions and prohibitions on political statements coming from the government in contemporary Hungary. By representing a different perspective, Bars stated: 'Well, retribution of discussions is a concept invented specifically for Hungary'. Rova also claimed: 'Yeah, you can tell anybody your opinion but that is all. I mean, nobody cares about people's opinion'. Estilla expressed her view on that with less sarcasm: 'Contrary to what is it today in Hungary, it would be best for people to be able to speak openly and without fear of any retribution. This is an indispensable requirement of a genuine democracy'. Bátor also expressed his opinion on the subject in a more elaborate manner:

If someone stands up for his/her political opinion nowadays in Hungary, then what usually happens is that this man is left alone. I mean, the authorities will not bother him. Nevertheless, on the other hand, sometimes it happens that such a person is persecuted by the tax authorities and the government tries to make his/her life more difficult'.

Depolit members on respect for law

The objective of the examination of this topic was to reveal whether in the views of group members, public officials are impartial and respect the law in the performance of their functions. In the discussions respect for the law was understood as the effective control of public servants so that policy implementation in individual cases could be characterized by impartiality whereas undue bias and corruption could be sanctioned.

The dominant opinion of Depolit members was that equality before the law is an extremely important condition for a working democracy: 'Equality before the law would be extremely important. The court should provide the same rights for its citizens regardless whether they are wealthy or not' (Tarhos); 'Politicians are making the law. So it would be a very nice thing if they would also respect the law' (Arika); 'I

reckon, the most important thing would be to prevent the corruption of judges. If the courts are corrupted, everything goes down the drain. If there is no equality before the law, there is no rule of the law' (Dele).

However, in their view this is not the situation in contemporary Hungary. In their opinion, the law is weakly respected by both politicians and the public officials. This view was clearly expressed by Bátor:

Yeah, corruption in public administration is rampant. I mean, if by corruption we also mean giving a job to my relative... then of course, there is corruption [in Hungary]. On the other hand, I believe that corruption in public administration is done without the direct involvement of money'

In their view corruption and discriminatory practices are common in most parts of the public administration: 'I reckon, there is corruption to a great extent in public administration in Hungary today. What is worse, it is ever-growing' (Estilla); 'Today in Hungary you can buy anything with money. I don't think that the law is respected fully by public officials. There is corruption in public administration, there could be no question about that' (Ilknur); 'This is one of the worst things in Hungary today' (Tarhos); 'Public servicemen take into consideration the respect for the law but only to a very small degree' (Askam). 'People without money and influence are not able to bribe the prosecutor, or the judge. If we could eliminate corruption, people who are not so well off would have a better chance to receive justice in Hungary' (Torzon).

Depolit members on access to justice

The objective of the examination of this topic was to reveal how Depolit members see the extent to which trials are fair, citizens can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, and citizens have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities have violated their lawful rights, including the rights to counsel, defence, and appeal as well as presumption of innocence and protection from ex post facto laws. The analysis of data revealed that Depolit members are well aware of how indispensable is to provide citizens access to justice. As Csenge put it: 'The justice system must operate on the basis of equality before the law. It would be crucially important that citizens will be able to seek legal redress at the court effectively and quickly'; 'There are other countries where the justice system is working and things are in general much better than in Hungary. And I don't think, that it is a coincidence' (Kartal).

The dominant opinion of Depolit members was that access to justice is mostly respected by the public authorities, but at the same time citizen's means of effective petition and redress are limited by the slow operation of the court system: 'One thing is for sure, the operation of the Hungarian justice system is very sluggish' (Dele). In the following, a few quotes are provided to illustrate some of these views:

The justice system is basically independent from the government, but again, there are those cases when one can see that this is not entirely true. I would prefer the American justice system. Also, the Hungarian justice system is extremely sluggish in operation. Why are they not able to make a decision in a relatively short time even in simple cases?' (Bars).

Ilknur also stated that: 'You can buy anything with money. Decisions are not biased, but to say that in Hungary today the court system operates effectively would not be true. There are extremely lengthy trials'. Others pointed out to the fact that anyone could be kept in arrest for years while waiting for trial: 'I don't reckon, that the Hungarian justice system is effective. One is forced to wait in arrest for two and three years for trial. To call that ineffective is an understatement' (Estilla). Arika has also pointed out to the scale of bureaucracy that people seeking justice have to overcome: 'I don't think, that there is a chance of making the idea of a corruption free justice system a reality in Hungary. There must be much less bureaucracy. Today the court system in Hungary is too complicated'.

Conclusions

In the field of political socialization several scholars pointed out that we are not born with democratic values (McClosky 1964; Putnam, 1993; Muller and Seligson 1994; Plasser and Ulram 1996). Therefore, for the institutions of a democratic system to work, people must gain attachment to democratic values and norms. Citizens have to learn to tolerate existing differences in society; they have to understand that since democracy requires complex obligations they must not, in all circumstances, try to follow only their own self-interest. In other words, they have to learn to exercise self-restraint and to appreciate the value of mutually beneficial cooperation. Citizens must also have to learn to value the rule of the law, solidarity and the equitable treatment of others. They have to learn to appreciate those who not only show active interest towards public affairs but who are also inclined to be active in their community. They have to learn to value not only their own freedom, but also those conditions that provide opportunities for freedom for their fellow citizens in society. For a working democracy, people also have to trust one another and the institutions of democracy to the extent that is sufficient for making them willing to use those institutions for resolving their interest conflicts. Citizens also have to learn to appreciate cooperation through competition. Political scientists also argue that activity in civil organizations could improve one's attachment to democratic norms and values (Putnam 1993; Muller and Seligson 1994; Misher and Rose 1997; Reisinger 1997; Csákó et. al. 2000). The examination of the level of attachment of Depolit members to these values and norms offered a good opportunity to test the validity of this concept.

The analysis of data collected indicated that Depolit members show signs of higher attachment to democratic norms and values than average young Hungarians. While intolerance and prejudice against minorities have increased in recent years in Hungarian society, Depolit members despise racism and discrimination and emphasize the benefits of tolerating differences. Similarly, while Hungarian society shows very high level of individualism, low levels of willingness to restrain egocentric behaviour and low levels of readiness to engage in cooperation, Depolit members clearly see the value of cooperation, reject the passivity of Hungarian citizens and blame them for being too individualistic, selfish and not being sufficiently active in public affairs. They also strongly attach importance to the value of equality before the law, and the equitable treatment of others. While in Hungarian society law abidance is very low, Depolit members strongly reject anti-meritocratic principles and law breaking behaviour and they apply democratic and meritocratic principles in the management of their association.

This study has also found however, that some of the typical signs indicating superficial democratic political socialization could also be detected in the case of Depolit. This superficial attachment to democratic values and norms had become apparent when they were asked to identify good periods in Hungarian history. Almost all of them preferred to avoid doing this by referring to the contingent nature of values and norms. Although values and norms are not the same in every culture and historical period, nevertheless, there are fundamental human values that must be respected in every culture and in every historical period. This reluctant attitude indicates that their attachment to democratic values and norms is not strong enough to apply them to the general evaluation of conditions required for acceptable human existence.

Their unsound adherence to these values also became manifest when some group members openly expressed generalised distrust towards Gypsies and stressed that they do not consider themselves to be intolerant because of that. Interpersonal trust within the group is high, new members are easily accepted. Group members also trust their elected leaders. On the other hand, however, it seems that this high level of in-group trust at micro-societal level is not enough for group members to acquire generalized interpersonal trust at the macro-societal level. Could it be that discouraging experiences in macro-societal level prevent the induction of generalized interpersonal and institutional trust? To answer that question would require additional research.

Yet another indicator of their superficial democratic political socialization is that although they stress the importance of activity in public affairs, they do not believe that through the series of ongoing small-scale activities, significant large-scale changes could be achieved in society. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that they do not believe that the activity of their group could exert any effect on either the student community of the university or the local community of the city of Debrecen. Their activism is limited to organizing public talks, discussing political issues among themselves and commemorating significant national events. Their distrust in the efficacy of organised public action became apparent in December 2013. For weeks, students at all universities and secondary schools were protesting all over in Hungary. Despite the fact that many of the Depolit members were participating at the student protests, they

have not even considered using their organization to support the case of students. Also, when talking about the cause of the low level of activity of Hungarian citizens in public affairs they almost exclusively referred to the detrimental conditions and restricted opportunities for participation. While those conditions indeed do not foster participation in contemporary Hungary, blaming the conditions alone and ignoring people's subjective attitude of passivity is surely a one-sided approach and serves to ignore the responsibility of citizens.

This study has also found that none of the group members see the post-1990 era of constitutional democracy to be a good period in Hungarian history. None of them mentioned membership in the European Union to be a momentous achievement for the country. Some of them even would prefer job security to freedom and, as a consequence, would prefer the late communist era to the current political system.

Group members also strongly criticise the contemporary democratic political system. None of them echoed the mistaken but widespread view in Hungarian society that the plurality of political parties and the presence of free elections are sufficient for a political system called democracy. Many of them claimed that since this political system does not work as a democracy it should not be called that. However, none of the group members would prefer a dictatorship to a democracy and would not support a political party aiming to establish that.

This general opinion of Depolit members is yet again a sign of their commitment to democratic norms and values. And it is this commitment is a basis of their criticism of the contemporary political system. As a matter of fact, many of the group members see the post-1990 political system in Hungary as a kind of continuation of the previous communist dictatorship. They see it as a corrupt, closed elitist system, which does not give opportunities for genuine participation in the decision-making processes. Their opinion brings into perspective the words of David Mason (1995: 385) who after the establishment of constitutional democracies in Eastern Europe has argued that

... participation and representativeness are important aspects of democratic politics in established democracies and probably even more so in fledgling ones... since democratic legitimacy and stability can probably be maintained only if the governments remain broadly responsive to and representative of the populations – or at least be perceived as such.

It became evidently clear from the analysed data that the majority of Depolit members do not perceive the government in that way. In analysing the conditions required for the mechanism of system-justification to work, that is, when citizens are feeling motivated to defend and support a political system that is disadvantageous for them John T. Jost (2003: 284) has argued, that people only continue to accept the current system of decision-making until they believe that it offers them at least some

believable opportunity to participate in those processes. In the light of the data analysed, the majority of Depolit members already seem to have passed that threshold.

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KARL BRUCKMEIER

Social Conflicts in the 21st Century – the Shadows of Global Environmental Change¹

Introduction: changing forms of social conflicts

The theme of this symposium, “Cultural Heritage and the Innovations of the Humanities in the 21st Century” includes difficult aspects as that of “Social Conflicts in the 21st Century – the Shadows of Global Environmental Change” for which it is not obvious what they include in terms of cultural heritage and humanities. The question, how to deal with new social conflicts can be answered in this perspective of cultural heritage and the new humanities as one that requires new ways of dealing with cultural heritage and innovative inter- and transdisciplinary thinking; such thinking is spreading in the humanities, in the social and natural sciences, and in the everyday sphere of lifeworld.

Social conflicts are no longer specific socio-cultural, ethnic, religious, political or economic conflicts, no longer clear in nature and scope, but become multi-faceted. The radicalization of social, cultural or political groups is not sufficient as their explanation; many people and social groups are involved, not only radicals. Manifold, political and other attitudes and interests are included. The normative implications of the term radicalization make it difficult as a diagnostic term to reveal the reasons of conflicts and explain conflict escalation. These new conflicts show the signs of the presently globalising modern society that has been called by Beck the global or “cosmopolitan risk society” (Beck 2002). Many of the conflicts have to do with environmental problems and, as the diagnosis of the risk society theory says, everyone can be involved in such conflicts, independent from class membership, social and economic status, political orientation and cultural self-perception.

The characteristic feature of such conflicts is, that they have several reasons and causes, social as well as ecological. Not always the main reasons become manifest in the actual conflicts or are articulated by the conflicting parties as the reasons why they are in conflict. Environmental or resource use conflicts can be masked as ethnic or economic conflicts, which seems to be the case with many, also violent conflicts in recent decades, also in Europe, e.g., in the civil war and war following the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. In this case the ethnic divisions and related conflicts, existing since the beginning of the state of Yugoslavia after the 1. World War, and the falling

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apart of the Communist regime masked more complex conflicts with further reasons, among that also scarcity and access to natural resources, e.g., in the Kosovo. The characterization of such conflicts as political is no longer adequate to denote their nature; they include political as well as further components and do not always allow for a political logic of conflict resolution.

Conflict research

Conflict research is not a homogenous field of research in the sense of a specialized discipline as found in academic science; it develops in changing forms of specialization and knowledge combinations that are described as inter- or transdisciplinary (Nowotny et al 2002). A well-known form of conflict research is the peace and conflict research that includes also environmental conflicts (Gleditsch 2004) as a specialized field of research, dealing with local, national, transboundary or international conflicts that are perceived as political conflicts and often include violence and military forms of interventions. This is not the only relevant field of research from which knowledge about the new conflicts is available. To understand the conflicts discussed here, conflict research needs to be broadened, becoming an interdisciplinary field of research where many facets of conflicts are to be studied. Complex social conflicts have various reasons and causes, as well in the lifeworld of people, as in the structures of societal systems, in the structures of power and forms of ownership, and in the ways humans deal with nature and use natural resources. Environment-related conflicts make it necessary to cross the boundaries between the humanities, the social and the natural sciences.

The conflict term needs to be discussed critically for the new complex conflicts. In academic conflict research dominate abstract and general definitions. Conflicts are often interpreted as dating back to different values or interests of actors. In the classical work of Rapoport (1960) conflicts are differentiated in fights (to overcome the other), games (to outwit the other) and debates (to change the views of the other). Instead of conflict also further terms associal dilemma, dispute, controversy, are used. A more detailed discussion of multi-causal and multi-scale environmental conflicts is found in the review by Stepanova and Bruckmeier (2013a) where the discussion of the conflict term is summarized as follows.

Definitions of environmental conflicts, such as “incompatible interaction between at least two actors over the use of natural resources or an environmental system, where one of the actors is damaged by the interaction, and the other actor intends or ignores this damage” (Mason et al 2007: 327) are general and vague, need to be specified with conflict typologies developing from empirical research. Such broad conflict terms give rise to controversies about the phenomena to subsume under the conflict term. Non-violent, small-scale and local conflicts often lack conflict indicators as organized actors, legal and political disputes and decisions, public attention, violence, governmental action. Conflicts are often dealt with informally, without political decisions and as non-security issues, are not seen as public policy issues and thus not

requiring concerted action. The policy research on conflict, peace and security covers a part of environmental conflicts, but other conflicts that occur in semi-public, local and private spheres and in everyday life, are covered less. Environmental and resource use conflicts are often multi-dimensional. For such conflicts a process perspective is useful to study conflicts in their development and within their social and natural environment. Cultural views of conflicts vary between views of conflicts as taboos and conflicts as necessary components of social life. Even in culturally similar areas in Europe there are significant differences in understanding, assessing and resolving conflicts in politics and everyday life.

General definitions need to be specified through more concrete aspects of conflicts, regarding the actors involved, e.g., as rights, interests, positions and strategies, values and worldviews (cf. Stepanova and Bruckmeier 2013b). The conflicts become always more complex, as the development and networking of social systems and modern societies themselves. Some of the knowledge and practical requirements for the analysis and resolution of the complex conflicts are found in recent conflict research, dispersed in several areas of specialization: in research on environmental and resource use conflicts (Bruckmeier 2005), in political conflict research (Dudouet 2006, Varisco 2010), in social-psychological research on conflicts and mediation (Bar-Tal 2009), and in some fields of economic and management research where the resolution of conflicts is described under the term of transformation, (Mason and Muller 2007), meaning the guided transformation of conflict into cooperation.

For many of the new conflicts discussed here the conventional forms of political conflict management and intervention of police or military, or juridical solutions of the conflicts through courts, are no longer adequate. Many of the conflicts are local, non-violent conflicts at low intensity that can be dealt with in such informal ways of conflict resolution as mediation or through negotiations between the groups involved. The general approach to resolve the conflicts is through their gradual transformation in cooperation of the conflicting parties. But the many forms and facets of such conflicts include also violent ones where violence happens in different forms, from militant protest to civil war and war. Scenarios of conflicts resulting from climate change give a rather dramatic picture of coming conflicts.

Climate change in the 21st century: a new state of nature – „war of all against all“

Violent and nonviolent conflicts resulting from climate change are paradigmatic examples for the new forms of conflicts emerging in the risk society, including wars, civil wars, and manifold peacefully mitigated conflicts. These conflicts result from the environmental catastrophes that humanity has evoked, unwillingly, with the path of development that the societies of the world have sooner or later entered, beginning about 500 years ago, called “modernisation”. Since about half of that time industrialisation is the dominant modernisation path, which is a direct cause for the climate catastrophe humanity is entering in the 21st century.

The rising average temperature on the planet, two degrees Celsius or more in two, 20th and 21st, centuries, is caused by a process that can be described simple in natural scientific terms as the rise of greenhouse gases, especially CO₂-emissions in the atmosphere. From the level of 275 ppm before the begin of industrialization greenhouse gases raised to 400 ppm in recent years. A reduction to 350 ppm is seen as necessary to prevent further dramatic climate change. But the outlook is, that the “heating of the atmosphere” is going on for longer time. In the last years about 35 billion tons of CO₂ have been emitted in the air every year. I do not report in detail here the knowledge that climate research has provided (summarized in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC) about the sources of emissions that include industry, but to a large degree also modern agriculture through methane emissions, the second important climate change gas. The phenomena of climate change that affect humans directly include: extreme weather situations; more strong storms as hurricanes; more dry seasons some parts of the world, especially in the “low latitude countries” in the tropical zone, and more wet seasons in others; rise of the sea level with more inundations in coastal areas and large parts of coastal lowland drowning in the sea. The further discussion is about forms, consequences and solutions of complex social conflicts resulting from climate change.

More than half of the global population lives close to the coast, about 60% in the zone from 0-100 km from the coastline. Two thirds of the so-called mega-cities of the world, cities with many millions of inhabitants, are directly located at the coast. What shall the people living there do, when their land is flooded and their houses are washed into the sea, when big cities are threatened by inundations, and many inhabitants lose their base of existence or can no longer be protected through dams and dykes, because these become too expensive (Yasuhara et al 2001)? Whatever will happen to the people, many conflicts are to be expected, already before millions of people are migrating or resettled. No country, no democratic or authoritarian political system, is prepared for climate change, in spite of all rhetorical commitments to climate policy. The first successful years of global climate policy, connected with the Montreal Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, have meanwhile ended in failure of new negotiations and policies, so that the aim to keep climate change within the level of 2 degrees Celsius is given up since years. Politically seen the fight against global warming seems to be lost for some time and the consequences can be anticipated as requiring conflict-prone adaptation to climate change.

In recent years the analysis and discussion of conflicts resulting from global environmental change, especially climate change, intensified in the international research of the IPCC. Anthropogenic climate change is seen in the ecological discourse as one of the main reasons for coming conflicts between and within countries. The books of the German social psychologist Harald Welzer „Climate wars - the reasons of killing in 21st century“ (2008) and of the Canadian military scientist Gwynne Dyer „Climate wars“ (2008) describe possible scenarios. Both authors see civil wars and wars because of global warming or climate change as more likely than peaceful solutions to climate related conflicts. Also the German Advisory Council on Global Change” has diagnosed, “Climate change strengthens mechanisms leading to

insecurity and violence” (WBGU 2007: 2). This abstract formulation translates in the book by Dyer, who uses the Hobbesian formulation for the state of nature as “a war of all against all”, in scenarios of possible climate wars. Welzer reflects about changing forms of violence in the past, present and future. Both authors describe potential consequences of global climate change starting from discussions of conflicts and catastrophes since the 1990s, when the world should have become more peaceful after the end of the East-West conformation with the collapse of East European socialism. But it seems that the “peace dividend” does not come, instead the countries of the world glide into new conflicts related to climate change and other environmental problems. Two wars about access to natural resources (1. and 2. Irak war), civil wars like that in former Yugoslavia, catastrophes like the genocide in Rwanda, and the conflict in Darfur seem to indicate that the world is entering in new regional conflicts where natural resources and environmental problems play an always greater role. The Darfur conflict is seen by Welzer and other authors as the first case of a civil war where climate change is one of causes.

Global environmental change in the forms of climate change, biodiversity reduction and land use change transforms into social conflicts through the involvement of social actors and groups, through manifold social causes and consequences that appear in these conflicts. Whereas in the 20th century environmental problems were dealt with mainly as such of pollution of air, water and soils and how to clean the poisoned environment, the 21st century is to become the one where global environmental change “dictates” development or limits it. The 20th century appeared in environmental history as the one of exponential growth in many areas - population growth, economic growth, growth of natural resource use, and growth of environmental pollution. The 21st century is to become the one where growth has to come to an end, either through concerted action in all countries, or, if this is not realized, in catastrophic forms, for which conflicts resulting from climate change can give examples. These conflicts appear as multi-causal, violent and non-violent, local, national and international conflicts, where the forms of conflicts we know from the past, do not provide any longer models and knowledge for preventing, de-escalating, managing or resolving conflicts.

Social conflicts in the 21st century

What can be said generally about conflicts in this century is that all spheres of social conflicts are influenced and changed through the ongoing processes of globalisation of modern economies and societies, also small-scale and local or regional conflicts are transformed through these processes into interconnecting multi-scale conflicts. Social conflicts appear in future often as complex conflicts with chains of interconnecting and reinforcing causes and consequences. This makes their diagnosis and the forms of conflict resolution complicated. It becomes controversial what the main reasons and causes are and how they interconnect.

- Multi-causal are such conflicts because no single reason or cause is sufficient as explanation. There is a complex interaction and reinforcement of many social, cultural, political, economic, ecological reasons and causes when, for example, agricultural production collapses in certain regions, with consequences of migration of people and fights for access to and redistribution of natural resources.
- Multi-scale are such conflicts because of the interaction of local, regional, national, international and global processes of social and ecological change. Climate change is a global phenomenon that results in many forms of conflicts that span from local to global levels. Also obviously local conflicts, in coastal fisheries for example the overfishing of local species, have connections to broader conflicts and appear, in the last analysis, as caused by global scarcity and overuse of natural resources.
- Many actors are involved in such conflicts and there is rarely a single and simple cleavage that separates the conflict parties in two groups with contrasting interests as traditionally assumed in politics, e.g., political differences between left wing or right wing parties and groups, or between economic and ecological interests and action. With the blending of multiple reasons and causes also several cleavages overlap and interact.
- Solutions in form of political action by governmental institutions can no longer be expected as the only and sufficient ones. Conflict mitigation requires, following the many forms, scales, causes and actors in the conflicts, a much broader spectrum for forms of intervention and action: much more managerial instruments stretching over different spheres of cultural, political, economic action. Many governmental and non-governmental organisations and civil society actors need to be involved in the resolution process.
- In the discourse of critical theory Honneth (2011) has diagnosed that the social conflict in modern society takes wild and anomic forms of aspiring recognition. Although not thought for the environmental conflicts, the formulation can, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied for the new environmental and resource use conflicts, where anomia is not resulting from seeking recognition, but from seeking to survive. It is not only a process of radicalization that results in conflicts; more complex processes and dissolving of boundaries between socially structured spheres of organized action are going on. In the European welfare states, until the end of the 20th century, it was possible to channel and manage social conflicts in the classical form of a class compromise, with the negotiations between labour unions and entrepreneurial organizations as the paradigmatic example. Conflicts that were for long time regulated nationally, as class conflicts in modern capitalist societies, become wild, individualized and deregulated.

Following the - controversial - hypothesis of the risk society theory of individualization and dissolution of old forms of class structure and organized collective action, it can be argued: social conflicts are becoming more fragmented, individualized and disorganized, with unclear fronts and cleavage lines, unclear forms of action and resolution strategies, with increasing scarcity of natural and other

resources necessary for life. Escalation to violent and armed conflicts may happen when old social and cultural ties dissolve through modernisation, when social and economic exclusion prevent the satisfaction of basic human needs (e.g., measured in the “Human Development Index” of the United Nations Development Programme), and when the negative factors reinforce each other. As difficult as the answer to the question of reasons and causes of complex conflicts is that how to solve them—through local action and at local levels, where the conflicts do not appear in their full scope, or at several scales, for which hardly political and other institutions of mitigation exist.

How such new conflicts differ from the ones investigated, described and explained in prior conflict research, can be found out from the analysis of their dynamics that differ from older forms of social conflicts in many regards, including the following moments:

- Dissolution of social boundaries: The social structures and social boundaries that create the conventional conflicts in modern, industrialized, capitalist societies dissolve or become unclear. Parties in conflict with each other and actors involved are often from different social groups or classes, conflicts also not simply between rich and poor groups, countries and economies, although much of that global cleavage of the rich and poor appears in the diagnoses of environmental conflicts, e.g., in the hypothesis of the “environmentalism of the poor” (Martinez-Alier 2002).
- New social actors or groups that are in conflict with each other include often social movements or mixed, “hybrid” groups of people living in one place that are in conflict with other groups, local enterprises, governmental institutions; but this may not show the full scope of the conflict. Conflicts may also develop between actors and groups in one country that come in conflict with groups in other countries, so that the conflict reveals only through multi-scale analysis of its interconnections in the chains of extraction, trading, processing and consumption of natural resources that may include global resource flows. Examples for that can be found in the distribution conflicts mentioned in Table 1.
- The conflicts appear as consequences of the globalization of economy, politics, and total society, of global social and environmental change. In the global conflicts more and more actors, organisations and groups in different places and countries come in conflict with each other. This can be seen as a result of the global resource flows from less developed to industrialised countries.
- The dissolution of political boundaries, described as differentiation of the national state into multi-scale states with local, regional, national and international components, resulting in action across administrative, legal and territorial boundaries of states, shows the conflicts to be of the kind insufficiently described in phenomena as “sub-politics” (by Beck) and “existential politics” (by Giddens), as civil society action, and as new forms of action of social movements that fight against globalisation and for environmental protection.

- Dissolution of knowledge boundaries: A rarely explicitly discussed assumption in conflict research and management was, that conflicts need to be understood in their nature, which requires knowledge about the specific spheres of cultural, economic, political action, and some kind of professional knowledge for conflict mitigation. The new conflicts remain unclear in their nature, require interdisciplinary knowledge, and still they cannot be solved in many cases, although solutions are urgently needed.

The following Graphic 1 by Howitt attempts to make visible the multiple interacting factors causing resource use conflicts and crises as multi-scale phenomenon, stretching from local to global levels. All factors that influence environmental conflicts and show their social facets are mentioned.

Graphic 1: Multi-scale crisis phenomena in the search for a new world order




Figure 2.5 New world order, power and local restructuring

Source: Howitt 2001: 87

Climate change and environmental problems more generally generate conflicts of complex nature. Environmental problems cannot be seen separate from social conflicts, both overlap and reinforce each other, show multiple and circular causality. In conflicts with manifold causes and consequences environmental problems and scarcity of resources translate into interconnecting social, political and economic conflicts of access to and distribution of natural resources as water, land, living resources. As Escobar (2006) formulated, various forms of cultural, economic or ecological distribution conflicts emerge. The multi-faceted ecological distribution conflicts have a variety of social and economic causes and consequences, among these scarcity and unequal access to, ownership and distribution of natural resources, appearing in the global resource trade and the patterns of global inequality between rich, industrialized and poor, resource delivering countries. The inequalities give rise to many forms of local, national and international conflicts. Social inequalities are also discussed in normative and ethical terms as environmental (in-)justice (Schlosberg 2007), regarding access to unpolluted air, water and soil or vulnerability through environmental risks. According to the inexact generalization of the inequality hypothesis that appears in the ecological discourse, also in Becks' risk society theory, are the ones who have to take the large part of environmental "bads" and burdens the inhabitants of the poor countries in the Global South, the women in all countries, and the future generations.

As environmental or ecological distribution conflicts (Martinez-Alier 2009) appear such of water and land use, conflicts through pollution of the environment, overuse of limited resources, and global climate change. Although often manifest as local conflicts they include global dimensions through globalisation and global trade of resources or global environmental change, especially climate change. Examples of such conflicts include the ones described in Table 1.

Table 1: Ecological distribution conflicts

Martinez-Alier (1995: 80) describes ecological distribution conflicts as "the social, spatial, and temporal asymmetries or inequalities in the use by people of environmental resources and services, i.e. in the depletion of natural resources (including the loss of biodiversity), and in the burdens of pollution" that may evoke local or global conflicts.

Martinez-Alier (2004: 8ff) describes ecological distribution conflicts as they appear in the commodity chains – extraction of materials and energy, manufacture and transport, disposal of the waste:

“Conflicts on the extraction of materials and energy

1.- Mining conflicts. Complaints over the siting of mines and smelters because of water and air pollution, and land occupation by open-cast mining and slag. Also, conflicts on oil and gas extraction. (Networks active in 2004: Mines, Minerals and People / Oilwatch). ...

2.- Biopiracy. The appropriation of genetic resources (“wild” or agricultural) without adequate payment or recognition of peasant or indigenous ownership over them (including the extreme case of the Human Genome project)....

3.- Land Degradation. Soil erosion caused by unequal distribution of land, or by pressure of production for exports. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) introduced the basic distinction between pressure of population and pressure of production on the sustainable use of land.

4.- Plantations are not Forests. The movements against eucalyptus, pine, acacia plantations for wood or paper pulp production (often exported). ...

5.- Mangroves vs shrimp. The movement to preserve the mangroves for livelihood, against the shrimp export industry, in Thailand, Honduras, Ecuador, India, Bangladesh, Philippines, Sri Lanka. ...

6.- Water conflicts. Defence of the rivers: the movements against large dams for hydroelectricity or irrigation (such as the Narmada movement in India, the *atingidos por barragens* in Brazil). ... Also, conflicts on the use and pollution of aquifers.

7.- National / local fishing rights. Attempts to stop open access depredation by imposing (since the 1940s in Peru, Ecuador, Chile) exclusive fishing areas (200 miles). The language here is international public law. Another conflicts is that of the defence (or introduction) of local communal fishing rights against industrial fishing (as in coastal India, or the lower Amazonia).

Conflicts on transport

8.- Transport conflicts are on the increase because of the larger and larger use of materials in the economy. Examples are complaints over oil spills from tankers or from pipelines, complaints over new motorways, harbours and airports, also over “hidrovías” (such as Paraguay-Paraná). ...

Conflicts on waste and pollution

9.- Toxic struggles. This is the name given in the U.S. to fights against risks from heavy metals, dioxins, etc. ...

10.- Waste dumping. The many conflicts around the world on waste dumps, incinerators. In an international context, “Toxic imperialism” was used by Greenpeace, 1988, to describe the dumping of toxic waste in poorer countries (theoretically forbidden by the Basle Convention of 1989).

11.- Transboundary pollution. Applied in the 1970s and 1980s mainly to sulfur dioxide crossing borders in Europe, and producing acid rain. Also between areas in the U.S. (New England polluted by western winds).

12.- Equal rights to carbon sinks. The proposal for equal per capita use of oceans, new vegetation, soils and atmosphere as sinks or temporary reservoirs for carbon dioxide

... . The disproportionate emissions of carbon dioxide have given rise to a “carbon debt”.

13.- Consumers’ and citizens’ safety. Struggles over the definition and the burden of risks from new technologies (nuclear, GMO, etc.) in rich or in poor countries. (These are the conflicts of Ulrich Beck’s “risk society”). They also affect producers (agro-toxics).”

Most of the distribution conflicts are and will be non-violent, but armed conflicts will increase too. The reasons why social conflicts - for which many forms of non-violent mitigation and resolution exist - can escalate to violent conflicts are also manifold. At this point the books of Dyer and Welzer become simple and conventional in their reasoning that environmental conflicts date back to resource scarcity, including that resulting from climate change. This reductionism can be partially explained with the scientific sources and knowledge they use for their explanations, Dyer that from policy analysis, Welzer social-psychological knowledge. Both authors see violence as a consequence of increasing scarcity of important natural resources. That is not wrong, but inexact and tends to simplification; the picture known from the Neo-Malthusian debate on “Limits to growth” (Meadows et al 1972) seems to re-emerge. Dyer means, to avoid violence and wars requires international negotiations, a reduction of CO₂-emissions to zero, the use of renewable energy sources (like wind, water, solar energy), genetic engineering and modification of plants and animals for food and other resources for human consumption. None of the ideas is new, and most turned out to be controversial. Consequences of the production of bioenergy on arable land, such as competition with land use for food production, especially in the Global South, are sources for conflicts.

Much more concrete and less simple suggestions than that of Dyer would be required, but these do also not come from Welzer, who replaces the “logic of political action” by the “social-psychological logic of human behaviour”. This perspective supports also his inclination to take as model case small and local societies from history, e.g., island societies as the anthropologist Jared Diamond, who made the history of Easter Island and its depopulation through environmental catastrophes a model case. What can be learned from small, isolated and simply structured societies for the extremely complex and globally networked modern society? The question remains to be discussed more critically. It is not sufficient that Welzer distrusts governmental action and international policy, replacing recommendations for collective and political action through a series of ideas that sound rather strange - that is: unrealizable - as possibilities of political action: to think beyond the horizon of everyday political action; not to accept the logic of the nature of the case (“Sachzwang”); to become aware of the possibility of changes in moral values and perception in situations of catastrophes; to understand ethnical and other masking of climate- and resource conflicts; to be prepared for that what cannot be planned, foreseen and explained. These are examples for an abstract and complicated reasoning, with ideas known from

the social sciences - e.g., non-anticipated consequences or side-effects of social action and limits of human rationality and knowledge use in decision making called “bounded rationality” - and from risk research and environmental research on vulnerability, resilience and sustainability, in approaches like adaptive management. These forms of reasoning use often heuristics and have in common that they address questions of the limits of knowledge and human insights, the limits of scientific and other knowledge for social action, the incapacity to deal with the unexpected, the unknown, and the future. It is difficult to translate such reasoning in criteria and knowledge for decision-making and resource management. From decision-makers, resource managers and users, or civil society actors it is required to become like scientists in their thinking and action.

Europe seems away from the centres of coming climate change conflicts and environmental catastrophes, but this may be an illusion. Nearly everything what global climate change implies has already been experienced in European countries, it was only not always understood as a consequence of global climate change: unexceptional dry and rainy seasons, extreme storms, floods and inundations that happened not only at the coasts, also in this country where we are at the moment, far away from the coasts, in safe distance from sea level rise. Here the catastrophes come “through the backdoor”, e.g., as flooding from the Tisza river. In the Netherlands, the coastal country in Europe most exposed to flooding from the sea, inundations came too from the river Rhine that enters the Netherlands with floods originating far away, in the Alpine mountains, through the melting of glaciers and seasonal flooding, enlarged through the engineering of the river bed of the Rhine.

Although something is already known from environmental conflict research and from practical, managerial experience with mitigation of such complex conflicts, much more is unknown. Conflict analysis and resolution require forms of navigating in ignorance more than in knowledge, following ideas that come from ecological research about disaster management, resilience and sustainability of coupled social and ecological systems, in strategies of adaptive management and environmental governance (Lindsay et al 2006). Mobilizing knowledge and formulating possible scenarios of climate conflicts, as done by Dyer and Welzer, is a first step and necessary, as also the conjecture of the authors, that in future wars seem much more probable than peaceful political solutions that would require much stronger cooperation in global policies, seem impossible today within the institutions of the United Nations. But it is also necessary to go further and develop more complex strategies of knowledge use, and to avoid the impression of apocalyptic visions for “our common future”. This formulation was the title of the popular Brundtland report on sustainable development, with which global environmental policy debates started more than 25 years ago. Sustainable development is today itself in crisis through global climate change. A further necessary step is to analyse and discuss more systematically possibilities of resolving such conflicts. In the thematic perspective of this conference this means: to seek for knowledge from the humanities, the cultural,

philosophical and normative knowledge fields, including ethics and knowledge about the building and maintenance of normative orders that guide collective, governmental and non-governmental action. Global norm systems such as the human rights need to be supplemented by rights regarding the environment and human modification of nature. However, ethics, moral or justice discourses, and normative orders alone will not suffice. New practices of knowledge use that include a variety of knowledge forms will be required.

The resolution of complex conflicts – new practices of knowledge use

It seems important to discuss possibilities of resolving the complex forms of social conflicts described above with an adequate diagnosis of the action situation and the knowledge available for resolving such conflicts. There are no effective institutions for conflict resolution that have mandates, power, experience, and are supported by the actors involved; nor is scientific and practical knowledge available to solve such conflicts peacefully, efficiently and with lasting solutions. How to resolve the conflicts needs to a large degree be learned in the resolution process itself, through joint learning and accumulation of experience, by the actors involved. Under the name of “sustainability science” some principles have been formulated, that can also be applied for research on environmental conflicts and their mitigation:

”Familiar approaches to developing and testing hypotheses are inadequate because of nonlinearity, complexity, and long time-lags between actions and consequences. ... become parallel functions of social learning, which incorporate the elements of action, adaptive management, and policy as experiment. Sustainability science will therefore need to employ new methodologies that generate the semi-quantitative models of qualitative data, build upon lessons of case studies, ... Scientists and practitioners will need to work together with the public at large to produce trustworthy knowledge and judgement that is scientifically sound and roots in social understanding.” (Kates et al 2001)

Knowledge practices in environmental research and resource management are not only characterized as cooperation of scientists and non-scientists. From the phenomenology of ecological distribution conflicts described by Martinez-Aliersome preliminary ideas about resolving complex conflicts can be identified that date back to the discussion of “wicked problems” for which never sufficient knowledge is available. This is the situation described by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) as “post-normal science”, where the problems require always urgently solutions and the knowledge is always controversial.

- 1) The complex social conflicts require transdisciplinary strategies of research and decision-making, where scientific and practical knowledge is applied, where researchers and practitioners cooperate. This is not a requirement to be seen as an effective or optimal approach to conflicts resolution; it implies strategies based on the limits of knowledge, of human action and rationality, emergency strategies rather than such of advanced science.
- 2) Forms of conflict resolution require multi-scale strategies and action, simultaneously or subsequently, to connect the different spatial and temporal scales at which action is required. This does not just require coordination of policies and managerial programmes, but more complicated forms of knowledge and action synthesis, beyond conventional assumptions as that: sufficient knowledge can be created through research and needs just to be applied adequately, in a hierarchically structured decision-making process, where responsibilities of action and decision-making are clear. Such multi-scale strategies are often preliminary and have deficits, no optimal forms can be found and hierarchical coordination of global policies in a linear model of command and control is impossible.
- 3) The possibilities and chances to resolve such conflicts are often unclear. It seems necessary to go away from the logic of specialized conflict research, that conflicts are negative and socially unwanted phenomena that need to be resolved for the purpose of maintaining or regaining peace and “normal” development. The attempts to mitigate such conflicts require experimenting with a variety of formal and informal, social and technical, direct and indirect approaches.
- 4) Conflict resolution requires, instead of only looking at the conflict and seeking how it can be solved politically, to understand the broader social and ecological contexts of conflicts and to integrate conflict resolution with broader approaches of natural resource management that aim at social, economic and environmental sustainability.
- 5) The connections of the themes cultural traditions, innovation of the humanities, and new social conflicts of complex kind do not require only or mainly research, but the opening towards inter- and transdisciplinary knowledge forms and processes that imply the integration and synthesis of different forms of knowledge, scientific and practical knowledge, positive and normative knowledge from a variety of disciplines, crossing the boundaries between the humanities, the social and the natural sciences. Discourses that come close to the new requirements of knowledge practices include that of human and social ecology, sustainability science and the broader sustainability discourse.

New forms of knowledge and knowledge use that are relevant for the resolution of complex conflicts are often discussed under the terms of inter- and transdisciplinarity. Both forms have rapidly increasing significance in many fields of applied research. Interdisciplinarity is the more known term which is mainly used for changing forms of scientific research and knowledge use through crossing of boundaries between specialized disciplines. Transdisciplinarity and the forms of knowledge use discussed

as “mode 2” (Nowotny et al 2002) include the combination of scientific and non-scientific, local or practical knowledge in research and knowledge application.

What can inter- and transdisciplinary forms of knowledge generation and application give in terms of new social knowledge practices that can help to mitigate or resolve such conflicts as discussed? First and foremost, it is the possibility and capacity to integrate and synthesize knowledge from different sources, scientific and non-scientific knowledge. Practically seen this implies that more knowledge can be made available and mobilized for conflict resolution than would be available from specialized and disciplinary knowledge. Secondly, with such synthesis of knowledge and action appear new ways of knowledge use and knowledge management in the separate fields of research and action. These new forms of knowledge synthesis include the ones already available or discussed in interdisciplinary environmental and risk research, but much more synthesis and action practices need to be developed through search and experimenting, in the processes of resource management and conflict resolution themselves. This is also a reason why the resolution of complex social conflicts requires to be integrated with long-term strategies and policies of collective action that are so far mainly known from the sustainability discourse, where social, economic and environmental dimensions of knowledge and action are combined. Knowledge strategies include the following:

- combined and integrated analyses of vulnerability, resilience and sustainability and strategies of action based on that (Derissen et al 2001);
- adaptive management and governance (Allen et al 2012);
- strategies of environmental and global governance as framing strategies (Davidson and Frickel 2004);
- social-ecological forms of knowledge synthesis and theories of regulating the interface of society and nature (Bruckmeier 2013).

All these forms of knowledge synthesis and action strategies require to deal with positive scientific knowledge and with normative knowledge where cultural values, worldviews, visions, paradigms of thinking, cognitive and practical interests of many knowledge producers and knowledge bearers need to be negotiated, mediated and integrated. This is where the humanities as knowledge fields and related social practices, the cultural nature of human action in general and of social conflicts as part of it, come into view. New normative orders at global and local levels (Forst and Günther 2011) need to be discussed, and new forms of justice and solidarity that are so far locked into traditional debates of justice and ethics in societal processes e.g., the Rawlsian justice-discourse. Such new forms of discussion of environment and resource related problems and conflicts include the examples of environmental justice and environmental citizenship, environmental or ecological ethics, and the discourse ethics of Habermas.

Discussion and conclusions

Conflict mitigation for such complex social and environmental conflicts as discussed above is not necessarily a task for governmental institutions, courts and diplomacy, more for civil society actors, and it becomes part of strategies of sustainable development and global governance. Conflict resolution is not a value or goal in itself, as it was often seen in peace and conflict research, but needs to develop in broader and long-term strategies of social and natural resource management that allow to build lasting solutions, as part of the process of building a new world order that discussed, e.g., in the global scenarios for sustainable development as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment from 2005. To develop and practice such strategies requires interdisciplinary research, also in the humanities, to deal with ethical problems when conflicts result from unequal distribution of natural resources between countries, national economies and social groups.

From the ongoing transdisciplinary scientific and political discourses as that about environmental and global governance, environmental justice and citizenship, or new normative orders, can the following conclusions be drawn regarding the contributions from the humanities to the debate of complex social conflicts and their resolution:

- 1) Dealing with complex social conflicts requires multi-scale strategies of knowledge generation and application which need to be learned by scientists and other actors in the processes of analysing and resolving such conflicts; they are not available in forms of well-developed methods and tools. The humanities can provide in this situation ways of dealing with normative knowledge, which was for a long time neglected in scientific discourses.
- 2) Although the global sustainability discourse as framing discourse of conflict resolution has brought substantial progress in formulating the requirements of societal transitions to sustainability, it is in danger to become temporarily blocked, as the climate change discourse as part of it, through the neoliberal policies and economic strategies that tend to weaken political institutions and civil society sectors. New efforts to revitalize and redirect the discourse as one of global social change and solidarity are required in which the normative debates mentioned above are key components.
- 3) Beyond scientific research, the results of which are then handed over to decision-makers who are responsible for knowledge use in the practices of policy and resource management, the new forms of knowledge integration and conflict resolution require much stronger cooperation between scientists and practitioners than hitherto practiced.

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IBOLYA CZIBERE

Projects' Social Effects: The Project Orientated Society

The new organisational strategy, Project Orientated Management was presented in 1990 in Vienna¹ opening the third developmental stage² of project management knowledge. This strategy is based on a fundamental coherence stating that every project functions as a temporary organisation and, therefore, offers strategic options for the usual organisational structures (with the incorporation of projects into the organisational structures, temporary organisations are created that disappear as soon as their individual task is done). This approach dramatically increases the importance of projects regardless of the previously known coherence that states a project created for various aims in public, non-profit and industrial sectors can heavily improve a company's efficiency and its chances of survival as well. These processes result in power shifts in society and change the forms of knowledge utilization.

1. Project proliferation and projectification

Projects significantly influence not only the operation of the receiving organisations, but also all of society by forming a new project-orientated social order. This also means that the project as a form of operation gradually becomes the organisational strategy for society in order to ensure more efficient management regarding the increase and dynamics of the society and its environment. Sjömbloom (2006) writes that this process cannot be planned and is unexpected or is a higher form of intervention that exceeds previous ones, for solving problems considered unusual; Jarjabka states that "the projects can be considered as an organisational response to the turbulent changes in the condition of modern market economy" (Jarjabka 2009:36). Perceiving a society as project orientated requires a special project orientated point of view and one of the potential forms of this is the appearance of new social

¹ The world congress on project management held by IPMA (International Project Management Association)

² In the first stage those projects were presenting that had technical goals set by the military and the space research and also those project that had high complexity, cost and duration. In the second stage those project presented that had the same features as in the first stage but in different industries.

groups or a social class; the project class resulting from this transformation (Kovách-Kucerová 2006). It is only a highly qualified and new type of community of interest embedding into postmodern society separately, but there are also specific techniques of co-operation and share of power and development of methods among local and expert elite (Kovách-Kristóf 2005). In addition, the embedding process results in the incorporation and operation of interest in the system level maintained for long term. This is an important characteristic since every project is planned and carried out by taking relevant social, economic and environmental context into consideration. These projects intentionally or not intentionally have positive or negative effects on their environment, in spite of the fact that during the planning of a project, cultural, social, international, political and physical environmental contexts must be taken into consideration.

The appearance of massification of projects and project forms have a significant effect on the redistribution processes, primarily on their extent and directions of distribution, furthermore on the effectiveness evolution on macro and company level, on the behaviour and power relationships of the economic operator and the operation of the institutional decision making system (Voszka 2006). The possibility of continuous influence and control over transferring developmental sources presupposes significant possession of power and knowledge capital. Kovách and Kucerová (2006) interpret one possible mechanism of action as continuous reconversion of capital forms belonging to the upper groups of social structure which results in continuous transferring of sources from different positions of power (managerial, professional, scientific, educational, administrative and concrete) in order to maintain the desired directions of project process.

The projectification and the process of projectification take place in not only business organisation but also in non-profit organisations and public administration systems as well. In this respect, – though, here we do not deal with the projectification of public administration in details – we should mention that the projects appearing in public and private sectors (and project interests and projectification processes relating to it) prevail, organize and operate in a very similar way. The fundamental differences between market and public sectors can be seen in the possibilities connecting vertically and horizontally which have not been able to describe the bureaucratic administrative system until the temporary organisations (projects) have appeared in large numbers and have loosened the traditional linear structural order and formed the need for the new organisational operation and new type of expertise relating to this. Both in market and public sectors, projects function as tools to separate certain activities within the organisation; but according to Sjöblom (2006), projects in the public sector aim at creating stability and they are tools to exceed bureaucracy with the

main aim of adapting to the increasing and continuously changing environmental needs by satisfying them. At the same time, project based organisation results in the mixing of organisational methods in the bureaucratic systems (Sjöblom 2006.) while it does not happen or just partially in market organisations.

In context of all these, even in the bureaucratic organisations, they use this special form of consensus called load relieving by organisation sociology literature and it is generally related to the behaviour of the organisations and is used for preventing or eliminating certain structural and other types of conflicts. For example, the authorities have both statutory authority and business interests at the same time so keeping business in a bureaucratic organisation can cause serious contradictions or sometimes serious conflicts within the management system and one of the main reasons for this is that the authority duties have to be organised differently from business; the incomes and interests are different from that of in a business-driven process. The authorities can be relieved from these conflicts by setting up independent business; within these independent businesses, business activities or even parts of project activities can be carried out in accordance with the rules of internal logic of economy.

However, projects operating in public and private organisations show identity in regard of impact mechanism so the correlations presented in this study relating economic organisations primarily prevail significantly in the cases of small, medium or big projects working in the public sector (research centres, academic institutions, hospitals, government agencies, organisations on regional level, municipalities). This is also true of financial techniques, for example, financing municipal projects can be done in several forms as well as that of business associations.

Projects are spreading more and more widely and newer types of projects gain increasing importance. In the 21st century, the concentration of material and intellectual resources in specific areas is getting more important through these projects so that is why the role of organisers and managers is getting more appreciated in each segment including academic life as well.

Dominant/determining characteristics of projects

None of the definitions of projects used in management science meets all the project situations, so there are many simultaneously used concepts that determine different emphasis. As for the Bajna (1994) definition the focus is on individuality, on the occurrence has one-off nature and on the intention to solve greater and more complex problems. In this sense, the project requires greater planning expenditures, special knowledge and special planning process in certain cases; furthermore, it has exact starting points and deadlines and extensions as well. In contrast to this, Aggteleki

(1994) highlight that these have practical relevance or are abstract plans which generally cannot be resolved satisfactorily within the framework of management's routine planning and leading tasks due to their size, complexity, importance or/and unique nature. Graham (1979) primarily puts the emphasis on temporariness when defines the project as a goal to be achieved that need to be accomplished within a particular budget and time limit with a temporarily selected group of people and resources. Görög (2001) focuses on the distinction from the routine activities of the organisations and states those tasks and their implementations can be considered as projects which are different from the organisation's usual, routine everyday activities, that is, the activity is one-off and complex activity for the organisation. Cleland (1994) recognized the identity – which has become generally accepted in management literature –the projects and project management are the most efficient tools for strategy realization as well. This was based on the correlation stating that organisational strategy is future-orientated so it aims at changing the operation of the organisation, the conditions and the aptitudes of the inner operability partially or totally. In the strategy programmess and actions, achievements are formulated that are specific and are to be achieved; these are the bases of the organisational strategy, therefore, it means achieving one-off and complex task within particular time and budget limits. These characteristics are in full compliance with the dominant features of the projects as long as it meets the generally accepted interpretation saying that “the project means those activities that are one-off and complex task for the organisation, have an achieving period (starting and finishing points) and their costs of execution are defined (similarly to the strategic target tasks) and aims at achieving certain goals...” (Görög 2003:20). The strategy target task, as they are set to specifically achieve a particular task, they always mean the achievement of a complex and specific task within the organisation. The nature of execution of such a task is different from the organisation's continuously repeating operative activities and is also different from the approach that considers strategy-development as future-oriented and also bears the organisation in mind as a whole. For an organisation, such complex and specific tasks can be considered as projects and the project management means activities for an achievement, that is, the management dimension. The strategy induces changes in the organisation and these changes are done by achieving various projects. The projects, therefore projects management as well as management belong to the tools of implementation of organisational changes. We can also say that same projects are created on the basis of organisational strategies in such a way that the organisational strategy itself makes them necessary and at the same time, the project management is formulated as a need for a leadership role. This recognition was found in the 1990s when many authors described this relationship in relation to strategy and project. It is

a natural consequence in the sense that the relationship of strategy and project had already existed since change is a natural consequence of every governmental, business, social etc. organisation. This recognition has been promoted by the acceleration in the extent of change taking place in the operating environment over the last one and a half decade; Cleland describes it as “the existence of the project in an organisation is a clear indication of change in an organisation and the organisation wants to meet the changed environment in the future”. (Cleland 1994:118) In relation to this, Görög (2003) states that projects were created and developed on the basis of organisational strategy, while the project management which executes the project is different from the strategy leadership regarding leadership activity.

The projects are made up of three significant groups in accordance with the content of project results, investment, research and development and organisation development types. As a result of investment project, a facility is created that is capable of creating some products or services or an existing facility is getting transformed, like expansion, renovation or cessation (e.g. hospital, highway). The characteristic of investment project is that the result of the project to be achieved can be well-defined and described with technical and performance parameters. The aims of research and development projects (R and D projects) are the creation of a new product or technology, improving an existing product or technology, manufacturing a new product, introducing new technologies, reducing costs of products and services, introducing goods and services in the market etc. The R and D projects also have the characteristics besides the material resources, the intellectual resources have become increasingly dominant during the execution. As a result of organisation development projects, new quality of operational condition framework and operational condition have been created, for example, the transformation of an organisational structure, change in ownership structure (e.g. privatisation), significant amount of training or retraining for the members of the organisation, redesigning the operational processes of the organisation. The expected results of such project cannot be often quantified satisfactorily, only the effects of the emerging new results can be described. At the same time the effectiveness of such projects can be expressed rather indirectly. The determining resource of the organisation development project are intellectual resources (Görög 2003). The type of typology above is justified by the fact that possible project types formed on the basis of it, the most fundamental characteristics of the various projects become visible. This draws the attention to the importance of the differentiated usage of project management toolbox that also fits the characteristics of the projects. Essentially, this is the same reason why the further typology of project is necessary in accordance with the people participating in the execution as well. They distinguish based on the latter criteria, for example, inner

projects, the organisation (project owner organisation) initiating the project does the execution of the project (achieving the project result) using their own resources. As for the execution of external projects, it is not done by the initiating organisation's resources but the external collaborators in contractual relationship. In the case of combined projects (partly external, partly internal), the project owner organisation and the external collaborators with whom they have a contractual relationship do the execution of the projects together.

2. Interest groups in the project environment and in the project

Projects usually appear along the interests of the interest groups and in the service for them. Not only those fundamental goals what for they were formed are important but also whether the project –resulting from the operational mechanisms developed within – is able to, how much it is able to and to what extent it is possible to serve the interest group. Therefore, such questions raise like what mechanisms do exist within the project and for the project, whether the operation and behaviour of the project actually serve the interest of the interest group and also there are forces and what forces act against it. Jávör and Rozgonyi's statement (2005) on organisation can be used for projects operating in organisations, too, so it can be said that projects adjust their behaviour to controlling, influencing factors and actors that exist in the environment or within the project. This largely depends on how strong position the manager has and also on what power sharing, project management skills and responsibilities are enabled. It will be discussed in more details below. At the same time, the projects are surrounded by significant conflicts of interest that mainly appear as factors relating to acquisition, distribution and redistribution of things that are for needs. Similarly to the interest within the organisation, the interest appearing in projects and needs behind it can be typically divided and converted into other things. It is a consequence of that –as a characteristic of conflicts of interest – in many cases the participants can reach a compromise due to the fact that interest can always be lessened or exchanged or converted to another type of interest (Jávör 2005).

Those individuals, occasional or organisational operating communities can be considered as interest groups of a project who have the same or similar material or non-material interest within each group in relation to executing the project and the operation of some achieved project goals (Görög 2008). The potential involved may be different in nature, therefore, achieving their satisfaction or at least decreasing their dissatisfaction requires a highly differentiated approach. For these reasons it necessary to categorize groups of interest in the project. As a result, two classical groups can be set. The inner interest group (owners, stakeholders, the users of project achievements,

employers divided on the basis of affiliations within the organisation, people participating in project management etc.) that is the groups of interest within the project owner's organisation and external group of interest (financiers, suppliers, contributors for execution, consumers, users outside the organisation, publicity, local community, movements, associations etc.) that is the groups of interest outside the project owner's organisation. According to the Cleland's (1994) categories, the interest groups involved in the project can stand for various interests. It is also emphasised that the one with an economic focus (a group of interest make economic advantage or disadvantage probable for itself in relation to the project) dominates mostly. In addition, further types of interest appear. Interests concerning mission (members of an interest group approach the project not based on their individual relation but on the mission of the interest group, for example, environmental movement); interests related to the possibility of obtaining advantage (a project or its achievement changes the chances of influencing power of the group, for example, introducing a new information system, in case of a business unit involved in operation); interests related to survival or to some political support (the members of a group approach the project is not based on their personal relation primarily but on the base of the interest of the group mentioned above, typically the reasons of the attitude of politics and media); interests related to life quality (the project result to be achieved affects the life quality of a group of interest, for example, a project that provides residential wireline gas service); interest related to security (the members of a group of interest feel their security to be threatened, for example, in case of a project on airport expansion); interest related to rights regulated by laws (a group of interest has authorizing privileges relating a project, for example, special authorities). Of course, it is not necessary for each interest group and each interest to appear in every single project. In many cases, for example in an organisational development project, there are mostly only inner groups of interest while typically in the case of real estate development and infrastructural development project, all these above mentioned projects might appear representing all the interest listed. However it should be mentioned that the inner groups of interest belong to the authority of project owner organisation, they have members who belong to external groups of interest and whose relation to the project is out of the project owner's authority. It is also an important factor that the different groups having similar interests in a project can amplify the intensification of each other's behaviour, moreover, the intensified behaviour can induce the formation of a new, previously not perceived group of interest. However, the interest of the same kind of interest groups do not necessarily appear with the same intensity; in addition, the same interests can have different reasons behind so there can be conflicts between the interest groups relating to the project. Coalition between groups of interest is

common. There might be so-called latent interest groups who do not demonstrate their interest publicly and can effectively influence the degree of the project's acceptance.

The operation of organisations' power system is one of the least researched areas of organisation sociology. Issues of power appear as other approach in general and in sociological sense, mostly in relation with the economic nature of trends, for example, agent-theory or issues of organisational culture. Participants of an organisation operate in a system of power, power field of force and their actions, behaviour and thinking are driven by power mechanisms and their effects. Power always produces its own culture, culture of power, that is, via multi-faceted processes creates power values, power orientated men who adapt power relations and get driven by it (Jávor-Rozgonyi 2005). The power system of an organisation is the basis of the consideration about the organisation, the formation and understanding of system processes. In sense of organisation sociology, in such a power field of force, every event has significance for the participants. In this context, in this particular field of force, every participant evaluates the event in terms of their own positions, ability for achievement, possibility to enforce interest, that is, we can say, there is no such an event that could be classified as neutral. The participants, individuals and groups do everything in order to improve their social status in and out of the organisation while they have to pay attention to the fulfilment of their duties and achieving their set goals. Consequently, we can state that exercise of power means constant conflicts. Routine, as a factor that influences the operation of the organisation significantly, can strengthen one's position so it is favourable for them and can also cause disadvantages for others. This is also true of the changes in the organisation. The appearance of a project in an organisation can be such a change. The incorporation of a project into the organisational structure, especially if these are already some, raises questions continuously, creates uncertainty and some might protest against the obvious loss of status (since the fundamental managers are aware of that the promotion of a new project manager can threaten their power). In the beginning, the participants perceive projects not only as tasks to fulfil, but as a thing that they have to present resistance against (Lockyer-Gordon 2000, Görög 2001); political changes and rearrangements might occur against or for the project and a new non-official (informal) structure might be developed that greatly facilitate work.

The modern western societies' economy, public administration, education and other function are generally based on the principles of rational-legal bureaucratic rule. The formal structures of the economic organisations are made up of the horizontal division of labour tasks (functional specialisation), the regulated nature of the processes and hierarchy of power of authorization. In this structure, the occupied

situation, position (especially the leadership position) gives the chance to exercise formal power, which has a typical manifestation form, that is, the administrative, punishing and rewarding power. The evolution power constellation and the dynamics of force field of power within the organisation are very complex phenomena which can be interpreted only through a special point of view, mainly through the knowledge of available sources of power striving for forcing interest and interactions of games. In this context can the practice of project management activity be examined, analysed and interpreted.

3. The phenomenon of dual responsibility and dual dependence in the project environment

The tasks to be fulfilled in the project are always delegated due to their characteristics and primarily due to their quantity and complexity. The delegation can only be effective if the balance between the four basic elements of organisation – responsibility, power, reliability and accountability – is kept. The responsibility means voluntary commitment to do a given tasks and also accountability by the leadership. Effective project succession requires one-person responsibility; the ultimate responsibility cannot be transferred because this is the only way to ensure the commitment of the whole system consequent upon one's responsibility to achieve the best solution. Consequently, the responsibility is not irreversible, that is, it is impossible not to have the task met but have the responsibility successfully; however, the reverse is possible. The project manager has to take legal, expert, social and ethical responsibilities within his/her personal liability during the activity. Within the project (and permanent organisations) parts of the responsibility can be delegated but some key responsibilities cannot be shared due to strategic reasons. According to the management sciences, some of the activities such as strategic planning, selection of key people, responsibility for supervision-control, evaluating and motivating people, rewarding, various team-building rituals (celebration, saying goodbye), solving personal issues and issues that influence future politics cannot be further delegated.

If taking responsibility is a voluntary duty, it is an important management task to decide whether the colleague has the conditions to take responsibility, that is, whether it is a realistic undertaking. This is a critical issue because the leader sharing responsibility has to be aware of the fact that he has the ultimate responsibility, that is, in case taking responsibility is not realistic, not the person sharing responsibility will be responsible eventually but the leader himself (in many cases, the project manager). Accordingly, reliability and power are required for taking responsibility, which have to

be provided by the one who shares responsibility and its required consequence is accountability.

Since project organisation is one manifestation of dual organisational formations, this means that the original structure has to be opened temporarily at the time of creating such an organisational structure. The project organisations – based on the departments' division of power – are multi-lined formations, since the employees temporarily working in the project organisation can temporarily get instructions from the project manager who was appointed above them in the organisational structure and they also get instructions from those who have been and also will be after completing the project above them in the hierarchy (Jarjabka 2009). In other words, questions arise whether who is going to do the work of a project participant, who is currently working on a project task instead of their own jobs. The question remains whether who is the boss of the employee working on the project task: the previous boss or the project manager who is temporarily above him/her? This is also called as the issue of dual responsibility. This can be approached from another direction, then this is the phenomenon of dual dependence (Jarjabka 2009), which basically symbolises the situation when a team member is subordinated both to the project manager and to his/her functional leader at the same time. In this situation, the functional leader tries to exercise the power that the primer organisation generally ensures for him/her. This method of exercise of power is contributed by the fact well-known among team members that a team member has to return to the original area of expertise after he/she has finished the expert project activity or after the project has been completed so the employee does not want to confront the functional leader. However, this can lead the employees to be forced to take dual responsibility and dual force to performance that can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of their work. Therefore, this is an important technical issue to declare the worker's temporary independence from their original job in the written form and also to define their project task and power. The lifecycle of the teams is strongly related to the project problem since the project problems generate the project team; and as in every group generally conflicts, power games and standard training occur in the beginning in order to ensure that the members can work in a coordinated way. This is the period of team formation and team-building; real and efficient work can only happen after all these. It is the project management's responsibility to form a team out of a group of people selected by power (Jarjabka 2009).

Summary

The last quarter of the 20th century was an important period in terms of project and project management. In this period, such technological, economic and social changes appeared and evolved in the operating environment of the projects that have encouraged the projects to change (Görög 2003). Some organisations have induced and formed the changes while other organisations have just tried to adapt to them. As a result, the importance of a strategic consideration increased and the changes of operating environment have had an effect in every area so varieties of strategies and projects have been formed that foresee changes.

The practice of the previous years and the experiences of the European Union have highlighted that the organisational and planning approaches that are instinctive and invented each time have not proved to be competent in addressing and conducting these targeted project activities. Therefore, it is essential to compare, approximate and mutually use results of the management sciences' scientific analysis on "projects.

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JUDIT CSOBA

*Managing the unemployment in Hungary*¹

Changing character of the Hungarian labour law

With the transition to market economy and after the economy was rebuilt on new foundations, the unfavourable accompanying symptoms – especially unemployment – also had to be addressed. The restructuring and continuous expansion of the system of institutions and instruments devoted to controlling unemployment followed the Western European model in many ways by this time, which had already amassed decades of experience; however, at the same time it was unable to break with its own traditions. The established system of labour market institutions operates in a very centralized way both with respect to its structure and its procedures, and non-state players either do not appear in the system at all or play only a very small role.

The first unemployment benefit was granted on 1st January 1989.² Although the government's intention was to grant the benefit for those in need only as a last resort, the number of people receiving it continuously increased. This tendency was reinforced by Act IV of 1991 on job assistance and unemployment benefits, which was adopted after the fall of socialism. This law still guaranteed passive benefits for the unemployed for two years. The table below presents the number of recipients and the amount of the benefit during the past two decades.

¹ The current study is a shortened version of a longer study. The original study published in J. Csoba, Labour Market flexibility and precarity in Hungary, [in:] P.Herrmann, V. Bobkov, J. Csoba, Labour Market and Precarity of Employment Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Data from Hungary and Russia Wiener Verlag für Sozialforschung, Bremen 2014, pp. 67-150.

² Decree 114/1988. (31st December) of the Council of Ministers on the unemployment benefit. According to this law, a person is entitled to the benefit if they had been employed for at least 18 months during the three years preceding the termination of their last job, and if no more than one year had passed since their last employment was terminated. The benefit was granted for a total of at most 365 calendar days within three years, but the regulation allowed for the unemployed to receive a transitional unemployment benefit for another 365 days after the end of the first 365 days at a significantly lower level of provision.

Table 1: Unemployment support and the average wage

Year	Unemployment benefit and other provisions independent of income			Income compensation benefit and regular social allowance			Monthly net average wage (HUF) ^a
	Average monthly sum, HUF	% of net average wage	Average number of people	Average monthly sum, HUF	% of net average wage	Average number of people	
1990	3,845	37.1	30,302	3,209	30.9	46,823	10,371
1995	11,891	44.6	182,788	6,590	24.7	234,411	26,637
2000	22,818	41.0	131,665	14,656	26.3	162,245	55,650
2005	39,593	38.2	111,732	16,991	16.5	158,565	103,727
2010	50,073	37.8	125,651	132,628
2011	52,107	36.9	110,803	141,127
The net average wage refers to the whole national economy; private sector before 1998: employers with over 19 employees; after 1998: employers with more than 4 employees.							

Source: Munkaerőpiaci tükör 2012, based on data on p. 391.

Due to the growth of the number of the unemployed and the costs, the period of provision was gradually decreased in the past 20 years. The duration of the originally 24 month long unemployment benefit is currently only 3 months (90 days) since September 2011, which is unique among the European countries.

After having received the unemployment benefit – which was based on social insurance – for the maximum duration, job-seekers participated in an income test and if they could prove to be in need, they became entitled within the social welfare system to income compensation benefit after 1993, and to regular social allowance after 1998. Due to the fact that control was emphasised more and more instead of services and welfare provisions, by July 2012, 53.7 % of the registered unemployed were not entitled to any kind of passive welfare provision anymore – neither to unemployment nor to social benefits. Among those entitled to benefits, only 53,500 people got provision on an insurance basis and 190,600 people on a needs basis.³ (A munkaerőpiaci... NFSZ 2012:16)

³ http://nfsz.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_stat_merop_2012

Table 2: Number of registered job-seekers and their division by provision forms 2008–2012

Year	Entitled to job-seeker provision	Number of people receiving social provision	Job-seekers not receiving provision	Number of registered job-seekers total
Number of registered job-seekers, thousands				
2008	134	148	161	442
2009	202	156	204	562
2010	188	168	227	583
2011	160	182	241	583
June 2012	51	193	280	524
Participation rate in %				
2008	30	33	36	100
2009	36	28	37	100
2010	32	29	39	100
2011	27	31	41	100
June 2012	10	37	53	100

Source: Ferge 2012: 16

Those unemployed people who are no longer eligible for passive provision have access to active labour market measures. Although a wide range of measures was developed, these mainly focused on placement, training and public employment programmes organised and operated by state and municipal government players. The instruments of employment policy involve participants from the private sector only to a small degree and fall far short of both expectations and opportunities with respect to their effects today.

Several reforms have been introduced in the past years with the aim of increasing the rate of employment. The system of unemployment benefits was transformed from autumn 2005 on. The period of unemployment benefit was first reduced to 6 months (2010), then to 3 months (2012). Passive provision, which had been used formerly, was replaced by job search support measures that encouraged the earliest possible entry into employment. The system of social benefits was also transformed in a way to promote work. People who are ready and able to work participate in public employment programmes organized mostly by the local governments instead of applying for social benefit. Whereas in 2008 less than 7 % of the economically active-age long-term unemployed took part in any public employment programme, their rate rose to 33 % in 2009. However, most of these public employment programmes took only 3 to 6 months, in other words they only provided short-term income for the participants, and moreover, their effect in the reintegration process is highly questionable. (Csoba 2010; Scharle 2011)

The OECD member states spend about 0.05 % of the GDP on similar programmes on average. This raises the standard of living of the employees by 0.6 %. The most noteworthy programmes operate in France, Ireland, Spain and Slovakia, where they affect 1.1 % to 2.7 % of the labour force. In 2000, Slovakia introduced a public employment programme which involved almost 12 % of the unemployed in a half-year programme with an income close to the minimum wage. The Czech Republic introduced a system in March 2008, where personalised activation plans were developed for those who had received social provision for at least 6 months, and they were also required to do 20 hours of volunteer work in exchange for the aid. (Magyarország 2011:26)

The sources for managing unemployment can be considered quite scarce in Hungary from an international perspective; in particular, there is very little available for the financing of active labour market measures.

Table 3: Spending on the management of unemployment (2011)

	Total sum in % of GDP	Active measures in % of GDP	Sum spent on education in % of GDP	Sum spent on passive measures in % of GDP
Sweden	2.32	0.96	0.58	1.36
Finland	2.58	0.82	0.37	1.69
Denmark	4.51	1.85	0.54	2.66
Ireland	1.48	0.61	0.28	0.86
Italy	1.32	0.53	0.22	0.79
The Netherlands	2.68	1.22	0.13	1.46
Hungary	0.64	0.28	0.06	0.36
Germany	2.97	0.88	0.33	2.09
Greece	0.47	0.07	0.04	0.40
Japan	0.59	0.19	0.04	0.40

Source: <http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LMPEXP>

At present, the private sector plays a rather small role in increasing the level of employment. The low number of available jobs can be explained by the crisis that still has an effect on the representatives of the private sector today and also – according to many experts – by the fact that the labour market measures which are being utilised do not focus enough on supporting the employment-promoting potential of the private sector, and that the range of employment policy tools is unjustifiably restricted to the support of the state sector. (Adler 2011)

After the fall of socialism an effective employment policy failed to materialise despite the efforts of successive governments. In most cases – apart from its political course – the government tried to improve the employment situation through well-meant but short-sighted experiments that were not integrated into a cohesive system and

remained ineffective as a whole. During the past decades, a peculiar and colourful system of employment-related and non-employment-related forms of labour exclusively characteristic of Hungary evolved in the context of this short-term regulatory framework, as the result of a spontaneous development that could be traced back to various economic and political reasons. Some of these forms of labour that are more or less different from non-fixed-term employment or self-employment have already existed as a socialist legacy for many decades (e.g. family member helping out with the family farm or business), others for 10 or 15 years (e.g. seasonal worker, independent sales agent), and yet others only entered the Hungarian legal system during the past few years (teleworker, hired-out worker, self-employing subcontractor). In other words, the regulation of forms of labour that belong to the grey zone (e.g. day labour) has progressed in an unplanned, spontaneous fashion for several decades in Hungary. (Laky 1998, Gyulavári 2006, Gyulavári 2009)

The Labour Code (LC), which has been amended more than 50 times since the fall of socialism, has remained a law with great political significance. Its content has been fundamentally shaped by short-term political interests in addition to professional and dogmatic requirements. (Kiss et al. 2010)

Among the countless amendments of the LC there were only four that brought considerable change. The first of these was Act LV of 1995. With this amendment the legislator aimed to strengthen the position of the trade unions and the collective protection of employees. Thereby it also determined the fate of collective bargaining on the long term. However, this also entailed the drawback that it became practically impossible to negotiate collective bargaining agreements above the level of individual organisations of work. This ambition of the law also caused a problem because the level of organisation of trade unions had become very low by this time, and it tried to ensure the representation of collective rights in a situation where, in the wake of privatisation and the appearance of foreign-owned companies, many employers did not have a representation of the social partners at all, or this representation possessed very little power. (Tóth 2000; Prigberger 2013)

The next amendment of the LC – Act LVI of 1999 – was passed in a period of change of government, and this made itself felt in the content of the legal act. One of the first provisions effected by the legislator was a change of section 25 (5), which had strengthened the position of the trade union earlier: The amendment of section 31 now granted the right of collective bargaining to the works committee as well. This amendment by the legislator caused huge indignation among the employees. However, this change was called for in the prevailing practical context, and the legislators recognised that it would be futile to change the regulations of labour law toward flexibility (for example, with respect to working hours) when there was nobody to sign the collective agreements with, since there was no trade union representation at the workplace that would be entitled to negotiate such agreements. For it has become clear by this time that a trade union did not exist at most places of employment, especially small and medium enterprises. (Bordás-Vona 2010, Prugberger 2003, Neumann 2005)

On 17th April 2001 the Parliament passed Act XVI of 2001, the third significant amendment of the LC.⁴ This amendment was essentially made necessary by the preparation to the accession to the EU, which took place on 1st May 2004. The provisions banning negative discrimination were complemented by a prohibition of indirect discrimination and by ruling that the burden of proof lies with the employer; the rules on collective redundancy were clarified; the employee's obligation to inform the employer was set out; and fixed-term labour relationships were regulated in accordance with EU law. All of these provisions served the goal of legislative harmonisation. However, the paragraphs introduced because of EU harmonisation triggered many debates among the stakeholders. One of the controversial provisions was Chapter XI of Part 3 of the LC, which regulated a completely new legal construct in the Hungarian context, the “hiring-out of workers” (i.e. temporary agency work).

Part-time and fixed-term work had existed for a long time in Hungarian labour law legislation within socialist labour law, as a restricted type of the labour contract, although employers and employees did not really make use of it. These atypical forms of employment were covered essentially by the very same general rules as non-fixed-term, full-time (8 hours a day) work. By contrast, the regulations on new forms of work that were included into the Labour Code between 2001 and 2004 – teleworking and hired labour – were very different from the earlier familiar rules on labour relations. (Laky 1998, Laky 2005, Dudás 2004) Hired labour, through which a placement agency – that has an employment relationship with an employee with the purpose of hiring out this employee – hires out an employee for a fee to a “user enterprise” was seen by many as exposing the employees to significant risks, making customary rights, which would develop in a normal workplace and serve the interests of employees, impossible, and creating obstacles for the development of stable co-worker relationships which are recognised to be a prerequisite for social solidarity.

The essence of another part of this amendment was to reorganise the chapter on working hours and rest periods, which was also motivated by the approximation to EU legislation. The amendment of the LC from 1995 already represented a careful step toward the demands that the employers had already been voicing for some time. This amendment encouraged the transformation of the way social aspects had been regarded, and strengthened the focus on market interests at the expense of the employees. Due to pressure exerted by employers' interest groups, the law allowed for a flexible regulation of working hours, which basically meant that the amount of total working time was extended and restrictions on overtime work were relaxed. After the LC had come into effect, several employers introduced a regime of working hours that was more favourable and profitable for themselves, at the detriment of the employees' interests.

In other words, this amendment permitted a regulation of work based on a private negotiation between the employer and the employee under private law, instead of the earlier official rules governed by public law. This significantly weakened collective

⁴ Act XVI of 2001 represented an amendment of Act XXII of 1992 on the Labour Code (LC) and related legal acts with the aim of legislative harmonisation.

protection and made the conditions of employment and the representation of employees' interests dependent on their bargaining power.

The fourth important amendment of the LC, Act I of 2012 marked a return to the liberal values. As a result the employees suffered a further significant loss of status compared to their earlier situation. The severance pay for employees near retirement age and the amount of the normal leave of absence was reduced. The rules of termination of employment were modified to the detriment of the workers. Now people are not entitled to protection from a layoff anymore during a sick leave. According to the earlier rules a fixed-term employment contract automatically became a non-fixed-term one if the employee kept working with the employer's knowledge for at least one more day. This has changed now according to the new rules: without a new work contract the employment relationship automatically terminates on the last day of the fixed period. After the amendment of the LC the employer can also terminate – under certain circumstances – a fixed-term employment relationship with a normal notice.

In summary one may say with regard to the amendments of the LC that whereas there have been several more or less substantial shifts compared to the original situation in 1991, a conceptual change is evident in one respect in the legal regulation of employment: the legal rights that are guaranteed by the welfare state in order to protect employees are being gradually eroded to the benefit of the employers. This is evident in the fact that termination of employment has been facilitated, and minimal wage as well as obligatory benefits have been drastically reduced through continuous changes to the Labour Code. (Kiss et al. 2010)

Weaker security and stronger control in legal regulation

It is not only the Labour Code – which serves the protection of employees increasingly less – that has undergone substantial changes in the period under discussion, but also the Social Act, which regulates the situation of marginalised groups on the edge of the labour market or those who have lost their jobs. When Act III of 1993 (the Social Act) was amended in 1996, the intention to introduce more stringent checks for the beneficiaries of social provision, to restrict the existing social protection, and to strengthen the supervisory function of the state became more prominent. The amendment stipulated that payment of needs-based social benefits for the unemployed by the municipalities must be made dependent on the required cooperation of the beneficiary with the municipal family support centre. This meant that social services which had earlier been provided for voluntary clients now had to be delivered by the social workers to clients required to participate, and in case this requirement was violated they had to apply sanctions which would have an effect on the livelihood of these clients. (Gilbert 1998, Csoba 2010a)

The supervisory role and the fact that unemployment benefits depended on certain conditions had already been present in the Hungarian welfare system before 1996, but verifying whether the clients fulfilled these requirements had not been the duty of

social workers or welfare services, but of members of the staff of labour market institutions, typically those working in administrative positions. Before the Social Act came into force, Governmental Decree 43/1992 (11th March) had regulated the social support of those unemployed persons who were no longer covered by unemployment benefit within the system of social governance. This support was a fixed sum, and the conditions of eligibility were based on the principle of neediness, as opposed to unemployment benefit, which was a type of insurance. To be eligible, the per capita income in the family of the applicant had to be lower than the minimum rate of old-age pension. As a further condition the decree stipulated that the applicant was required to cooperate with the local job centre. If this cooperation did not take place, the client was excluded from the benefit. After the Social Act was passed in 1993, the applicant still had to agree to cooperate with the competent labour agency in order to be entitled to the benefit. At this point the separation between the service and the supervision by the authorities was still guaranteed by the law.

However, with the amendment of the Social Act in 1994⁵, the requirement already appeared that the beneficiary had to cooperate not only with the job centre but also with the municipal government. As part of this cooperation, those having received an income compensation benefit for at least 6 months could be employed for a maximum of 40 hours per month in public employment projects organised by the municipal government. The unemployed were required to accept the work they were offered. A further change was that an unemployed person refusing cooperation was not allowed to receive an income compensation benefit for 6 months after the rejection of the place of work or community service offered. At this time it was already the case that a significant part of the long-term unemployed appeared within the system of social governance, and their administration (determining the rate of the aid, keeping contact, supervision, participation in public employment) was the duty of administrative staff working for the municipalities. Thus the supervisory role was transferred from the labour market institutions to the municipalities, and more specifically to their employees (civil servants) working in social governance.

When the Social Act was amended in 1996,⁶ a new form of support was introduced, the regular social allowance⁷ (RSZS). People who had not received unemployment benefit earlier but had cooperated with the municipality or with the job centre for a certain time were also entitled to this form of provision. A broad group of people who had not received any provision now applied for regular social allowance. However, because of the size of this target group the officials working in social governance were only able to deal with their administration (verification of eligibility for benefits, and payment of these benefits), but not with counselling for the recipients of the benefits,

⁵ Act VI of 1994 (in force since 1st February 1994).

⁶ Act CXXVIII of 1996 (in force since 1st January 1997)

⁷ Since the income compensation benefit introduced by the 1993 Social Act could only be paid for a maximum of 24 months, those in need only became eligible for regular social allowance after this period had elapsed. The rate of regular social allowance was different from the earlier income compensation benefit: it amounted to 70 % of the current minimum rate of old-age pension, but the period of payment was unlimited in this case.

nor supporting them in leaving unemployment. Therefore a number of support services for recipients of benefits were introduced gradually and operated by social workers in the municipalities' family support services, which could be utilised by the clients on a voluntary basis.

The next change of legislation affecting the recipients of social aid entered into force on 1st May 2000,⁸ when the cooperation of those receiving regular social allowance was specified as an obligation in the Social Act, as opposed to its voluntary status in the earlier years. This amendment marked the birth of the legal framework of conditional welfare provision, because since then proof of neediness was not sufficient anymore; what was also required from now on was a proof of 'worthiness'. The primary goal of the required checks by the family support services was to limit the constantly growing number of clients, and to urge clients who were able to work to enter the primary labour market. However, the objectives that professionals working in the social field were expected to achieve – promoting the return of inactives to the labour market, addressing difficulties that arise from their disadvantaged situation, and reducing budget spending – proved to be infeasible because of the low levels of qualification, regional disadvantages, a lack of available opportunities for work, and the large number of unemployed persons. A large proportion of the clients was unable to enter employment immediately.

In September 2005, the policy makers accordingly modified the regulation of the duties connected to clients receiving regular social allowance, and launched a new programme, the so-called "Inclusion programme". Its ultimate goal was still to facilitate the return of individuals to the primary labour market, but it provided for a two-year period during which programme elements – planned together with the client – supporting the achievement of this goal and the improvement of employability could be implemented.

The detailed provisions on the "Inclusion programme" were set out in Governmental Decree 63/2006 (27th March). This new type of cooperation emphasised the joint responsibility of the recipient of aid and the organisation he or she was required to cooperate with.

The situation of the recipients of social aid and the opportunities of the social workers have changed only slightly since the launch of the "Inclusion programme". Although the long-term unemployed are again required to stay in contact with job centres since 2009, and only those have remained clients of family support services – and receive regular social allowance – who are unsuited for everyday work because of their state of health, their age (above 55) or their special circumstances (family is caring for a child under the age of 14), the everyday activity of social workers in family support centres is still characterised by a lack of resources and uncertainty regarding their own status. Diminishing support, reduced services and extensive application of supervision measures toward aid recipients have become ubiquitous since 2009. The programme

⁸ Act CXXII of 1999 on the amendment of certain laws on labour and social issues (in force since 1st January 2000)

titled “Pathway to work”,⁹ which was launched in that year, as well as the “National Public Employment” programme which started in 2011, fundamentally transformed the preconditions for benefits. People of economically active age and able to work were strictly required to participate in public employment as a precondition of aid. Public employment as a form of employment was removed from the scope of the Labour Code.¹⁰ Thereby the wage for public employment sank below the guaranteed minimum income. The income that could be earned by 8 hours of work a day was a gross amount of 71,800 Hungarian Forints, that is, 77 % of the normal gross minimal wage in 2012.¹¹ Those recipients who are of economically active age and cannot enter public employment receive the employment substitute support,¹² which amounts to 22,800 Hungarian Forints a month (about €76) and depends on the condition that the applicant can provide proof of an employment relationship of at least 30 working days during the previous year. These conditions clearly strengthened the supervisory character even further instead of the service character of these provisions, resulted in precariousness becoming permanent because of the low level of the provisions, and contributed only minimally to the social and labour market reintegration of marginalised groups.

The social consequences of changes of legal regulation

During the past ten years the number and proportion of people living in poverty have grown significantly in Hungary. The 2008 crisis contributed greatly to the phenomenon that precarious situations have become omnipresent and permanent. Its economic and social consequences, including rising unemployment and lower real incomes, have made themselves felt here as well. The fact that people were forced out of the labour market, had difficulties repaying mortgages (which affected broad social groups), and rising costs of living (rising taxes, prices, inflation) resulted in a reduction of the consumption of households and the broadening of gaps in society. With the exception of 2005 and 2006, the income inequality index (defined as the quotient of the incomes of the top and bottom 20 % of the population with respect to income)

⁹ Act CVII of 2008 on the amendment of certain laws on social and labour issues comprised amendments of several legal acts. This act transformed regular social allowance, introduced the so-called ‘readiness allowance’ as another component of the ‘support for economically active age persons’ in addition to regular social allowance, for periods when the municipality is unable to offer community service work to the beneficiary. It defines the objectives of the programme, the tasks and duties of the municipal governments with regard to employment, and contains provisions on financing. Implementation with regard to forms of both financial provision and provision in kind is regulated by Governmental Decree 341/2008 (31st December).

¹⁰ Governmental Decree 170/2011 (24th August) on the specification of the wage for community service work and the guaranteed wage for community service work.

¹¹ The net value is 47,025 Forints = about 157 €/month.

¹² Act III of 1993 (Social Act), §35. The monthly amount of the employment substitute support is 80 % of the current minimum rate of old-age pension.

was constantly below 4 in Hungary, whereas between 2010 and 2011 this metric again approach the value of 4 (3.9). (A fenntartható...2013:108)

During the past 10 years the structure of poverty has also changed due to the transformation of the redistribution of income among the social groups. The standard of living of families raising children has deteriorated significantly, especially in single-parent families. It was observable that income shifted away from young citizens – and especially children – to older people, and from the economically active members of society toward pensioners. (Vastag 2012: 293) In 2010 the proportion of poor children was distributed along a broad scale, from 11 % in Denmark to 31 % in Romania. The rate in Hungary (20 %) lay around the middle of this scale. In households with children, poverty is 2.5 times as frequent as in those without children. During the past two years the situation of families raising children has become even worse. For example, poverty among 0- to 17-year-olds has increased from the value measured in 2010, 20.3 %, to 23.0 % in 2011. More than 16 % of children live in households that do not have any economically active members. The proportion in Hungary is twice as high as in the Czech Republic or in Poland, but it is also significantly higher than the similar indicators in Slovakia and Romania, or the average rate in the EU (10.6 %). (Magyarország 2011: 30, A fenntartható...2013:107) Thus in Hungarian society it is children and families raising them who live in the most precarious situations! In single-parent families, poverty rate in 2011 was near 30 %.¹³

According to data published by the KSH, the minimum subsistence level in 2011 was 84,000 Hungarian Forints / month for singles (1.01 million Forints / year). For families, this figure is – for 2 adults and 3 children – 277,000 Forints / month (3.32 million Forints / year). For comparison, the average gross income in Hungary is 2.52 million Forints / year. For families with children to earn an income that exceeds the minimum subsistence level, there should be at least two wage earners in the family earning at least the average income. However, in the current employment situation, where the proportion of active wage earners is only slightly higher than 50 per cent, this is rather unlikely. Atypical forms of employment, which are in fact widely recommended in such contexts, do not represent a real solution to emerge from poverty either. In 2011, due to the spread of atypical forms of employment (especially part-time employment), the income situation of people employed in this form has deteriorated to a higher than average degree, and their poverty risk rose from 0.43 to 0.45. It seems that in the context of the standard of living in Hungary, part-time employment does not offer adequate protection against poverty. Their rate of poverty is higher than the national average (16.7 %) and close to the corresponding average rate for people who are not employed (16.4 %). (Társadalmi... 2013:2)

In Hungary, 68.3 per cent of all social allowances consisted in financial provisions, which is higher than the average rate of the EU-27 (65.1 %). As opposed to the prevailing trend in the EU countries according to which the proportion of forms of support or services in kind is growing within the range of social provisions, financial support even gained ground between 2000 and 2009 despite the low level of

¹³ http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/eurostat_tablak/tabl/tsdsc250.html

provision. Even though Hungary is spending much less on the correction of inequalities than the EU average,¹⁴ social transfer payments that are intended to reduce poverty still consume significant sums.¹⁵ (Társadalmi... 2013:9)

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¹⁴ As opposed to the EU average of 29.5 %, spending on social protection in Hungary only constituted 23.4 % of the GDP. The value of the payments per capita at purchasing power parity was half of the EU-27 average. The only area where the amount of expenses is higher than the EU average is the provision for families and children (Hungary: 13.2 %, EU: 8 %).

¹⁵ Aid that is available on a needs basis reaches those with a low income and the poor through the municipal governments. Municipal aid comprised 2.5 per cent of all social allowances in 2012, or 0.5 per cent of the GDP. (KSH 2013: 3)

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VIDA GUDŽINSKIENĖ

*The provision of day care services for the children in
need*

Introduction

The main aim of Day care centers (CDC) for children is the reduction of social exclusion of children and prevention of children removal from the families of origin, complex (social, psychological, pedagogical) support for the child and his/her family - these kind of activities are directly related to the needs of the children at risk. Currently, the highest numbers of disadvantaged families in Lithuania come from Kaunas, Vilnius and Klaipeda counties. The social services within day care centers have been provided for 6873 children in 2012, which is 14.2 percent less than in 2011 and even 18.1 percent less than in 2010.

This subject of study is been popular among the Lithuanian and foreign authors. Analyzing the experience of foreign countries B. Palavinskiene (2001) discussed the possibilities of prevention of domestic violence. The study area of M. Black, M. Raymond and others (2002) – the neglect of children of the families at risk; the authors have focused on the pre-school age children in rural areas. B. Kairiene (2006) has studied the possibilities to alter the aggressive behavior of parents towards their children, emphasizing the contribution of teachers in these situations. According to the author, the educators should take the role of social workers as well – building the close relationships with students and communicate openly, encourage them to confide in harrowing matters. G. Kondrotaite (2006) studied the social context of social risk families, analyzed the newly formed factors affecting the expression of social tensions. L. Dromantiene and R. Salaseviciute (2006) analyzed the various problems arising within the professional social work with children and tried to identify the role of social workers in respect of the concrete situation.

V. Gudzinskiene and R. Gedminiene (2011) analyzed the psychological, social, and learning difficulties of the children from the families where parents abused alcohol. M. Wadsby (2012) focused his study on the psychosocial crises of mothers and their possible negative effects, such as alcohol, drugs abuse and the impact of these characteristics on children. V. Gudzinskiene and A. Railiene (2012) studied the social skills and professional competencies of the staff members of day care centers for children. S. Stoltz, M. Londen and others (2013) were interested in determining the connections and correlations between the children aggressive behavior and their sex as well as the impact of aggressive behavior to the level of the child's successful socialization. A. Crowley, S. Jeon (2013) studied the compliance of the services

provided by the children day care centers with the requirements of the licenses and other pieces of legislation, with a focus on children's physical health and safety.

Meeting the needs of children at risk in Day care centers

The needs of children from families at risk

In order the person is able to meet his needs the certain conditions of the environment should be present and these conditions must specifically correlate with personal action opportunities, as well as behavior and experience characteristics (Kisielyte-Sadauskienė (2003)). Only then any kind of behavior makes sense - people acting purposefully can realize their needs.

According to V. Legkauskas (2008), the two types of needs are inherent for humans: 1) biological needs – these are defined as an absolute dependence on the physical conditions essential to the existence as the failure to meet them would cause death (food and water); 2) social needs – these are defined as the dependence on the relationships and communication between people. The failure to meet these kinds of needs won't be fatal; however these needs motivate and encourage people to communicate and collaborate with other people.

According to Leonavicius, (1993) Johnson (2001) the need is that element that is needed for the person or social system successfully function in specific conditions. The need is not something one is wishing to gain or have - it means a lack which barriers a person or system to develop and grow. According to the authors mentioned above, the needs predetermine the expectations, motivation and goals of the person, while needs met form certain opportunities. The needs of young people are the motivator of individual or social group (community) activity. The emergence and growth of needs is directly linked with motivation of young people, generally - what we want to change, achieve or gain, something what would be beneficial or leading to solve the problem.

According to V. Atkociuniene, S. Navasaitiene, does A Aleksandravicius (2012) the need can be described as a state of the individual. This may be a lack of something, or the requirement for something when the internal and external functioning conditions do not match.

According to Maslow's theory of needs hierarchy a person reaches the fullness of life when meeting the highest needs in the hierarchy - actualizing and realizing themselves. This theory emphasizes that the emergence of higher needs is based on the satisfaction of lower ones. J.Siniciene and others (2012) argue that the new base needs emerge in every stage of psychosocial development of child. Lacking the possibilities to meet these needs, the child faces difficulties to overcome the crisis specific to every stage, which obviously negatively affects the dynamics of development and the physical health. Based on the theory of E.Ericson, many authors believe that the 6 – 11 years life stage is characterized by excellence (diligence), or worthlessness. It is very important to encourage the child to perform independently or complete the task on

his own in this stage. When a child is not encouraged or when attention is not paid to his efforts to carry out the work - the feelings of worthlessness is forming.

One of the most obvious problematic cases when the needs of the child are not met within the family is when the family is considered as the family at risk. In order to provide the support for the children to meet their needs various forms of political and social action are employed.

The Act of Social Services (1996) social services defines as a form of non-monetary assistance to people when other guarantors of the social security system are not effective. As emphasize A. Guogis and Gudelis (2005), although this definition is quite general and is suitable for most services, but a more detailed regulation of social services is dependent on the same social work content and organization within different types of social service agencies. According to these authors, the main purpose of social services is to meet the vital needs of the people and create the sedate conditions for people when they are unable to do so themselves. Moreover the authors argue that the definition of social services can be explored further – these are such the services, which aim to improve the quality of life and provide better living conditions for people who partly or in whole are unable to take care of themselves. Based on this definition, social services, as well as all other services can be bought or sold on the market. Social services for socially disadvantaged families or families at risk are provided in order to develop the initiatives and motivation of grown up members of the families to create a safe, healthy and harmonious environment for children. Social services focus on maintaining close family relationships with the society and to ensure the education, coaching and development of the children (Services for families at risk, 2013).

In addition to the biological needs, the 6-11 years old children have characteristic social needs: learning and cognition while the children from 12 years old - integration of social roles and the identity search. In order to meet these needs the active participation of children in the social life is required – within the family, school, friends circle.

According to J. Siniciene (2012), 12-19 years age group is considered as teenagers. The authors stress that identity or the uncertainty in respect to social roles is characteristic to this stage. At this age period psycho-physical changes are causing many teenagers suffering unexperienced feelings, so it is important that the teenagers purposefully integrate their social roles that would help to achieve the self-awareness.

It is obvious that children growing within social risk families often have no or lack necessary skills - to communicate, to discover, to create. This significantly complicates the realization of needs of those children growing in disadvantaged families. The social services in day care centers are organized for the best interests of such children. The activities organized in day care centers come under several types: rapid occupation and free time activities; physical and social environment for learning, communication and discovery.

The functions and work strategies of CDC's

The social support system is currently functioning in Lithuania that aims to provide and ensure the social and material assistance to the disadvantaged families and the children. The services are designed to promote the motivation and activity of families affected by social risk in the field of overcoming children education problems (Masiliauskiene and Griskute, 2010).

The social assistance for social risk families in Lithuania currently provide: municipalities and child protection agencies, social welfare departments, family support and crisis centers, pedagogical-psychological services, care homes, various educational institutions and NGO's. One specific form of social support services for social risk families are children day care centers (CDC), which activities are based on a systematic set of measures designed to protect the social interests of children, to ensure social security and realize the basic needs.

According to E. Masiliauskiene and V. Griskute (2010), CDC in Lithuania are treated a social services agency, or entity providing social support to disadvantaged families and children as well as initiating their education and training. The authors state that CDC activities are legally recognized by following laws: The Law on Education of Republic of Lithuania (1991), The National Children Day Care Centers 2005-2007 years program of Republic of Lithuania (2004), The Social Services Law of Republic of Lithuania (2006), The recommendations for work with social risk families of Republic of Lithuania (2003), and Social Services Directory of Republic of Lithuania (2006).

CDC aim is to provide non-institutional childcare, the organization of extra curriculum activities in order to meet the needs of children that are not met within the family for various reasons. On another hand CDC provide support for parents in developing their parenting skills. Generally CDC have these main objectives (Masiliauskiene and Griskute, 2010):

- 1) Helping to solve the issues and problems that children growing within social risk families are facing - via education, informal learning, activities and social work with parents at risk;
- 2) to ensure the adequate conditions for the socialization of children; organizing the prevention of children involvement in criminal activities; coordination of social services provision for social risk families.

In respect to the above objectives the essential tasks of CDC are distinguished:

- 1) The provision of various social services (education, psychological and social) in order to develop appropriate social skills (communication, cooperation, self-employment) that are essential for the better integration of social risk families and children in society.
- 2) Active cooperation and work with the family in order to ensure good enough for your child to ensure the appropriate conditions for the growth of the children;

- 3) The organization of sapid occupation and free time activities for children growing in disadvantaged families, aiming to prevent the children of using the substances and getting involved in criminal activities;
- 4) Strengthening the moral attitudes and values of the children, hoping that they will become functional members of the society;
- 5) Contributing to any social problem-solving and prevention initiatives and ensuring the security and safety of the society (Masiliauskiene and Griskute, 2010).

The authors also argue that the variety of complex services offered for the social risk families and children can help the families and children to deal with social, cultural, economical and learning difficulties effectively and provide emotional and physical safety for children along with the development of parental capacities. Obviously children day care centers offer all these measures as well as ensure the complex occupation and social support for children after the school.

Table 1.: The number of children who have received children day care services in 2008–2012.

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Republic of Lithuania	6 766	6 764	8 387	8 013	6 873
Alytus district	215	231	269	352	399
Kaunas district	1 502	1 151	1 452	1 475	1 102
Klaipeda district	875	839	1 071	659	565
Marijampole district	605	651	525	461	284
Panevezys district	669	726	657	574	406
Siauliai district	563	379	309	301	542
Taurage district	72	66	105	60	47
Telsiai district	378	518	229	375	446
Utena district	204	311	243	122	231
Vilnius district	1 683	1 892	3 527	3 634	2 851

Source: The department of statistics of Republic of Lithuania, internet <http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/default.asp?w=1280>

Analyzing the provision of the day care centers services for children we notice that the number of children who have received the services in 2012 has dropped 14,2 percent if comparing with 2011. Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipeda districts were the ones providing the most services (Table No 1). It is important to notice that some of the districts can be characterized by the growing number of services provided in the same period – 11.8 percent more children received these services in 2012 in Alytus district, Telsiai district – 15,9 percent more, Siauliai and Utena districts – respectively 44,5 and 47,2 percent more.

The volunteers also take an important part in CDC activity. According to O. Grincevicius (2011) the volunteers are mostly responsible for the free time and leisure activities in the children day care centers. On another hand, having the regular contact and forming close relationships with children the volunteers perform the role of big

brothers or sisters. The volunteers also participate in summer camps and other outdoor trips. The volunteering helps to restore the broken or form new relationships with the community.

Table 2.: The number of the employees and volunteers in children day care centers in 2008–2011

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Employees with the work contracts	3 209	3 045	2 663	2 934	3 030
Full time employees with the work contracts	1 954	1 821	1 557	1 657	1 766
The number of social workers of total number of employees with the work contracts	1 598	1 503	1 264	1 330	1 484
The number of full time social workers of total number of employees with the work contracts	1 110	1 012	783	935	1 054
Volunteers	2 161	2 272	2 847	2 935	2 963

Source: The department of statistics of Republic of Lithuania, internet <http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/default.asp?w=1280>

According to the data collected by The Department of Statistics of Lithuania, the number of the full-time employees at CDC in the three years period was the highest in 2012 (Table 2). It should be emphasized that the number of volunteers in 2012 was the highest in five years. I. Janulyte (2006) points out that the young volunteers often get involved in voluntary work with children; they are actively involved in children's education and social support systems.

As stated by the author, the volunteers working with children mostly engaged in the following activities: working with children in day care centers, camps, organize their leisure time, consult by phone, conducts educational seminars for peers.

E. Masiliauskiene and V. Griskute (2010) claim that it is vital to create the favorable learning environment especially focusing on the preparation of homework. In this sense, it is important to develop a child's sense of responsibility and the child should be aware that free time activities are only possible after the homework is done and this is because the learning is now an essential part of his activities. CDC's are also responsible for the development of other important general skills that promote independence and integration into society (housekeeping for example). On another hand, the provision of material support for children is also important, especially the meals provided at every day basis – meeting major physiological need. Kids relevant, useful and necessary as well as the fact that the VDC to them for aid food is even the possibility to end up bringing food to his house. Material aspect of VDC is important for children so that they can receive daily steps - clothing and shoes. The food packages, clothing, shoes and other material support being distributed to the families is another important aspect of CDC's. In general, however the main aim of the CDC's

in our country is to perform the prevention of social problems of social risk families and this is achieved by the complex system of services provided. The environment offered by the CDC's help to realize the physiological and social needs of the children that are especially important to the development of the personality and successful process of socialization.

It is also important to draw the attention to the fact that not all the CDC's in the country are creating the conditions for the realization of the children needs and this is mostly predetermined by the lack of resources (poor working space, lack of finances or educational and work materials). This fact requires the further study of the opportunities offered in the CDC's to meet the needs of the children from families at risk. Although the first children day care center in Lithuania was founded in 1996 in Kaunas, we still lack the studies of the capacities and activities of CDC's as they are mainly analyzed in the management approach – technical cooperation possibilities, coordination and administration of the centers are the main fields of studies. The experience of grownups are mainly discussed in these studies – the competences of the staff, the work content and other things, however the activities of the CDC's are mainly focusing on the children and their experiences are very little studied.

Methodology of the research

The scientific problematics. The researchers often focus on the following essential aspects in the scientific literature: social problems existing within the families at risk; the influence of these problems on children socialization and integration; and the role of children day care centers in the context of helping to solve these problems. However the study of children day care centers activities as the way to prevent the social problems of children at risk had been very fragmented and the possibility of meeting the needs of children in these institutions generally haven't been covered. The study attempts to view the needs of children at risk and possibilities to meet them in greater focus. The subject is been analyzed in the following aspects: the possibilities to meet the need of children at risk in day care centers; the main aspects of activities organized in these centers; and the benefits or support offered to help disadvantaged families and children.

The object of the study – meeting the needs of children at risk in the children day care centers. *The aim* – to analyze the activities of children day care centers in the context of helping to meet the needs of disadvantaged children.

Objectives:

- 1) To highlight the needs of children at risk and the problematic of realization
- 2) To reveal the possibilities provided in the children day care centers to meet the needs of children at risk.

Survey sample – the employees and volunteers working in the children day care centers (CDC) within the most disadvantaged areas of the country. 106 employees and volunteers involved in children day care centers had participated in the study. The minimum period of 1.5 years of involvement in CDC was the main criteria for

choosing respondents. The study was performed in the CDC based in the most disadvantaged areas of Lithuania.

Study organization - the study was conducted using IT. A questionnaire was posted on the site www.apklausa.lt. Link to the e-survey was e-mailed to the leaders of the CDC at the same time asking for the permission and mediation to interview their staff. Respondents answered questions anonymously. The total number of 106 responses was achieved. The study was performed in January-February 2014.

Study data collection methods – the survey with e-questionnaire was used in order to study the possibilities provided by CDC to meet the needs of children of social risk families. The questions of the questionnaire were constructed using a nominal and ordinal scales, all questions were closed-ended.

Data analysis methods - data was processed using Microsoft Excel for Windows and SPSS 17.0 (Statistical Package for Social Science) software. Relations were assessed using Spearman correlation coefficients. Statistical error probability p critical threshold indicates the permissible size of the statistical error in the decision. $P < 0.05$ statistical margin of error was used in this study. Thus, the statistical solutions that do not meet the conditions of $p > 0.05$, will be considered as invalid in this study.

Ethics of study. The study met the requirements for ethical research (according to Bitinas and others, 2008) - respondents were not asked to answer personal questions, they all participated in the study voluntarily, answered questions anonymously, were introduced to the content and purpose of usage of the data obtained during the survey.

The empirical study on the possibilities offered by the CDC's to realize the needs of the children at risk

Characteristics of the respondents


The 106 respondents were involved in this study. The majority of the respondents were female (91.5 percent). The distribution of respondents according to age was rather uneven – the biggest percentage (41.5 percent) was in 41-50 years old group while the least (1.9 percent) - in <20 years age group. The majority of the respondents (69.8 percent) have had a university degree. The social workers compounded one third of all respondents.

The needs of the children at risk attending CDC

It is obvious as discussed earlier that children from the families at risk often don't have adequate opportunities to meet some of their needs. In order their socialization process is not disrupted and they are successfully integrated into the society, they need some sort of social assistance provided by the relevant responsible authorities - one of these are CDC's.

The research has helped to identify the CDC's staff and volunteers opinion about the needs of children in need and the level of realization of these needs.

Diagram 1.: The opinion of CDC staff and volunteers on the main educational needs of children from families at risk (%), n=106



The opinion of the CDC staff and volunteers in respect to educational needs of the children at risk is shown in diagram No. 1. Most of the respondents agreed that the most important educational needs of children are self expression education and training activities (80.2 percent), learning to look for information in the CDC library (69.8 percent.) as well as artistic and creative activities (67 percent.). The respondents were also asked to answer how much time is dedicated to educational activities in CDC's. More than half of the respondents (58.5 percent.) indicated that 1 to 2 hours are dedicated to education, preparation of homework every day, almost one-third (32.1 percent) indicated 2-3 hours, a small number (9.4 percent.) claimed they only spend less than 1 hour a day . Most of the respondents (82.1 percent) claimed that the educational needs of the children from social risk families, who attend CDC's are fully met.


The study also sought to determine how often the educational activities have been organized in CDC. It is been estimated that in most CDC's the educational activities

were organized 3-4 times a week or even more often (60.4 percent.), 1-2 times a week (34 percent.), 1-2 times a week once in two weeks (5.7 percent).

Using the Spearman correlation coefficient it was aspired to determine whether the CDC staff and volunteers opinion that one of the reasons why children from families at risk who had difficulties at school attended CDC because of the educational activities organized 3-4 times a week or more. The key statistical link ($r = 0.434$, $p = 0.04$) between these symptoms has been identified.

According to V. Gudžinskiene and R. Gedminiene (2011) based on C. Black (1981), K. Sher (1991), JG Woititz (2002), those children who have not possibilities for proper rest and conditions to do the homework, can have a variety of emotional and behavioral disorders at school. Thus, it is important that the children from social risk families could realize all their educational needs in other environments.

Diagram No 2. The opinion of CDC staff and volunteers on the realization of educational needs of children at risk, (%), n=106



The study also tried to disclose the CDC staff and volunteers opinion on the children from families at risk essential social needs in respect of social skills. In Diagram 2 we see that the respondents accepted all the proposed claims, however focused on the development of communication skills most of all (92.5 percent). The communication is the basis for co-operation, every person must be able to communicate in order to share their experiences with other members of society, able to work together to achieve a common goal. As stated by M. Miskiniene and A. Petkeviciene (2010) obviously it is possible to realize the communication needs or to gain recognition, constructively discuss only while being in the group.

Particularly significant in the sense of children socialization is respondents' prominence to the encouragement of comprehension, tolerance towards the smaller children (89.6 percent.). According to the data of public organization "Save the Children" (2013) study, more than half of school-age children in the country suffer bullying in schools, as well as the same number of them are bullying other children. Moreover - approximately one-fifth of schoolchildren are experiencing physical abuse at schools. Having these numbers in mind it is very important to encourage the

development of tolerance and promote the discussions about morality and values while working with disadvantaged children growing in families at risk. It can also be proposed that the children attending CDC will develop essential social skills, as 88.7 percent of respondents emphasized the development of child's responsibility. The personality taking the responsibility for their actions and interests is valued not only by the people who are directly dealing with them, but also by the society as a whole.


I. Leliugiene and A. Juodeikaite (2005) claim that the child growing in social risk families is usually lacking social skills. One of the objectives of CDC's is to enable the children at risk learning how to overcome the difficulties they face in socialization process. Surely it is obvious that only the socially mobile person can successfully integrate into society and be useful to themselves and others. Thus, the study aimed to find out what is the focus level on the development of children's social skills in CDC. For this reason we asked the respondents how much time per day CDC's focus on the development of social skills. It was revealed that the most of CDC (77.4 percent.) spend > 3 hours per day developing social skills of disadvantaged children. 19.8 percent spent 2 to 3 hours a day while 2.8 percent - less than one hour. It could be claimed the CDC pay enough attention to the development of social skills of those children in need, which allows the assumption that these children are given the possibilities to meet their social skills gaining needs.

It was studied if one of the reasons why children from social risk families attend CDC is the fact that they are brought to the CDC by social pedagogues working in schools is linked to the fact that in order to meet the social skills development needs in CDC, children communication skills development and children understanding, tolerance, tolerance promotion are organized.

The application of Spearman correlation coefficient established a strong statistical relationship between the variables ($r = 0.758$, $p = 0.001$) in first case – the child from social risk family brought to CDC by social pedagogue is been characterized by the lack of communication skills. In the second case, the weak link between the variables ($r = 0.382$, $p = 0.01$) has been identifies - such a child is also lacking the understanding, patience and tolerance to others.

Most of the respondents (67 percent) claimed that the social needs of children in respect to social skills were fully realized. Almost one-third (30.2 percent) of respondents indicated that these needs are met at the medium level and only 2.8 percent considered that the social needs related to social skills were not met and this could be identified as problematic aspect in the CDC functioning.

As stated by F. C. Yuen (2005), the way the person is spending his free time has a great influence on the purposeful development of the personality. Purposefully planned leisure not only helps a person to discover the favorite areas, develop the creativity, communication skills, but also prevents the individual from aimless wasting of time. This is especially important subject of study in respect to children at risk as the aimless free time can lead them to criminal activity, inappropriate social contact. Social risk families are often not particularly interested in what their children are engaging in the time free of school and homework time, while the child at risk has no abilities to choose and organize the appropriate free time himself.


Diagram No 3. The activities organized in CDC, (%), n=106

We wanted to identify the activities provided by CDC in order to ensure rapid occupation and free time for children at risk. In this case it is considered that the target group children's have rich free time when they have the opportunity not only to participate CDC community life but to spend some time in other environments (summer camps, excursions), and thus to expand their horizons and gain more experience. We can see from the data shown in Diagram No 3 that in most cases CDC initiated the involvement of children in the events, competitions, public actions organized by school or municipality (67 percent.). It is important to note that significantly less often children are going to excursions, trips to the countryside, museums and exhibitions (42.5 percent.), as well as to summer camps (17 percent.). Trips to other environments are expanding personal horizons, help to understand the differences between social decisions, make it possible to meet new people, get into new situations – most of disadvantaged families lack sufficient financial resources or simply an interest in organizing trips for children themselves, thus it is important that these activities were organized by CDC. The respondents were asked how often CDC initiated the organization of free time and leisure activities (out of CDC) children at risk. It was interesting to find out that most of these activities are organized in CDC's only once a month or even less often (89.6 percent.). Only a small number (10.4 percent) of respondents indicated that such activities are organized 1-2 times in three weeks. Obviously this could be influenced by the limited CDC financial resources. As it has been discussed by D. Antiniene and R. Lekaviciene (2012), based on Lekaviciene (2001), the children from social risk families often lack social activity as well. That's why it is really important that disadvantaged children living in families at risk had the opportunity to spend their leisure time purposefully – to see new things as well as learn something, to take part in certain activities and try their selves in new activities, looking for their identity at the same time. According to the opinion of the respondents of the study, the social needs related to the meaningful free time of children in families at risk were poorly met. Almost one-third (29.2 percent) of the

respondents claimed that they believed that these needs were met at the medium level. The data indicates limited CDC opportunities to meet the social needs related to the meaningful free time of children at risk. There obviously is the need to identify the reasons that limit the realization of these needs.

It has also been focused on the association between the opinion of the respondents that difficulties they are facing in their work are affecting the realization of the need of children at risk and the opinion that children's needs in respect of meaningful leisure are poorly realized. For the purposes of Spearman correlation between these traits essential statistical correlation ($r = 0.432$, $p = 0.04$), t. y. difficulties arising in work with disadvantaged children in families due to the employment of children leisure satisfaction levels. The application of Spearman correlation coefficient established a strong statistical relationship between the variables ($r=0,432$; $p=0,04$). In this case – difficulties faced working with disadvantaged children are affecting the realization of social needs associated with sapid free time and leisure.

Diagram 4.: The opinion of CDC staff and volunteers about the core needs related to healthy living lifestyle (%), n=106



The study aimed to find out what were the social needs of children attending CDC's in relation to the healthy living lifestyle. The most of the respondents emphasized the education of self-care and personal hygiene (Diagram No 4.). It should be noted that the least of respondents emphasized children sex education (30.02 percent.) and children interest in the promotion of a healthy diet (46.2 percent.). Having these findings in mind it is obvious that the situation isn't consoling as the parents of the children at risk often avoid speaking about the sexual education issues with their children, are not interested to do this or simply are not able disclosing the theme. On another hand the parents of social risk families aren't interested in developing the healthy living lifestyle skills. Due to the lack of economic resources or appropriate knowledge, the diet isn't balanced, the children lack physical activities, are keen in passive way of their leisure.

As stated by N. Frishman (2013) it is particularly important to encourage children to choose the healthy lifestyle in the childhood - physical activity, proper diet, healthy lifestyle, while the certain knowledge of the child will help to prevent many health issues in the future and also to maintain a positive attitude towards learning and in general to achieve their goals. L. Mann (2013) highlights the exceptional importance of the healthy living menu in CDC to the formation of healthy living lifestyle.

Thus, respondents were asked how much time is spent daily in CDC to develop the skills of healthy lifestyle and meeting similar needs. It was revealed that most (78.3 percent) of the CDC's spent 1-2 hours per day in order to promote healthy living lifestyle. 17 percent of the respondents claimed they spent only <1 hour per day on such activities in CDC, another 4.7 percent of the respondents claimed their CDC's offer 2-3 hours healthy lifestyle promotion activities daily. According to the opinion of 82,1 percent of respondents the social needs of target group in respect to healthy living lifestyle development were realized in medium level. The opinion that these needs are met fully emphasized only 13.2 percent of all respondents. We wanted to find out whether the participants' opinion that the social needs related to the healthy living lifestyles of children at risk is realized on the medium level is associated with the opinion that the CDC volunteers and staff are currently experiencing the lack of competences related to work with social risk families. Application of Spearman correlation coefficient between these variables the weak statistical correlation ($r = 0.38$, $p = 0.01$) as identified. On another hand the lack of the competences can also be responsible for the certain level of the realization of social needs in CDC.

Thus, summarizing the data of the study we can note that the CDC staff and volunteers emphasize self-realization development activities as the key educational needs of children from social risk families. The importance of the educational needs can be identified from the fact that educational activities in the CDC's are organized more often than the others. The social skills development activities are also organized pretty often while the rapid free time and leisure activities are the least popular in CDC.

In the frame of the social skills development the respondents of the study most often emphasize the promotion of understanding and tolerance among the children at risk. In the frame of leisure needs – the opportunities to participate in the events, contest and competitions organized by local schools and municipalities. In the frame of healthy lifestyle education the respondents mark out the development of self-care and personal hygiene skills.

Summarizing it is obviously important to notice that the best realized needs of the children from social risk families are in the areas of education and social skills development. Meanwhile the healthy lifestyle development needs are realized at the medium level and the leisure and rapid free time needs are poorly met. In general it is essential to promote and develop the opportunities to meet the healthy lifestyle and leisure needs of children at risk. This is also very important because of the fact that the CDC services are also offered for the adolescents (11-13 years old) who are experiencing one of the most problematic development stage and usually are particularly sensitive.

Conclusions

Results

1) Based on the insights of the scientific literature and legislation the social risk family is characterized as the family where the parents due to the negative behavior, economic circumstances and other reasons are not performing their social status within the family function or the functioning is abnormal. The reasons why the family is identified as social risk are often linked together and are affecting each other or stimulate the emergence of the new. The needs of the children of such families are not realized or realized in insufficient level, their socialization is impaired – resulting these children to face a variety of social, physical, psychological problems.

2) One of the main aims of the children day care centers (CDC) is to help the children from the social risk families to realize their needs and thereby to facilitate the socialization and integration into society. These institutions aim giving the opportunities to meet the needs of children by creating the conditions to learn, create, spend their leisure time, engage in a favorite activity. These services help gaining the communication skills, enable children to satisfy their core needs and develop self-confidence.

- The empirical study showed that:
Usually the CDC located in the most disadvantaged areas of the country provided the following services to the families at risk: giving the educational opportunities to the children; providing the information about social assistance services. The best developed services within CDC appear to be in the field of cooperation with social partners and the educational support to the children.
- The CDC's of the most disadvantaged areas in the country are most likely to have greatest potential to meet the needs of children from social risk families in relation to the development of social skills and education, while the promotion of healthy living lifestyle skills are only realized on the medium level. The least potential CDC have in organizing meaningful leisure activities, these needs are usually poorly realized;
- The social workers and volunteers working in CDC's believe that the educational activities in CDC are organized more often than others as they are responding to the fact that the children from social risk families are facing learning difficulties more often. The activities that are helping to develop social skills and realize related needs are organized quite often as well, while the least attention is paid to the realization of rapid free time needs;
- The self-expression development activities are stressed in CDC in order to create the conditions for the children at risk to learn. Most CDC stress the promotion of understanding, tolerance in respect to social skills development needs. Opportunities for children to participate in competition, events organized by local schools and municipalities are the most often organized activities that should help

meeting the rapid free time needs. Personal hygiene and self-care education is specific to healthy lifestyle promotion;

- It is also very important to draw attention that the realization of the leisure needs of children from social risk families in CDC can be affected by the difficulties employees and volunteers experience in their direct work with children. The lack of the competences of the volunteers and employees can also be associated with the level of the realization of healthy lifestyle needs.

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FRANZ HAMBURGER

Dynamics of welfare – social work in the ascendant and under pressure

Trying to talk about the dynamics of welfare in 30 minutes is like the flight of Icarus. If you go too high, your words combust on the abstractness of the theories.¹ If you fly too low, you sink in the water of the various forms of welfare. So I will try to stay in the middle. Perhaps Icarus also managed it for at least 30 minutes.

“Welfare” is not a fixed quantity; it is the subject of political debate, and decisions about it are made in a discursive process. The participants do not, of course, have equal chances of influencing the decision. This presentation of a discourse on welfare goes beyond functionalist theories and looks for the normative bases for welfare.

Historical aspects

Functionalism can explain the intervention of the welfare state in society as a necessity that arose from the industrialisation and urbanisation that started in the 19th century. Social policy deals with the risks threatening the livelihood of wage-earners such as illness, old age, disability, family reproduction. The social insurance systems in European states have experienced a fairly stable development, and have been stepped up and extended to other risks. Social policy in the area of production related to workers' rights in the workplace and to labour market policy has undergone a different development in the different countries. European integration and the freedom of movement have put this area under pressure. Finally, there is a third type of social policy which relates to the area of reproduction. This deals with education and upbringing, care and medical treatment, social support in all emergency situations. Whilst we can find these welfare measures in all the countries of Europe, the extent of realisation is rather different. These differences can be explained on a historical basis. Here, the important question is how the social problem was defined in the respective country at the start of the development of the welfare state (Kaufmann 2003: 33). As a consequence, rather different forms of welfare pluralism developed in Europe. The same players are involved everywhere – the state and the market, social organisations and private households. The respective proportions of their activities are very different.

National discourse decides on the relationship of the players and the extent to which welfare is to be realised – the fact that this is no longer tenable in the process of European integration and globalisation will have to be discussed. One other aspect is

¹ The paper presented at the Conference „Radicalization and social conflicts in XXI. century” organised by the University of Debrecen, Department of Sociology and Social Policy on. 8 October, 2014.

important for narrowing the topic down further, i.e. so that I can then concentrate on social work: “welfare” is, to start with, a “problem formula for public communication ... that relates to the mediation between the particular forms of lifestyle and the condition or development prospects of a community” (Kaufmann 2003: 227). It makes discussion about the correct degree of welfare difficult, therefore, as a link is always established between the collective activities and the individuals and their behaviour. So who deserves to receive aid from the state? What conditions must the individual meet in order to be given institutional support?

We immediately recall the mechanisms for discrediting or privileging groups of people. The right to aid is granted to the deserving poor; it is denied to the undeserving poor. Despised groups such as foreigners, Sinti and Roma or other minorities are supposed to receive no help at all or, at the very least, to be strictly monitored. The questions asked today, however, also include: should old people really receive all the medical benefits? Shouldn't infringements of the requirements of the public employment services entail much tougher sanctions? For which members of the family should the social insurance benefits be available? Do children really have to have health insurance with their working parents?

Normative bases

These questions not only relate to the systematic concept of welfare production. They are also typical for a time in which the legitimacy of the welfare state has long been questioned. In any event, when welfare and welfare production are determined in such a way, the meaning of the word “social policy” becomes clear, as “social” addresses the relationship of people with their society and with the state – and vice versa. It is the same with the term “social pedagogy”.

For a long time, there was a conviction in Europe, shared by both the bourgeoisie and the labour movement and originating from the Enlightenment and Christian ideas. It was “the belief in the inherent value of every person and the perspective of a peaceful coexistence in liberty and equality”, as Franz Xaver Kaufmann expressed it (Kaufmann 2003: 38). This “social” idea sometimes kept capitalism somewhat under control; in particular, it was of benefit to the latter, promoted national loyalties and gave rise to social security benefits – on different levels, of course. Thomas Humphrey Marshall summarised this dynamic in his theory of citizenship. (Marshall 1992). It is, therefore, a matter of de-commodification in the sense that man is no longer a commodity on the labour market and other markets and is able to determine his relationship with the environment in his own way. To this end, the state, as the all-powerful player, must provide him with rights. If the state is no longer able or no longer wants to do this because it is driven into a corner by other powers or subscribes to nationalist ideas, there is a social crisis.

The welfare state

First, however, we must remember that a period of economic growth, which was also fostered by welfare policy, i.e. by the improvement of incomes, pension and labour market policy, co-determination and the expansion of the health system, was achieved in Europe after the Second World War. Burkart Lutz (1989) has analysed this period and shown that the improvement of the income of the majority of the population that was possible on the basis of full employment was the decisive driving force for development. At the same time, however, in “Der kurze Traum immerwährender Prosperität” (The Short-lived Dream of Perpetual Prosperity), he shows that this period was associated with a unique set of circumstances.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the experience of national solidarity during the war and in the post-war period and the political awareness that wars are always also made possible by capital for financing showed that the normative requirements for a welfare state also increased in this period.

Globalisation

There are doubtless a variety of causes for the crisis of the welfare state diagnosed from the middle of the 1970s. The most important may be the fall of the rate of profit that caused companies in Japan, Western Europe and North America to further expand their international markets. The expansion of the markets and production locations creates an international value creation chain which puts the domestic locations under pressure. Thus, globalisation becomes a boomerang that hits the employees in the central locations. The reduction of wages and social standards is pushed forward with the argument that cheaper production is possible elsewhere. The transformation from the “Keynesian welfare state” to the market state is far-reaching. The middle classes, which particularly benefitted from the welfare state, come under pressure. The hopes of an upswing felt in the 1950s and 1960s transform into fears of decline. To safeguard the location, the state mobilises cheap labour through on-going discipline.

The process that is forging ahead through globalisation was introduced through European integration. Within a common market, the states are trying to bring as much investment as possible to their country through the promotion of industry. One means is making labour cheaper. Germany has already taken this path for a long time and thus secured its hegemonic position in Europe. It is an irony of history that the European Central Bank is now asking the trade unions to demand hefty wage increases. Making labour cheaper leads to the growth in poverty, as well as wealth, in all the countries in Europe, with the result that the wealthy in Europe, along with the banks, form a power elite that has autocratic control of the state (“oligarchic rule”). Democracy is reduced to agreement to a policy that is sold as the only alternative.

Americanisation?

One feature of this policy is the European, especially the German, social policy coming significantly closer to the American model (Seeleib-Kaiser 2014). Belonging to a skilled workforce becomes, more than ever, the key condition for a secure livelihood. The social benefits for the unemployed and pensioners are reduced and get closer to the American level. Anyone who does not belong to the workforce continuously and anyone who is unemployed for a long time is threatened by poverty and really becomes poor in old age. The difference between the European social model and the American one is, however, retained, as there is a guaranteed minimum income in Europe at the level of social welfare. The citizens are not robbed of their social rights entirely; decommodification survives at a modest level. If however, as is the case in Germany, the sanctions of the public employment services also reduce the benefits to the minimum subsistence level, even this baseline of membership of society is destroyed. In any case, the divide between the population living in poverty and those in the workforce has increased. This has a disciplining effect, with result that even undesired and poorly paid work is accepted, up to the professional classes. Fixed terms in employment contracts are now found throughout the area.

When thinking about the future there are also, at first glance – contrary to the hitherto somewhat pessimistic assessment – more favourable models. Thus the question arises of which circumstances were relevant to the periods of prosperity before the First and after the Second World War. Whilst welfare state policies were decisive for the prosperity after the Second World War, Lutz makes the following diagnosis for the period before the First World War: “Before the First World War, the strong national state, which protected foreign trade and, within the country, ensured law and order and secured low labour costs, was an essential condition for imperialist land acquisition through the conquest of colonial empires and the development of economic spheres of influence” (Lutz 1989: 261) Now the constant expansion of the European Union since its establishment in 1957 can be regarded as land acquisition for the modern market of centres. Although the stages of expansion are now questionable from the perspective of politics and human rights, the expansion is forging ahead and has taken up the states between the EU and Russia. The Kosovo War in 1999 shows that states do not even shy away from a military seizure of land. If we now consider the investment of American concerns and the EU in the Ukraine, the crisis in the Ukraine no longer seems surprising. The West has already won one cold war and now another such war seems imminent, this time against Russia alone.

The activating welfare state

The deliberations on the labour market do not go far enough; they are confined to economic aspects. The conversion of the preventative welfare state to an activating welfare state is associated with a fundamental reinvention of the social aspect (Lessenich 2008). The individual value preferences are now also the state's control imperatives. The individuals are interested in autonomy, flexibility, mobility and self-determination. And that is precisely what the state and society require of them. "Be subjective and rule yourself"- that is the slogan. "But you will not do justice to your responsibility for yourself and society in doing so!" The social aspect, i.e. the social cohesion in which the individual must be interested for reasons of self-preservation, is reinvented in the paradoxical form of the subjective will. Thus, the earlier pedagogic formula of "prompting self-activity", which has matured into a working principle in social pedagogy, becomes a socio-political programme. Also in this respect, we can speak of an upswing for social pedagogy. However the formula is no longer being tested in an educational situation, but is being implemented in social reality. Here, there is no room for the testing that characterised the educational domain. Moral standards are piled for the government of society ("don't eat too much", "don't get fat; stay fit", "don't smoke; drink in moderation") and the media is taking on the implementation of this programme. "In the new welfare state, society is constituted as a subject that is working towards socially compatible action by the subjects. As a result of the initiation of socially responsible independent activity by the individuals, a new pattern for welfare state relations is established that relates the subjects, *uno actu* so to speak, to themselves (their "self-interest") and to the social community (the "common good")." (Lessenich 2008: 85)

The programme of "promoting and demanding" has also transformed a formula from within social work into policy. Advice and support are merged with permanent control and threats of sanctions in "case management".

The activating welfare state that took the place of the state of decommodification has a pleasant side. Those who are to be encouraged to work need training, childcare and care for old people, so that the people of working age are actually able to work. The mobilisation of a workforce, especially women or mothers, gives a boost to social work and the education system. The financial allowances are to be reduced, whereas social services are to be extended, insofar as they promote employability. Just as states compete for the best location, the citizens are to fight for secure positions in the labour market by availing themselves of professional development opportunities and through self-management. And those who are still in the workforce must discipline themselves and overcome their weaknesses.

This is why all the reports from the world of work point to permanent stress, to overtaking, to increasing speeds and intensification, to burning out and to exhaustion.

Social work is in demand in this situation too, as it is to use its support skills purposefully for the rehabilitation of the exhausted members of the workforce.

In the ascendant and under pressure

The two faces of the pedagogisation of society come to light in many areas of the present development. Thus, the area of youth welfare has been growing steadily in Germany for years. Here, we cannot talk of the dismantling of the welfare state. Pre-school education is expanding rapidly; the costs of youth welfare are increasing every year. The number of people working in youth welfare rose from approx. 510,000 in 2000 to approx. 700,000 in 2013. Between 2006 and 2012, the expenditure increased from 20.9 to 32.2 billion euros. Between 1998 and 2012, the expenditure almost doubled. (Komdat 1&2/2014) If we consider the whole set of social work occupations, we can see the following picture: the number of people working in this area in 2010 is estimated at 2.2 to 2.5 million; that is 8% of all people liable for social insurance. In 1980, barely 300,000 people were engaged in “social” work; since then, the annual rate of increase has been 5.6%. However, it must also be mentioned that almost half of them only work half days (Nodes/Wohlfahrt 2012).

In Germany, work in childcare centres, in particular, has been pedagogised in that a continuous observation of the children is conducted and documented. Support, prevention and control go hand in hand.

The contradictory expansion of social pedagogy is also visible in the programmes for child protection and for dealing with juvenile delinquency. One of the structural changes in the management of youth welfare is the shift from “welfare” to “security” as the target formula (cf. Dollinger 2014). This change is fundamental and affects all areas of policy. At the same time, “security” is broader than the “social security” that was at the fore in the first phase of modernisation. At that time, “the social aspect” had to be reinvented, after detachment from feudal structures of security and dependence, through employment contract security in capitalism. In the Second Modern Age, people are activated and mobilised to find employment in any place in their own country or the whole of Europe. Within society, this mobilisation relates, in particular, to women who, in the past, were responsible for the family, bringing up the children and looking after the old people –often working part time at the same time– and in many cases still are today. Social security is now the security and freedom of the individual who becomes more dependent on social insurance, the more he/she has been mobilised. For mobilisation means detachment from communities; thus, the various “social bolsters” between the individual and society get thinner.

Social control has always been the work of the communities. It has also provided orientation and, without it, uncertainty becomes the over-arching experience of everyday life. In this case, security of orientation is primarily established by the media – from mass media to the “social networks”. The mass media, in particular, not only generate security but produce fear through their fixation on crime and the

dramatisation of the extraordinary. They attend to people's delight in sensations and increase this need in their struggle for market shares. Particularly lucrative in this respect are reports about disasters with innocent victims, reprehensible perpetrators and serious damage, ideally with atrocities. Such reports make the need for security boundless and legitimise any form of preventative and protective security policy. In the area of child protection and criminality, in particular, individual reports in the media are sufficient for setting the legislative machinery in motion and developing a policy of detention and incarceration of perpetrators. Social problems are translated "into questions of security and the guarantee of security" (Dollinger 2014: 299). When these are dealt with, the complexity of the causes disappears; the rigidity of the simple solution dominates.

However, such a spiral of state repression (and social control of the neighbourhood in the case of child protection) cannot continue indefinitely. For the policy of security produces further needs for more security. And punishment instead of therapy generates recidivism. Therefore, there is a recurring discussion about sophisticated forms of intervention that are managed professionally. As these are expensive, they are avoided and society is supposed to protect itself. Militancy returns to the self-help of the "preventative" organisations.

Social policy is taking the form of an intensive policy of risk avoidance. Comprehensive diagnoses and monitoring procedures aim to avoid disasters – but they also always reveal precarious life situations and call for further forms of intervention. As these are not affordable, there is only one solution: the "guilty" are not worth the help and support. If social work deals with them, it should do it with an iron fist.

Social work is also massively involved in these processes. Its quantitative expansion is, however, connected to qualitative formation. It is no longer concepts that mediate between subjective claims and social requirements, but procedures that implement the social requirements under the mantle of individualisation that are socially desirable. The friendly visitor with his puritanical behaviour has returned.

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BALÁZS KRÉMER

Idiosyncrasies of recent growing inequalities in Hungarian income distribution¹

Introduction

During past years of financial crises and “great recession” most of the European countries have experienced widening income inequalities. These growing disparities are multifactorial, not simply affected by earned incomes in labor markets, social transfers or fiscal policies and revenue regimes, but also by indirect consequences of earlier running indebtedness and amortizing loans.

This paper attempts to take into account various factors of growing income inequalities, and Hungarian biases from international trends. As a conclusion, we will argue that relatively high and rapid growths of Hungarian inequalities cannot be seen and interpreted as an unlucky consequence of great recession, rather as an outcome of intended politics of ruling government.

Income inequality trends


Contemporary social discourse has put the subject of inequality into new insights. Social inequality is not simply identical issue with the humanitarian trouble of poverty, any more; it is rather an overall factor of social and economic development.

Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) provided evidences that larger inequality not only leads hardships for bottom strata of societies, but also, overall social and well-being indicators are worse in less equal societies, than in more unequal ones. Krugman (2012), Stiglitz (2012) and Piketty (2014) confronted with traditional approaches supposing that more unequal distribution of income and wealth would create more savings, more investments, more job-creation, and finally faster economic growth – and egalitarian fiscal intervention and redistribution by their nature slows down healthy markets and economic developments. The after-crises “new economics” discuss social inequalities as damaging factor of market demands, the “security” of market mechanisms, creates concentration of power that destroys such foundations of markets and capitalism, like free competition and entering new actors into markets.

In the below paper we do not want to contribute into that high-lifted debates on the relevance of inequalities in economics and political economy – we simply accept that social inequality seems to be more important and more general question than it used to be, and I shall try to present Hungarian findings on inequality in that wider context – whatever it means “wider”.

Hungarian public opinion and policy narratives look back past decades, as a period of permanent growths of inequalities, more or less as “natural consequence” of capitalist transition. The inequalities expressed by differences of nominal incomes (not corrected by inflation) illustrate and “confirm” that perception.ⁱⁱ


Figure 1: Nominal income growths of bottom and top decile and average income (HUF)



Source: Social Research Institute (TÁRKI): Household Monitor Report, 2012

However the above graph seems to prove the popular narratives, it shows also that inequalities started to grow not after the transition, but rather during the late communism (actually from the late '70s). Meanwhile, the curves let us suspicious whether the inequality has been permanently growing. In fact, no, the relative ratios show wavy, and not permanently widening curves.


Figure 2.: Relative income of bottom and top decile as ratio to average income



Source: SRI (TÁRKI) op. cit.

Synthetic inequality indicators confirm the wavy character of inequality changes. If we would to avoid the measurement uncertainties and unavoidable mistakes of income figures in bottom and top deciles, and we use the lower breaking point of top and higher breaking point of bottom deciles (P90/P10), we gain the below graph from Tárki 2012 data.


Figure 3.



Source: SRI (TÁRKI) Monitor, 2012

Or applying Gini-coefficients that refer for overall distribution (and not only to the bottom and top tenth):

Figure 4.



Source: SRI (TÁRKI) Monitor, 2012

Giving brief historical and descriptive explanation to the inequality waves illustrated above, we may differentiate four different time-intervals. The first period is the transitional crisis that started during late communism and ended at the beginning of 2000s. Inequalities were growing partly by impoverishment and mass unemployment, since 1,5 million jobs of former socialist economy disappeared by the collapse of Eastern bloc, by restructuring and privatizing former state-owned industrial and agricultural firms, as a consequence of post-industrial transition, and as confronting to low competitiveness accessing to open, globalized economic world. Applying Marxist language, same period was the era of “original accumulation of capital”, the birth of new Hungarian bourgeoisie that raised inequalities on the richer side, as well.

The second period started in 2002, when socialist-liberal coalition won the election and socialist Prime Minister opened a “new course” of so called “welfare transition” (indicating that after the democratic and capitalist market-transition there came the time for transition of welfare toward a more generous one giving more to the people). That policy supposed a booming GDP growths right after the accession to EU – that was an unrealistic hope. Expanding welfare expenditures could be financed from depths and deficits – that partly reduced social inequalities, but also brought to dramatic shortages the state budgets.

The third period was very short. From 2008 the socialist government almost “gave up” the political competition for the 2010 election, and their only objective remained a proper crises-management trying to avoid a final collapse of economy. Looking back to that period, it was a properly successful treatment of crises in economic and social sense, as well: they managed the state budget and did not cause as much social pains and hardships, as it had been predicted before. The social inequalities were growing – on a modest range. On the other hand, while government indeed avoided a major imbalance occurring, but the deficit was still well above the Maastrich-level and left the EU with no other choice but to continue the EDP against Hungary; also, the relative balance was financed by increasing government debt, from foreign (mainly IMF) debts.

From 2010 the new right-wing (FIDESZ) government started a new era widely criticized by their autocratic use of political power, cutting back the rules of law and “unorthodox” economic and fiscal policies. From that time the scissors of inequalities permanently opened – that we will analyze in detail.

Following evaluation of Tárki Household Monitor report of 2012 we may summarize the overall past decades’ trends of inequalities as follows:

Table 1.

Ratio of income strata within the population (%):	1992	2000	2012
Rich (more than double of median income)	7	9	8
Upper-middle strata (120-200% of median)	25	25	27
Middle strata (80-120% of median)	42	34	30
Lower-middle strata (50-80% of median)	20	23	21
Poor (less than the half of median)	6	9	14
Total	100	100	100

Source: SRI (TÁRKI) Monitor, 2012

We may observe two major shifts, namely the intensive growths of the poor, and the remarkable loss of the middle. Both shifts are unusual from the viewpoint of “middle-classism” that progress is typical in developed countries. (Even if the recession broke that “middle-classist” tendency in many countries and middle classes were narrowed during those hard times. The Hungarian specialty is the twenty years continuity in shrinking middle strata.)

Concentrating onto past years and ongoing developments the trend has become craggy and definite: inequality has been strongly grown. (Tárki, Household Monitor, 2012)


Table 2.

	2009	2012
Gini	27,2	29,3
P90/P10	3,53	3,87
P90/P50	1,81	1,84
P10/P50	0,51	0,46

Source: SRI (TÁRKI) Monitor, 2012

Thus, the profile of income structure behind the overall growing inequality is very special.

Figure 5.: Average total income of households in Euros, calculated in PPP basis




Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2013

One special character is the falling income of the poor: stepping back to the first graph (Figure 1), it is unique since contradicts to basic principle of justice by John Rawls that the nominal income of the poor has fallen in past years.

Despite of falling income of the poor the real breaking point is not at the lower income segments, it is rather at the top. In a period when the average income increased, the income distribution has shifted roughly in a simple manner: the loss of the lower deciles became a gain of the richest.

Figure 6.: Real income change calculated on HUF basis 2009-2013




Source: Eurostat SILC 2014

Compared to above two graphs it shows that only the top deciles realized average income growths of the whole society; and, the gains on the top is much higher than the loss on the remedy of population.

Looking at pure distributional effects during past years we may observe that 9.-10. deciles have gained a growing proportion from total incomes, while 1.-8. deciles lost from total incomes.

Figure 7.: Changes in% as gained or lost shares of deciles from total income (2009 to2013)



Source: Eurostat SILC 2014.


As we said earlier, the poorest are suffered by biggest loss of income, but also the lower three quarter has experienced definite income declines.

Searching causes why households have less money they had had before, we should draw the attentions onto following factors.

First, the government cut down the levels of welfare benefits, also the duration of unemployment insurance to 3 months and restricted eligibilities to disability pensions and benefits that reduced the income of poorest, social transfer recipients.

Second, while employment rates remained, or slightly increased caused by the extension public work programs (employing people in very poor conditions for very low wages) and the rapidly growing emigration and foreign job-placements – these employment-growing tendencies did not compensate the loss of “standard-employment” in public private sector, and the relative higher wages earned in business enterprises and open job-markets.

Figure 8.: Changes in open job market employment compared to 2008 3rd quarter



Source: Hungarian National Bank, Report on Employment, 2012

Third, the FIDESZ government introduced and implemented flat rate tax (and other fiscal policies, analyzed later in that paper) reduced fundamentally the revenues paid by the rich, and at the same time, abolishing tax deductions for low wages that put heavier tax burden onto the poorer and middle strata that reduced the net income in these segments.


“Almost incomes” – impacts of consumer credits to household incomes

Inequality literature probably underestimates the impacts of depths and credits onto social income structure. Analyzes often characterize ongoing recession as “credit-crises”, or, at least as rooted in credit crises, but analyzes focus onto transition of political-economic systems and fiscal implications, and less to social consequences.

Colin Crouch (2009) introduces the phenomenon of „privatized Keynesianism” drawing attention to the household credit as financial means replacing earlier welfare transfers targeting middle income strata. Also he smoothly criticized the hidden attitude of people could be observed in that period losing their strict awareness about paying back any time these credits and redemptions could be financed from newer depths. Monica Prasad (2010) goes even farther by setting up a thesis of public policy trade-off between consumer’s credits and welfare provisions. In his paper, Akos Rona-Tas (2012) emphasizes that in CEE post-socialist countries the global trend in booming household credits had been even strengthened by the multiplicative impacts of emerging new banking services, such as credit cards and other banking services and products.

Our viewpoint is very simple with regards of credits: even if in a longer run credits do not affect income positions since any has to pay back credits, but when you get the credit (during early 2000s), this amount will raise your income; and when you must pay back loans (during the recession), that will reduce your disposable income and /or your savings. In that primitive scheme “almost-income-increasing” indebtedness is a major character of the before-crises period, and the burden of paying redemption dominates past years household economies. Of course, that burden is even heavier for those earning less, and it is easy for those realizing much higher net income than earlier.

Figure 9.: Gross debt- to income ratio (calculated in %as: loans, liabilities/gross disposable income




Source: Eurostat 2013.

The reason why the total amount of households' debt felt was not the fact that people paid back their loans, rather they did not, could not receive new loans. The only peak of new loans occurred when government adopted a new law offered an opportunity of payment of full debts on an artificially low exchange rate (policy statements justified the regulation by the worsening exchange rates that put extra-burdens to those indebted in foreign currencies, sharing that extra-burdens among banks, state budgets and those were ready to utilize the "subsidized payment of full at once now before the date of expiration" scheme), and people applied for loans in HUF for paying back loans in foreign currency, dominantly in Swiss francs.

Government programs that aimed – at least by their rhetoric - at easing financial burdens generally, they were designed and implemented to make profits for those having high income and savings comparable with the amount of they went on tick as an exchange of debts calculated in an artificially low price with savings they owned. Government schemes for easing debt-burdens did not make benefits at all for poorer people in debt or arrears having no reserves and savings could've been exchanged on a good price of foreign currency credits.


Figure 10.: Amount of new household-loans in billion HUF



Source: Hungarian Central Bank, Portfolio.hu

Largest proportion, roughly the half of household credits are spent for buying and building new houses and apartments, and the rest is used for cars, household equipments and other durable utilities. Trends in newly built and newly legally used apartments clearly visible illustrate the fall of household credits. Figures also show the housing and construction crises, while earlier the number of built houses was higher, and housing permits (administrative permission to move into the newly built apartment, issued by local authorities after checking all regulation was fulfilled during the construction) followed in time the amount of newly constructed flats. In past years the newly built houses are less, than new housing permits, showing that just earlier built houses can be sold, and are taken into use.

Figure 11.: Number of housing and building permits for new apartments, 2005-2012 (Central Stat. Off. 2013)




Source: CSO, 2013, Home Centrum website, 2014

Macro-level figures and general trends on how the stock of overall debts changed do not point to the facts of distribution or allocation of debts. Unfortunately, we do not have access to any source that would show directly how different social and income strata were and are involved in indebtedness, that is the reason we should use indirect information.

We may earn indirect information from trading data of another good typically bought from loans: the different categories of cars. Below charts, compare partly two “typical” brands both manufactured in Hungary, as well, - Suzuki, producing Swift of small category (that was advertised in Hungary by the slogan: “this is our car”), and Audi selling cars on premium prices. Before crises, Suzuki sold more than 30 000 new cars in a year (basically to middle and lower middle income-strata), felt down to less than 2000 to the year 2010, and climbing up slowly to slightly above 2000 per a year. Audi – aiming at consumers from upper strata - started from a much lower baseline, but the diminishing of salesmanship was relatively modest, and the recovery seems to be faster.ⁱⁱⁱ


Figure 12.: Newly sold Audi and Suzuki cars as % of realization in 2007



Source: DATAHOUSE complete data collection on car-markets, 2013

If we split figures by the owner of the new cars, we find over the above trends that the loss of company bought cars went back more than private persons and household car purchases in case of both brands. Since most of the company bought cars can be seen as an in-kind extra earnings of high positioned business personals – the trends in car realization show additional effects on opening income-scissor.


Figure 13.: Newly sold Audi and Suzuki cars as % of realization in 2007 / owner



Source: DATAHOUSE complete data collection on car-markets, 2013

General selling statistics of major car categories show similar tendencies.

Figure 14.: Realization of cars in different categories, in Hungary, as % of 2007 figures



Source: DATAHOUSE complete data collection on car-markets, 2013 (Numbers of cars sold in different categories in 2007 (=100%) are shown on the right)


If we suppose that unequal loss of selling (and buying) new cars are indicators of unequal access to “almost income” credits and loans; meaning also lower income groups could get less credits and loans than before – we might conclude that unequal access to “almost incomes” is an added factor to growing inequalities.

The value of money – trends of consumption

Sociologists are usually interested about how people get by, and what are the major social inequalities among groups get by on a different level and different mood. To measure and to compare living conditions by in kind measures is extremely difficult, this is the reason why we prefer to measure income in money – supposing that the amount of the money different people and household own is an appropriate synthetic indicator of what they can buy and how they can get buy. For doing so, we should also suppose that the value of money is stable in time, the exchange rate between money and the needed goods and products are unchanging. If above presumption is well founded, monetarist measures are fairly correct and sufficient to express living conditions and social inequalities.

When people using their money to pay or buy something – they exchange money to in kind goods. In favor of having an overview on what people buy for their money, we can take a look onto the figures on what people buy from merchandises, small traders (retail traffic), and what they spend together with other expanses, like housing costs and others (consumption of residents). Chart below shows quarterly shifts of retail and consumption. Varying values are mostly in negative range (showing decline of consumption).

Figure 15.: Change of retail traffic and residential consumption by quarter years, in %



Source: HNB report on GDP trends, 2012

Losses expressed in kind make us suspect that trends “in kind well being” of people might be even worse than shrinking amounts of incomes.

As an indicator of in-kind well being we may profit from EU deprivation data, showing the ratio of population missing, being deprived from goods and services are seen as standard and normal needed prerequisites of life. Eurostat defines factors of indicators, as follows:^{iv}


“Based on the limited information available from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data-set, the EU MD rate is currently defined as the proportion of people living in households who cannot afford at least 3 of the following 9 items:

- coping with unexpected expenses;
- one week annual holiday away from home;
- avoiding arrears (in mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase instalments);
- a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day; keeping the home adequately warm;
- a washing machine;
- a colour TV;
- a telephone;

- a personal car.”

Similarly, Eurostat defines as “severely deprived” households those who cannot afford 4, or more items of above list. The Hungarian figures on ratio of severely deprived population show worse situation, than in the “old” member states; but the dynamics of declining living condition is much faster worsening data compared to both, “old” and “new” member states.


Figure 16.: Ratio of severely deprived (4+ deprivation factors) population



Source: Eurostat SILC 2014

Meanwhile, not only the ratio of severely deprived household had grown, but also the “deepness” of deprivation had worsened at the same time in Hungary.


Figure 17.: „Deepness” of deprivation – Eurostat, 2013 (average number of deprivation factors)



Source: Eurostat SILC, 2013, Hungarian data

Deprivation is not identical with poverty with regard to the fact that not only the poor miss basic prerequisites for “normal life”. Of course, poor people and families are suffered more often from shortages in everyday life, but other strata miss also certain goods and services regarded as standard and normal elements of consumption. Also it is true, that dynamics of deprivation indicators show more rapid decline in case of lower income-groups, but ratio of deprived households has grown in every income level.

Figure 18.: Ratio of severely (4+) deprived within in come quintiles, Hungary



Source: Eurostat, SILC, 2013


If we want to illustrate declining living standards by less sophisticated figures than deprivation and severe deprivation index, we should take a look onto data provided by Gallup Group in collaboration with OECD on how people are frustrated for not to be able feeding properly their family.^v

As explanation of below charts we must draw the attention onto the subjective nature of data: data do not show the proportion of population experiencing or living permanently in hunger, data shows the ratio of those reporting hardships to afford appropriate food. Many and often criticize subjective well-being data as showing uncertain realities beyond subjective perceptions, but longitudinal data prevent this turbulence, since basics of perception on what is proper and what is not – do not change overnight. Following that concern, increasing ratio of those who are unable to afford appropriate meals – is a clear and valid indicator of declining living standards.

Also we should add that developed countries regard nutrition as evidentially fulfilled need within their population, inadequate nutrition is basically a trouble in the developing world. Data confront as with said reality: a large, and rapidly growing strata

of people suffered by being incapable for insuring appropriate food, with special regards to kids.


Figure 19.: Top 9 OECD countries with highest incidence of families struggling to afford foods 2013



Source: Gallup report in co-operation with OECD (2014)

In international comparison we may observe that the fastest and deepest decline of adequately feed families and children can be observed – in Hungary.

Figure 20.: Families with children reporting difficulties affording foods, in OECD countries with largest increase between 2007-2013



Source: Gallup report in co-operation with OECD (2014)

Applying in-kind measures for indicating trends of living standards, we may evaluate a worse decline in Hungary, than in monetarist indicators. By other words, the “exchange rate from money to products and services” of shrinking income of Hungarians has been also devaluated during past years.


Changing character of revenue and tax policies would found casual explanations for above observations. The flat-rate income tax-reform (by abolishing earlier tax-deductions and rising revenues on low, and reducing burdens on high wages) decreased the overall direct burdens on wages and personal incomes, and various consumption-related taxes (e.g. lifting VAT to 27%) compensated shortages of state budget. This means also to pay higher taxes in gross prices and less net counter-value for purchased goods. Less income of lower 80% of population, makes pay even less in terms of consumption and living standards.

Household savings and investments – the lost security

Savings and investments are not so exciting issues for sociologists dealing with social inequality. It is rather a classical topic for economists analyzing savings – with special regards to savings of households – as resource for investments, basically for company investments. Monetarist and banking services are interesting issues as technical ones: how efficiently they may implement that trade off, how efficiently they channel private-individual savings to job-creating and development-gearing investments. For us household savings have different, probably less sophisticated meanings. Roughly, if someone owns any forms of savings or investments, he/she keeps in store some reserve that may serve survival in hard times; that might serve as startup capital, if something must be changed, something new must start. In contrast, having no reserve means having no choice, no change and no power to change – show must go on, how it goes.

Below figures will illustrate how Hungarians lost their previous savings that ever used to be smaller in international comparisons – but for us that means also a process of losing security and freedom, as well.


Figure 21.: Gross household saving rates (as % of household incomes) 2003-2012



Source: Eurostat, 2013.

Generally speaking, the overall value of households' financial assets had grown until 2009, and after 2010, they have fallen back to the level of 2006.


Figure 22.: Financial assets of households, in USD, Hungary



Source: OECD Statistics, 2013

Looking at the major factors of assets, investments and life insurance reserves stagnated with minor increase, loans fallen as illustrated above, and also pension fund equities fallen dramatically, since the government abolished privately managed mandatory funded pension schemes by converting equities to eligibility in pay-as-you-go pension system.


Figure 23.: Trends of different financial assets in USD, Hungary



Source: OECD Statistics, 2013

The overall ratio of households' investments is almost the half of same ratio in Euro era, and the trend of changes is slightly positive in time, despite of the crises.

As we mentioned earlier, government programs like "exchange rate embankment" and, "subsidized payment of full" generated trade-offs between savings-investments and loans, but above turbulences caused by government regulations the trends of declines are explicit.


Figure 24.: Saving and investments rates of households, Hungary

Source: Eurostat, 2013

Overall rates do not inform on allocation and distribution of shrinking household savings and investments. The only accessible help to know more on that is the relative small-simple, but representative survey made run by Gfk Ltd. By our assumption Gfk data cannot be seen as punctual, partly because 40% of survey-interviewed persons did not answer at all about their savings, partly because self-reported data on wealth are even more uncertain than income data. Meanwhile, cleaned data (without non-answers and later no savings) seem to be accurate in a sense that they correlate strongly with data from external sources on same topic.


The loss of savings rooted basically in loss of savers. Since less people have savings, parallel fewer people consider making pay to maintain their client-relation with banks. Ratio of savers and bank-clients were all the time smaller than international standards, both ratios fell during the crisis even deeper from that relative low baseline, as well.^{vi}

Figure 25. Ratio of those owning savings and being bank clients within 16-64 population



Source: Gfk Ltd, 2013 (ratio of persons reported they own savings among those were answered to relevant question of inquiry, in the representative survey of RBM research program)


The loss of savers are proportional in all of the cohorts, meaning also that older generation's readiness and advantage to save remained proportional in lower levels, too. In absolute terms, this means also a weakening material security for younger generations.

Figure 26.: Ratio of savers in different cohorts, Hungary

Source: Gfk Ltd, 2013.


Ratio of savers declined proportionally among different income categories as well: higher income people maintained their proportional advantages during overall decline of savers.

Figure 27.: Ratio of savers in different income groups (individuals, Euros/month) Hungary




Source: Gfk Ltd. 2013 (incomes are calculated by Euro/HUF exchange rate in 2013. September)

At the same crises period, among higher educated persons more reacted to raise their savings, in contrast of lower educated ones, ratio of savers declined permanently in these social groups.

Figure 28.: Savers by educational level, Hungary

Source: Gfk Ltd. 2013.


Taking into account the amount of savings, we will see surprisingly low data. Below charts show the distribution of that 16% of population which has any savings – by the amount of how much they have laid by.

Figure 29.: Ratio of saving individuals (within 15,8% of savers in total population), by saved amounts, Hungary

Source: Gfk Ltd. 2013.

Structure of the amounts of savings reflects back the composition of savers. Younger savers have typically low amount of savings, and just only among older cohorts – accumulating longer their sparing -we find relatively higher amounts of stocks:


Figure 30.: Ratio of saving individuals in different cohorts, by saved amounts (in Euros), Hungary



Source: Gfk Ltd. 2013.

Distribution of saved amounts mirrors back the structure of savers by their monthly income, as well. Roughly speaking, mainly relatively high-income persons do economize, and only they could accumulate relatively higher amounts of savings.

Figure 31.: Saved amounts (in Euros) among savers in different monthly income rates, Hungary



Source: Gfk Ltd. 2013.

What we may see from saving data is a dramatically decline both, persons who save and the amount of reserves they own. Decreasing savings seem to be an overall relative trend in society, but in absolute terms, this leads to a kind of “evaporation of reserves” in case of younger generation and lower income population. These figures correlate strongly not only with Eurostat figures on household savings and financial assets, but also with deprivation indicator showing an increase the ratio to three quarter of population to whom covering an unexpected expense would be hardly or not affordable.

If we give a rough estimation that a yearly average net income, by large an equivalent amount of HUF with 10000 Euros may insure resources for a yearly get by in case of getting unemployed, or starting a new small-business or starting a new job by geographical mobility, etc. – we assume that just only less than 2% of population (a bit more than 10% of 16% of population owning any savings) is in a secured financial situation in that sense. The remedy has no savings at all, or the saving they own is not satisfactory to bridge over typical financial hardships may occur during crises periods.

Concerning inequality issues, we may give an estimation based on combining above quoted Gfk survey data with the “official” report of National Bank on household savings at the end of calendar year of 2013. Calculation result an amount more than 90 000 Euros as average savings of top savers, (5,4% of 15,8% all savers above 16667 Euros) the 0,85% of total active aged population. Since the simple of Gfk survey was an individual, and not a household based simple, the concentration of savings might be even higher on a household level. Calculating all together savings and investments of households, the concentration might be even higher. (Questionnaire of Gfk asked about savings, but we do not know how people calculated with shares, bonds, equities they own, and they calculate with them simply as reserve, as saving, as a “technical” alternative of bank accounts. About the distribution of definite household investments – we did not find any data-resources; this is why we could not calculate with them.)


The unique nature of Hungarian genre by raising social inequalities

In above chapters – hopefully - we gave evidences that income and financial structure of Hungarian society became much more unequal during past years, how it used to be before. Readers may react that yes, this is the very nature of free markets and capitalism, especially during recession and crises: the poor get poorer and the rich get richer.

In that paper we do not want to justify above statement, but definitely we want to argue that growing inequality was not a “spontaneous” consequence of the recession, inequality gaps were widened by the policies implemented by the Hungarian government.

International comparison that may make suspicious us shows, how social expenditures and GDP figures interlinks during the period of crises.

Figure 32.: Social spending increased least in countries most affected by the crisis (percentage changes in real public social spending and real GDP, 2007/08 to 2012/13)




Note: Estimates for 2007-08 and 2012-13 are averaged over two-year periods to allow for the different years in which the crisis began across countries and to limit the effect of year-on-year fluctuations. Source: OECD (2013), OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), preliminary data (www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm).

Regardless Greece (experiencing an extreme GDP loss), Hungary is the only exception by not increasing (definitely reducing) social expenditures during the crises. That cannot be explained by extra high ratio of welfare expenditures (Hungarian ratio to GDP is on the middle rank in EU), and also the ratio of recession does not explain, why the Hungarian government did not want to ease the hardships of lower strata by strengthening welfare schemes, and why we can observe a solidly shrinking social expenditures. In fact, government cut back the amount of social benefits by more than 25%, shortened the duration of unemployment insurance to 3 months (from 9 months), cut back dramatically disability pensions and benefits – that resulted a definite loss of income of welfare recipients.

Meanwhile, if we talk how government made actively social inequalities grow, the major impact is not how the poor became poorer, but rather how government benefited the rich to be richer.

In 2013 State Audit Office published a report (Tóth G. Cs. – Virovác, P. 2013) on its' website, analyzing the impacts of fiscal programs implemented by the government from 2010 to 2013, applying micro-simulation methods on administrative (tax-reports) data. By that report, the income taxes paid by different income deciles were as follows:


Figure 33.: Average income tax paid by income deciles (thousands HUF), Hungary



Source: Tóth G. Cs. – Virovác P. op. cit. micro-simulations on SAO data, 2013

The difference between taxes paid in 2013 compared to 2010 (presented in the above chart) shows extreme gap between lower 7 deciles to which tax burdens were growing, and the top 3 deciles, especially the top (10.) deciles, where taxes were reduced to less than half.


Figure 34.: Difference of average income tax paid by income deciles (thousands HUF), 2013-2010



Source: Tóth G. Cs. – Virovác P. op. cit. micro-simulations on SAO data, 2013

Government rhetoric argued tax reforms by pro-natalist objectives giving incentives to better-off, working “middle-class” via family-related tax-deduction schemes – replacing and converting partly the universal family-allowance scheme. Not reflecting to the policies and realistic projections how states may “buy” children from middle strata by tax reliefs (no evidence on that would result positive shifts in fertility rates...), data show that natalist impact is minor, almost symbolic, compared to widened gaps between poor and rich.

Figure 35.: Difference in income taxes (HUF) paid in 2013 to 2010, by deciles and different types of families



Source: Tóth G. Cs. – Virovác P. op. cit. micro-simulations on SAO data, 2013

Summing up we conclude that different sources, survey and administrative data are converging and correlate strongly about the profile of widening gaps in living standards, also we demonstrated the very special nature of Hungarian genre by growing inequalities is, that not the markets, not the crises – but the government and fiscal policies raised inequalities in income and material well-being.

Conclusion

Income distributions become globally more unequal in 2000s, especially during the “great recession” almost everywhere on the Earth. Social sciences, especially affected by Th. Piketty’s popular concepts exerted in his book explain global trends of opening income-scissors by strong concentration of wealth and capital incomes of the richest. In contrast of global trends the growing income-inequalities in Hungary cannot be explained by capital-concentration, or, the impacts of economic crises. As we demonstrated above, growing income-inequalities, and overall weakening material insecurity of Hungarian population can be seen rather as a consequence of government fiscal policies. It is unique – at least in Europe – that government decreased social expenditures during the crises, and even more unique that beneficiaries of fiscal reforms are exclusively the top income-strata of society. While mean income of total population increased – just only the top decile realized growing incomes, and the income position of the “rest”, the 1-8 income deciles lost from their income position, mainly as an effect of government fiscal, revenue and redistributive policies.

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Hungarian Flat-rate (single rate) Tax-reform with Micro-simulation Methods)
<http://www.asz.hu/penzugyi-szemle-cikkek/2013/nyertesek-es-vesztesek-a-magyar-egykulcsos-adoreform-vizsgalata-mikroszimulacios-modszerrel/toth-virvacz-2013-4.pdf>

Notes

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- ⁱ This paper is a shortened and modified version of the chapter: Krémer, B.: How mafia-state spoiled the society? In: Magyar, B. (ed.): The Hungarian Octopus – The Post-Communist Maffia-State 2.tome, 2014 Noran Libri, Budapest
- ⁱⁱ Source of Tárki Data: Szívós, P. - Tóth, I. Gy. (ed.): Egyenlőtlenség és polarizálódás a magyar társadalomban, (Inequality and polarization in the Hungarian Society) TÁRKI MONITOR JELENTÉSEK 2012, http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/hm/monitor2012_teljes.pdf
- ⁱⁱⁱ I am deeply indebted to DATAHOUSE for providing me unpublished data on new car selling.
- ^{iv} Measuring material deprivation in the EU, Indicators for the whole population and child-specific indicators, Eurostat, 2012 Edition, p.1.
- ^v Dugan, A.- Wendt N.: Families Struggling to Afford Food in OECD Countries, More than one in five individuals with children had trouble in 2013, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/170795/families-struggling-afford-food-oecd-countries.aspx>
- ^{vi} I am deeply indebted to Gfk Hungary Ltd. for providing me unpublished, or partially published data on savers and savings.

ANDREA RÁCZ

Child protection models for mainstreaming child's rights

Introduction

Thinking about and dealing with children, it is extremely important to ensure they get everything that is needed to unfold their skills and potential talents. The professionals working with children have to trust them and children living on the border of child protection, or those living in public care have to be supported in a way that their needs – special and unique – are taken into consideration just the same as if they lived with their families. The recognition of the family's role in children's life is inevitable; in care provision, it means the necessity to move towards an integrated, family-community based system of provision, which is capable of ensuring effective service packs for the primary and secondary target group of child protection, adjusting to the dual function of child protection. "Child protection is a social institution that was created to support another social institution, the family, in order to help the family in its tasks related to the child's development and social inclusion, and if it is necessary, to take over the responsibility for the child from the family which is unable to ensure it." (Domszky 2011: 3-4). First, the study presents Fox Harding's typology about the system logics of services for children. Then, we deal with the need of strengthening the rights of children in care and illustrate it by two examples: 1) FICE: tender for good practices in child protection and 2) the Children's Parliament 2014 which had the theme of social integration.

Child Protection Models and Children's rights

The ideal types of services provided for children were developed most comprehensively way by Fox Harding (1991, 1997) who identified four "value position": 1) laissez-faire; 2) state paternalism; 3) models protecting the biological family; 4) models protecting children's rights¹. According to his interpretation, the laissez-faire model is based on the belief that it is important for the family to not have any state intervention in the natural processes, that is, we can talk about only minimal, forcing intervention. Restricting the exercise of parents' freedom and exercise of the state's power rarely should be applied. In a broader ideological perspective Fox Harding associates this kind of approach with the patriarchy, where a strong father/head-of-the-household is identified. In his view, the laissez-faire model is not

¹ Fox Harding acknowledges that there are uncertainties and the four positions overlap but believes that each model represents different orientation in the field of politics and practice aimed at children.

only a theoretical abstraction in periods, like the Victorian era or in the period of the Conservative government between 1979 and 1997, this approach can be observed in practice. The model's criticism is that state interventions are negative and a special gender-role can be identified as played by the father in the family. In the state paternalistic model, the role of the state has to be limited but exemplary at the same time. When the children are at risk in their families or the parents are incapable of taking care of them, strong and effective state interventions are needed for the children's protection. There is considerable trust in the ability of the professionals, in the intervention mechanisms and in that every situation would be assessed adequately and proper interventions will prevent bad treatment. The aim is to fix families that are falling apart and provide services for the children and the families. According to Fox Harding, this model is typical of the UK's practice at the end of the 1960's and in the 1970's, when the number of children living in state care significantly increased. The criticisms of the model are that it lets little space for the families and children and the authority of the professionals is too big. It was diagnosed too late that the interventions are not actually efficient and reliable enough. The state can seem to be oppressive during interventions, mainly in cases of poor and excluded families. The model about the protection of biological family can be interpreted as a belief in the positive role of state intervention where those promote the families' well-being. The financial and other forms of support serve the autonomy of the family. There is a partnership between the family and the service provider. The appropriate level of support is necessary for the family's welfare. Even if special needs arise, the intervention still has to have a supportive nature. If a child has to be removed, this temporary period should aim to strengthen the family and not to satisfy a need for long-term and continuous care. Within this model, Fox Harding perceives two types of approach: one is represented by the group of people who protect the family's rights and the other claims that state interventions aim to keep the child in the family. The model takes into consideration the fact that the relationship of the child and the family is complex and it should be the basis for interventions. Its criticism formulates the view that it idealizes the biological family and does not calculate realistically the capacity of the welfare state and its willingness to spend on family support and too optimistic in relation to the effectiveness of professionals' preventive activities. In the model that protects children rights the protection of the children at all cost appears on one hand and the social responsibility on the other hand. The Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 brought significant shift in the approach of child treatment. From the children's rights perspective, meeting individual needs and requirements is most important so, the interventions have to be adapted to these and the child has to be an active participant. It is essential to have the child to participate, express his point of view and to be heard, as opposed to the other models that mostly put the emphasis on child protection. However, Fox Harding notes there are certain rights that have to be "grown into", that is, they are not universal or obvious from birth. The protection of children's rights requires active involvement from the adult society. Further criticism is that beside the rights, the issue of responsibility is difficult to interpret (Smith 2005: 22-27, Kirton 2005: 7-8).

Based on Fox Harding' standardization, Hungary can be classified as a paternalistic state model, although, the pervasive value of the Child Protection Act of 1997 is the extensive protection of children's rights. The Hungarian Child Protection Act was greatly influenced by the English one of 1989 that basically favored prevention. This means, in principle, that it is a basic requirement in the Hungarian system to provide every kind of help for the families and children in order to keep the child in his/her family. As for the ethos of domestic law, it is child-centered but in practice, the services mainly concentrate on families in crisis. (Domszky 1999; Rác 2013)

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) is the sum of the minimum rights that have to be ensured for all children². The Convention broadly defined the rights of children and categorized them into three categories:

- 1, Rights for care and provision, family support (to preserve family unit), health, social security, education, recreation and play, special care and protection for disabled children, for refugees, identity, nationality and freedom of religion.
- 2, Protection Rights: protection from violence and abuse, kidnapping, human trafficking, child labour, sexual exploitation, war and armed conflict, drug abuse, inhumane treatment in case of juvenile offenders.
- 3, Participation Rights for respecting children's rights, ensuring the freedom of association and expression and ensuring access to information.

By the birth of Convention on the Rights of the Child the view that states "children are properties of the parents" was replaced by the view that states the parent's primary responsibility is taking care of the child. The Convention changed the conception of children fundamentally and contributed to treating children as social value and to paying attention how to treat children, how to assess children's needs and competences (Robinson, 2010). Modern health care, social work and child protection consider children to have further rights in addition to human rights.

The existence and development of the Convention are strongly associated with child poverty and with the development of children in general. In mainstreaming children's rights, attention should be paid to what micro-level social issues are related to children, what political responses there are, that is, how granting children's rights appear, how the recession affected children, social institutions and the broader supporting environment. In the beginning of 2000's the UN Committee found that the politics relating to children can be considered good in certain countries, however, comprehensive approaches to children's rights prevail less. The issue of child poverty is not emphasized enough in particular situation assessments, furthermore, the opportunities for consultation with children and young adults are not widespread. The effects of the recession on children are obvious: malnutrition, increased child labour, bigger proportion of unemployed youth, different forms of child exploitation,

² Hungary ratified the CRC in 1991 and proclaimed it by the LXIV law of 1991. Besides, the Fundamental Law (i.e. Constitution) also states that children must be protected with special measures. The Child Protection Act contains the widest range of child's rights.

violence and maltreatment, decrease in schooling, decrease in the use of health care services, decreased emotional security, and the access to public services related to care and provision became limited. All these threaten the future capacities of children. Several experts draw attention to the fact that the situation of children could be stabilized if countries realized the effects of the recession on children and responded along a well-developed strategy with effective toolboxes – in addition to including the civil society, conducting an active political dialogue and requiring the government's crisis management measure to be accounted for. This includes supported child care services, services for mental and psychical health, reducing addition, preventive measures, protection of the investments in child protection and social services (Harper et al. 2010). For example, Canada considers mainstreaming children's rights as not only a legal and moral obligation of the adult society but also as good economic and social investment. Needs were articulated for having children's rights mainstreamed, children's development ensured and for ensuring they become full members of the society. Furthermore, the politics on children should be centralized, that is, to unite the fragmented responsibilities of different governmental bodies and levels (Canadian Coalition for the rights of Children 2010). According to Eurochild (2014), besides developing a permanent children's right management system, it is also important for the politicians, decision makers and public officials to take part in children's rights training. For example, Canada urges to determine what effects the annual budget decisions have on the children and certain groups of people. In 2007, Hungary spent 22.7% of the GDP on social protection expenditure. By 2009, this expenditure grew (24.3%) but in 2011 it dropped to the level of 2007 (23%). Between 2010 and 2013, the proportion of the poor and excluded grew among children and in the whole population. 43% of the children belonged to this group. (Ferge-Darvas 2014: 64-66)

The need for strengthening children's right was reinforced by a survey in 2006, which pointed out that 75% of people do not know how to exercise their rights with respect to the other's rights. The survey also revealed that parents are more aware of children's right than the children. (Canadian Coalition for the rights of Children 2010:22) Századvég Foundation's research of 2014 shows that it is important for most of the society to be aware of basic legal knowledge. The majority (52%) requires information about financial services, 49% needs information about real estate and vehicle administration, more than 40% marked the areas of public administration and judicial administration. As for everyday life, legal knowledge is mostly used related to private affairs, daily life (43%) and the labour market (46%). More than 3000 interviewed people said that the most efficient information provision is personal informing, followed by electronic legal publications and specialized books.³

³ <http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/32990> (last download: 27. 12. 2014)

It was expressed that more attention should be paid to how the helpers of children and young adults can be involved in the interpretation of children's views for the politicians (Harper et al 2010). An online survey⁴ carried out among children between 9 and 18 years old Canadians in 2008, highlights the fact that the least prevailing area of children's rights are: ensuring children's participation and listening to them. Most parents ensure basic clothing, food, school attendance while security provision is unstable: 27% of the parents protect their children from bully, 38% ensures safety while they are at their workplace and 22% of them talk about drugs. (Canadian Coalition for the rights of Children 2010:23-24) Many research draw attention to the fact that children and young adults would like service providers and professionals to provide opportunities for involvement indecision-making about responsibility-taking in accordance with their maturity. It is a key area to have choice in regard to using services, inclusion into service planning, development and to ask them for feedback as a means of quality assurance and to provide them with adequate information about their rights, and certain provisions and services. For example, in relation to those who leave the system, it is problematic that the leavers are not involved in planning the process of leaving and are not treated as partners. In cases of disabled children, research shows that school consultations would mean great help for them in understanding their rights, however, professionals rather see their disabilities than their hidden potentials. Another research shows that those children who were expelled from school - that is, their studies were interrupted - were not consulted during the disciplinary hearing (cited by Mainey et al. 2009: 20-22).

Understanding children and supporting them in social environments are basically dependent on two main aspects: 1) holistic approach to children, which means disabled children, children without family are treated like children in the mainstream society and the professionals working with them ensure their participation in various programs and maintaining friendships; 2) Recognition of the family's role in children's lives is inevitable; children also see what supports are needed for maintaining family union and that these are also required during long-term care to maintain contact with the biological family. On care system level, it means the shift toward integrated family and community based care, ensuring efficient service and care packs for children and their parents (Mainley et al 2009; European Commission Daphne Programme 2007; Volunteer Development Agency 2011). In the case of children living in public care, it is very important for the care to have some kind of therapeutic atmosphere and with professionals support to help children learn how to cope with stress, get over traumas, to form appropriate behaviour and to be safe emotionally. For this, the professionals have to concentrate on the strengths of children, to recognize their talents and to support them. The basis of increase in children's responsibility taking and a positive view of the future is a stable emotional state, for which the professionals have the primary responsibility (Furnival-Grant 2014).

⁴The sample's size: 629 people.

Participation can be interpreted as the pedagogy of listening, which ensures that the opinion and the perspectives of children are heard granting the chance to be understood. Listening means not only hearing the requirements/needs but also means attention and rights to share opinion, debate and questioning. Treating children as vulnerable dependent groups strengthens the denial of their rights to express their views. Exercising children's rights by children depends on how much parents can pay attention and how much the pedagogy of hearing, as an approach is embedded in society. (Te One 2011). The first Hungarian civil report of mainstreaming child's rights was written in 2013 covering the period between 2006-2012. This civil report is based on broad collaboration and partnership in which significant civil organizations, professionals and child protection professionals took part, furthermore, children were asked in written or drawn forms about how they see children's rights (Civil (Alternative) report 2013)

Because of the big changes in the lives of children removed from their families and because of the loss of their support networks, they need stable, safe home, advocacy, help in their education, extended relationship with peers and most importantly, a stable, caring, supporting adult in both institutional and foster care. (LEARNS n.y.). Therefore, kinship care instead of foster care is supported in many countries, although, a Canadian research highlights that according to professionals, the relatives go through the same struggles as the biological parents from whom the children were taken. (Briesbois et al. 2013)

Child protection scenes of mainstreaming child's rights: Hungarian examples

The National Child Protection Conference was held on 20th of November in 2014, on the International Day of Children's Rights that aimed to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Hungarian Association of FICE contributed to the commemoration by the call for tenders for Good Practices in Child Protection and by holding a Children's Parliament session.

The tender for Good Practice in child protection aimed to collect the best and most innovative processes in basic care and long-term care and to make them available for professionals. The theme of the tender was: protecting and enforcing children's rights. At the same time, the 15th Children's Parliament session was held, with 40 children discussing what social integration means for those who live in care. After the session the Children's Parliament reported to the decision-makers and professionals participating in the conference what changes, supporting mechanism and professional programs are needed for social inclusion. In the following, we first present the classification of the proposals for Good Practice in Child Protection in terms of how the mainstreaming and protection of children's rights appear in the professional work, what new initiatives were created in the field of child welfare and child protection and

along them, what innovative solutions can be disseminated regarding the development of the child protection system.

Innovative initiatives in Child Protection

Collecting innovative child protection solutions and local initiatives and spreading them among professionals are important elements of laying the methodological foundation of child protection work (Domszky 2011:10).

19 tenders were received and 3 of them were from the field of child welfare.

We typified the good practices in terms of how the protection and mainstreaming of children's rights appear.⁵ Children as a target group were not addressed as a primary target group in every case, that is, we have to distinguish those practices that have children as a direct target group from those where children's rights prevail indirectly, for example, via the professional's work and strengthening parental treatment. The applications can be divided into four types: 1) programs aimed at children; 2) programs aimed at parents; 3) programs aimed at professionals; 4) programs aimed at system development. The programs aimed at children can be further divided:⁶ a) programs based on teaching children's rights; b) programs aiming to develop the children's personality, competences and increase their knowledge; c) programs based on forming the society's view.

⁵ It is important to mention that the proposals can be classified in several ways. In the following, the presented pieces of information are from the programs of the proposals; they are presented anonymously. (Note that the Evaluation Committee took into consideration other aspects also during the evaluation process).

⁶ Sub-types are not separated rigidly, there is some overlap in the goals.

Table 1.: Types of applications according to target groups and achieved goals

Children as direct target group		
Programs based on teaching law for children	Programs aiming to develop children's personalities and competences and increasing their knowledge	Programs based on changing the society's view
law camp creation and application on a constitution	drug prevention and other thematic programs complex lifestyle programs programs aiming to convey household knowledge talent support mentoring team-building	sport program carried out by broad social collaboration/ presenting values of the target group for the society
Children as indirect target group		
Programs targeting parents	Programs for professionals	Programs aiming system development
programs that develop parental competences programs for decreasing poverty	training professional training	developing a quality assurance system in pedagogical work IT development

The children were the primary target groups in 13 applications out of the submitted good practices.

Programs based on teaching child's rights (two proposals) convey the knowledge to children in different ways, like a law camp where the participants reflect about the fact that the children in juvenile justice are typically not familiar with the participants and stages of the process, and with their own rights. In these cases the competencies and goals to be developed were "taking responsibility, learning victims' emotions, awareness, strengthening advocacy, raising legal knowledge, increasing level of communication, prevention, reducing offending." In the other good practice – that can be classified into this type – children could create their own constitution, in which they declared the system of rights and responsibilities providing behaviour models for children and young adults. In the daily application of the accepted system of rules, the following main aims were formulated: to make children self-confident during decision-making, to demonstrate democratic attitudes in their expressions, to express

their views in an appropriate way, to recognize their own and their peers' values, to respect each other, to be empathetic. In relation to the proposals grouped in this category, supporting the development of law-conscious behaviour was formulated as the basic goal.

Programs aiming at improvement of children's personality and competences and extending their knowledge (9 tenders) were delivered in various ways and presented mainstreaming child's rights in various ways. There were tenders that aimed to change children's knowledge or views in a complex way including many areas. One proposal is especially worth mentioning in which children could learn about different topics like drug abuse, harm reduction, psychological-mental health, civil society, role of art within the framework of a series of thematic events. The motto was "learning by playing". "With the experiences, appropriate motivation can be formed for receiving the knowledge. Passive listening can be replaced with joyful learning activity. Thus teaching and competence development go hand in hand playfully and have the expected effects." Another good practice puts emphasis on becoming adult and helped to learn skills in regular sessions, like washing, cooking, cleaning and furnishing. A tender targeted overcoming school disadvantages and in its framework a mentoring system was developed and introduced. Two organizations considered talent support to be especially important in relation to mainstreaming child's rights. One more proposal is worth mentioning in this category, which indicates a complex pedagogical system, the so-called lifestyle method which is overall regarding the children's life living in children's home and contains healing elements as well. The professional program responds to the fact that children who are taken into long-term care usually get into a child protection institution at an increasing later age, usually at puberty; and that there are more and more people in care who have special needs and because of this, complex methodology is required in daily operation.

Programs for the formation of the society's view had two proposals; both based on broad collaboration. One of them is a global art meeting in which the show contained songs of individuals and bands and theatre plays as well. The participants were children who live in their families and in child protection. "In the public's mind there is an image of children living in child protection as unfortunate and helpless children (...) we would like to call the attention to the those children who are successful in some field of art – music, drama, fine arts – due to their talent or in spite of their disability." The other tender is the First Children's Marathon that aims to develop willpower, endurance and shape children's character by sport in order to have healthy self-esteem.

In six proposals, children and young adults appear as indirect target groups.

As for the programs targeting parents (two proposals), one of them was sent by a children's home and the other was sent by a child welfare service. The tender of the children's home aimed to strengthen the connection with the biological parents and

strived for developing parents' competences related to taking care of children and upbringing. "We experienced in many cases that the family has a dysfunctional nature despite the parents' efforts and good intentions." Both parents and children participated in the program. The other proposal aimed to improve life quality of a given settlement's population – and the youth between 5 and 18 years old is a priority target group - aimed to support the acquisition of right life management, to reduce poverty and disadvantages, to ensure equal opportunities, and providing support for preserving physical-psychological-mental health." A social program that embraces the whole life from the birth of the child over becoming adult until old age, preferring basic social values and norms and ensuring guidance."

The programs for professionals (two proposals) reflect that it is important to ensure training, develop professional competences and mental hygienic care for professionals who advocate mainstreaming child's rights. In one of the cases, a complex local program was introduced that consists of weekly team meetings where the small groups' work is based on case conferences, an annual two-day long professional training that is held off-site, as well as a presentation prepared at home made by a professional. In the case of the other proposal, training was carried out in a juvenile justice institution with the aim of "conflict solution", cooperation, problem processing, credibility, professional self-awareness, mutual trust, acceptance, empathy and creativity. This was a one-day long training off-site and 18-20 people participated. The workers took part in 6 groups and in the final event they could discuss their experience.

There are two proposals in the group of programs for system development. In the framework of one of the programs, an IT system was developed that can stabilize the operation of institutional care on system level. "Beside the professional characteristics of work their work, administration, working with administrated data and information are the greatest burden for the colleagues." Therefore, the applicant organization developed such an administration interface that can minimize time required for data recording and makes previously recorded data available. The result of the project was that the software adapts to the needs of the workers of the children's home and provides the following functions: planning schedules, time-sheets, group log, planning menu, statistical data provision. The other part of the proposal aimed to support the life-start and employment of those who are in after-care, in which the organization employs young adults as cleaners, repair men, carpenters, electricians, financial and IT staff. The other proposal for system development targeted the introduction and maintenance of a quality management system relating to child protection's corrective pedagogy processes. The program contained the following modules: preparatory training, adaptation phase, follow up, preparation of documentation and audit. According to the experience of the applicant, during the implementation of the quality management system, children's home workers' problem solving ability developed, predictability and planning improved and teamwork was also strengthened. The

effectiveness of professional work became objectively measurable and by this, the care's quality improved.

We can see that within the framework of the Good Practice tender, the organizations had many ways to approach the issue of protecting and mainstreaming child's rights. The protection of rights for care appeared which meant the support for preserving the family unit supporting health, social security, education, leisure and playing activities; ensuring access to information appeared widespread and there were some applicants that dealt with the issue of protection of rights by implementing the topic of protection from violence and drug abuse in the program.

In the following we explain the importance of participation by presenting the Children's Parliament's role in the field of mainstreaming child's rights.

Children's Parliament on social integration

Under the 12th Article of CRC all children have to be ensured with the right to freely express their views about everything relating to them and their views have to be taken into account in accordance with their age and maturity. "Participation is a process, with which the youth can gain self-confidence and self-esteem as well as obtain and exercise skills and abilities." (Hazai 2014:359). During participation the young person takes the initiative since he/she recognizes when an issue is related to his/her and peers' life and formulates needs and proposes solution in the name of others. Participation is a public role (Hazai 2014).

FICE – Hungary organized the Children's Parliament in 2001 for the first time. Approximately 40-70 children and young adults between 15 and 20 years old in care take part in a session. They come from children's homes or foster care from all over the country. Several topics have been discussed in the sessions so far, for example, the difficulties of life in children's home, separate placement in case of siblings, dealing with homosexuality in children's home, placement of underage mother and her child, using pocket money, using housing support (Hazai 2014). The delegate selection for the Children's Parliament was done by children through Children's Councils. Where there is no Children's Council, the delegates were elected voluntary. Before every session, a preparation is held, where the delegates can get ready regarding the topic and form their joint views and formulate their demands. The topic of the Children's Parliament was the promotion of successful social integration and its motto was: "We are entitled to live our – satisfied and safe – lives."⁷

⁷At the Children's Parliament we made a recording with permission of the participants. In the following, the presented pieces of information are from the Children's Parliament; they are presented anonymously.

The participating young adults dealt with very important topics and they formulated on both individual and system levels those changes that are needed to create basis for social integration successfully.

They named the following main changes on individual –children – level:

- Opening care places with programs for the society and environment at as young age as possible
- Development of a contemporary support system; presenting positive models for those who are in care
- More intense involvement into finance management and activities relating to independent life
- Accepting themselves and their situation, making real self-image
- Exercising the right to express their view.

The most important suggestions for the environment about the development of the child protection system:

- Supporting programs and forums where the society can learn about the values of children living in child protection (social sensitization)
- Supporting participation in education, the restoration of compulsory school age to the age of 18; in case of part-time studies – acquiring leaving examination or profession – the age limit for after care service should be increased in accordance with personal needs
- Training and supporting credible professionals
- Supporting mentor-system
- Support for sport and other forms of recreation
- Ensuring more efficient operation regarding advocacy (Children’s Council, Children’s Parliament) (Major 2014)

For the successful social integration, the delegates formulated several important improvements on system level. As previously mentioned, it is essential to put the emphasis on the strengths and talents of the children. Presenting successful models can greatly contribute to making children and young adults to be motivated (Furnivall-Grant 2014; Rác 2009). Many studies draw attention to the importance of the development of a mentor-system, in which a stable and positive person provides help in keeping up, school career and in accessing different services. The relationship is based on trust. The mentor can stabilize the child emotionally and lead him/her to an independent life (without the system) (LEARNS n.y.) This is the need what for the participants of the Children’s Parliament responded. Besides presenting successful models, the establishment of a contemporary support system for credible information provision about different topics like addiction was also mentioned. “(...) my experience is that they accept more readily something from somebody who was in the same life situation, from such a credible person who really went through this and did it than from a person who sat in front of a book and learnt it during trainings about

what it really is, what to do and tells what not to do.“ “Because I don't want to convince them not to use drugs, I tell them facts, like see what I achieved, think about it.”

Both in foster and institutional care, the support for keeping contact with the biological family and preserving identity is particularly important. Many of those who live in care said that they do not belong anywhere and feel themselves rootless. The children and young adults living in child protection face exclusion and discrimination daily. In every session of the Children's Parliament, it was mentioned that the children and young adults feel ashamed of their situation and hide it, they want to break the fossilized walls around them built of negative social images. (Rác 2012; Hazai 2014). “We're trying, there is an image of us that we carry (...) we do not have self-confidence at all because we are emotionally damaged.”

Children and young adults criticize that they were taken from their close-wide environment, friends and family and by this, their cultural tradition and heritage; furthermore, maintaining relationships is also hard. The children also said that the professionals did not inform them about their rights, how they could express their views and what forums are enabled for them. In the case of those who left the system, we can talk about a very small social network and they are not prepared (finance and household management skills, getting job) to start an independent life. Many experience abuse, neglect in the system and even the professionals do not take children and young adults seriously; furthermore, they cannot or only after a very long wait (causing deterioration) can access certain services (department of addictology, child psychiatry). Their failures can be seen in their school career that greatly complicates social integration. Disabled children and young adults are also in difficult situations; most of them cannot access the appropriate services and they are rather a vulnerable target group⁸ (Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children 2010; Rác 2012; Csurgó – Rác 2012).

According to many research, the children wish professionals to provide emotional and practical help for them. Hill (1999) summarized what features children seek for in a worker: show willingness to listen, be empathetic and reliable, take action regarding the children's matter, to be able to talk with them confidentially, respect them, consider them as a complete people. In contrast, a bad professional does not listen to the child or keep his/her promises, has too much control over the child's life, does not share information and does not take the child's opinion into account (cited by Oliver 2010:4). This requires the existence of several skills like communication skills (including communication with disabled children), ability to share information in accordance with the so-called 'you need to know' principle; satisfying their emotional needs, helping children to get involved in the decision-making on care and provision they get. (Children's Rights Director for England 2012). This need was formulated by

⁸ According to the results of a Canadian research, disabled children and young adults are overrepresented in the child protection system and are twice as likely to become victim of abuse. 55% of them cannot access basic services; the parents are in worse situation in the labour market due to the state of their children and as a consequence they have worse financial situation. (Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children 2010: 76)

the Children's Parliament as well, that is, to have space and opportunity to express their views and get involved actively into decisions about their lives.

The delegates formulated that they think the continuous training for professionals and the involvement of greater number of men into child protection to be important. According to international experience, young adults would love to take part in trainings for professionals in which they could express their views directly about what kind of help they need. (Children's Rights Director for England 2012). Children living in foster care also formulated that they would like to have less restriction in the care and more help in keeping contact with the biological parents. In case of unsuccessful return to home, the children and young adults would like to go back to the same foster parents and they would also like to keep in touch with the foster family after leaving the system and get little help occasionally. A survey⁹ pointed out that according to the children's suggestions foster parents should make them feel more that they are full members of the family and they would like to get more support for programs (sleeping at friends, participating in a trip or staying out late) and they also would like to be placed in a family that has the same religion and ethnicity. (Children's Rights Director for England 2012)

The 15th Children's Parliament confirmed that sport and other leisure or recreational activities should be more supported. In this connection, they also said to forbid the restrictions of these activities with the aim of punishment. "(...) prohibition of sport should not be punishment. If someone wants to spend his/her free time this way or something does not go well in one's life it should not be punished by prohibiting sport, for example, because they have bad grades."

The delegates indicated that the quality and level of support of care and provision between types of care (institutional and foster care) and between the areas in the country are not the same. Rác's research (2012) on the after care system and after care provision pointed out that professional support is discretionary since in many cases, young adults get provision based on the child protection professional's judgment. Furthermore, implicit selection prevails since the young adults do not have information about what provisions are available for them.

Summary

As the 15th Children's Parliament showed, children and young adults are capable of formulating very determined opinion about the received care and services. They can clearly see their situation and reflect on what changes are needed on both individual and system level for successful social integration. The children's and young adults' points of view greatly help to understand the upbringing processes and demonstrate that the youth does not necessarily think the same way as the adults. Children can express their views about their lives, the behaviour of their carers and parents, the

⁹ In connection with foster care 363 children and young adults were asked personally and with surveys; 60% of them were girl, 21% of them were under the age of 11, while 2% of them were older than 18 years.

attitude of the workers and about their emotions. Their message to the adult society for the exercise of their rights: "Listen to us, check whether we need something, help to keep contact with our families, ensure safety for us and remember we are human too." (Oliver 2010:32) The delegates said they can add that they accept "how the society affects us is the same how we are affecting the society (...) We have to learn to accept the society." Most of the children and young adults understand what care and upbringing mean, but they would not mind receiving preparation. It is important because their experience will affect what kind of parents they are going to be. (Madge-Willmott 2007) The proposals for Good Practices in Child Protection confirms that even on the lowest level of methodology building, there is a need for conscious "problem-solving, experience gaining, -sharing and professional rule-making" work for the profession's development. For this, continuous search for solution, self-reflection is needed on each organizations' level (Domszky 2011:2; 9). Listening with understanding to the views of those who are in care is the key for all these.

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EDIT SCHRANZ

'Who is in crisis? With reference to the debates about the 'crisis of masculinity', discuss about poverty, unemployment, or other social issues, and its effects on women'.

But

Whose crisis is it after all?

Introduction

Is it sexuality or the lack of it, or rather money or the lack of it that defines better the relationship between men and women? Have the position of women really changed a lot regarding sexual hierarchy from the image of the “cheap household manpower” to the self-conscious modern woman possessing an independent income or is that all just an illusion? There are changes that can be traced in the feminist literature from the pre-industrial society through the appearance of the paid labour force of women kept count of the result of the industrial revolution, as well as through the positive changes in the election and heritance rights considered from the women’s point of view to the modern, strengthening feminist fights for female quotes. Can these be really considered as big steps taken forward or rather just very small ones in respect of equality between genders considering the present picture of societies basically described as patriarchal in the literature? Proceeding along the theories we try to give an answer to the above questions in this study by focusing on the results that summarize the empiric study of a present-day female group of a given social position, namely deep poverty. At the same time, we are going to concern the issue of masculinity crisis to a large extent. According to our hypothesis, it is actually not clear whether only “masculinity is undermined” as a result of the general economic difficulties (unemployment) affecting the financial situation of families at a micro level. What happens to women in the meanwhile? Or what happens to the children, respectively, that is to the families themselves? What happens to them especially at around or under a well identifiable standard of living: the subsistence level? American literature of sociology in the 1980s – which described studies on the feminisation feature of poverty carried out in the United States – has already made it clear that widows, divorced women or mothers who rear their child alone live poverty deeper than men do. They simply live in deeper poverty. Research results gave a plastic indication of the fact that the chance of families sustained by women the ten times more likely remain poor even for long-term than that of families sustained by men.

Governmental measures intended to cope with female poverty (USA; years of the 70s and 80s), however, did not work. The reason for that can be traced back now, from a temporal distance of 30 to 40 years, to the fact that the underlying causes of female poverty are actually different from that of male poverty. Additionally, programmes coping with poverty were developed for men and thus they were not suitable and effective for women; moreover, they have anchored the state of female poverty. (Czibere 2014) Child rearing duties incumbent solely on women as well as women's handicapped position at the labour market a priori make the female form of poverty "unique", irrespectively to whether it hits mothers struggling with solving everyday living of their families in America or – as we'll see in our example – in the middle of Europe. We try to draft it in this study that what evidences have researchers found so far to verify that poverty appearing as a process due to social differentiation can at the micro level be detected - as a sign of inequality within the family - between genders, in a male-female relation, also in several dimensions.

Sub- and superordinate relations

There have been different views supporting or criticising each other about inequalities between men and women – both in the family and the society – seeking the social causes and, respectively, considering the possible mitigation of them. The study by Helen I. Safa from 1996 titled „Gender Inequality and Women's Wage Labour: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis” describes the bases of the different views from the standpoint of women by giving an analysis of the effects made by the capitalist development (Safa, 1996. p. 186). She leads the idea from the features of pre-industrial societies – where access to education and labour was given or denied on a gender basis – through the “women- liberating” theories of women's wamework appearing along with the capitalist development to the patriarchal relations defined in her own interpretation. Safa, when stressing the masculine control over female work, states clearly that this feature does not only characterize relations at home but it is typical of the workplace relations, as well. As she writes it; gender hierarchy is reproduced at the workplace. (Safa, 1996. p. 188) The Marxian interpretation of the changes affecting women coming forth along with the appearance of capitalism: the views connected to the egalitarian division of family roles proved to be real “treasuries” for the feminist literature. These views, as a basis, gave birth to many studies later on. Nonetheless, these views were actually elaborated by Engels, a close friend of Marx, it is also true that they allow an insight to the function of capitalism according to Marx's ideology (Baxter 1992). Janeen Baxter, at the same time, in her study titled „Families and Households in Society and Gender” considers Engels' views on the division of labour in the family and the egalitarian opportunities of women wrong. Engels stressed that no inequality existed between man and woman before commodity production has developed and that natural division of labour determined the activities. Surplus production and the curtailment of maternal rights brought forth inequality for men, as

well as the possibility to quasi “demote” female gender and treat it simply like an instrument of slavery acting to please men. This leads Engels to the point that equality between man and woman would be achieved again only if women, leaving their home, appear in the paid labour market. According to Baxter, however, it became clear relatively soon – as it is stated in following studies – that in spite of the increasing number of women entering the labour market neither the inequality between genders, nor the inequality of household labour division ceased. Therefore, Engels was wrong – writes Baxter – when he contrasted the value of economy-based labour with the goods that can be produced at home. In other words, Engels was mistaken in explaining the reason for the devaluation of housework and child-rearing. The statement itself that duties between man and woman would originally be divided on a biological base was proved to be wrong, as well (Baxter 1992). There is one thing, however, in Engels’ reasoning that is worth attention: feminist directions in the 20th century, mainly in its second half, in the course of family studies developed further the issue of family labour division in a man-woman relation. Legal equality was introduced in many countries and – as Engels finally had “predicted” it – more and more women managed to find their place on the labour market. Thus changes took place also in the family economic relations. However, now the question is – as we have already indicated it in the introduction of our study - that to what extent this shift regarding male and female egalitarian endeavours is to be considered. Literature – seems – to estimate it for the moment that in terms of family power relations the mentioned shift did not bring forth a significant step forward (Cseh-Szombathy¹ 2006). As we shall see through a Hungarian example later on, literature is very likely to be right.

Many variations of female subordination are presumed by Helen I. Safa, as we have already referred to her. She tries to illustrate her statement by comparing and collating two theories in connection with paid female work force, namely the Marxian feminist analyses and the bases of the so called modern school. The modern school – as Safa refers here to the theory of Rosen (1982) – reckons on the basis of ascriptive criteria thought to be traditional that the paid female work appearing along with the capitalist development quasi „emancipated”, liberated women. Due to the increasing independence of and the professionalism acquired by women the integrity of women has promoted their mobility climbing upwards the social ladder – through the development of human capital – and modernity became finally an attitude. According to Safa, theories approaching from the direction of the Marxian-feminist views agree with the representatives of modernity in that paid work or waged work have liberated women. At the same time, they also stress that capitalism in alliance with patriarchy is actually the source of the subordination of women. And thus, instead of mitigating inequality, it strengthens further the already existing hierarchy – as we have already demonstrated it above keeping track of Baxter’s study. In connection with this, Safa mentions the differences in male and female labour wages at a disadvantage for women. She stresses that among these patriarchal relationships capital, state and men

¹ László Cseh –Szombathy (1925 - 2007) Member of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, he was Director of the Social Science Institute for Social Science Research at the University of ELTE. His research focuses on family and demographics.

all are interested in maintaining the reduced prestige of housework which, in her views, is the token of saving the masculine role. (Safa 1996. p. 187 -189) We still have to mention also that men – as well as the state and the capital – exactly know that the token of the future is to be found in child rearing, the reproductive function of women. And though all actors are aware of this, disputes emerged about the division of labour and hierarchy in the family as well as the acknowledgement of women's housework done at home – in the opinion of feminist authors - still show all together in the direction that among the existing patriarchal relationships the myth of masculine “wage-earner” is safe and unshakeable. “Sub- and superordinate relations” thus remain, in spite of that the economic depths and crises of recent decades as well as the growing unemployment and other subsequence² resulting from them significantly contributed to the erosion of masculine roles as a wage-earning one. Due to this, the instability of family has grown and the proportion of families sustained by women expressed in a percentage has definitely increased, as well. (Safa 1996. p. 216) This latter fact will play a role also in our example to be demonstrated later on: the sample of the unemployed breadwinner producing a complicated life situation and attitude.

The feminist directions of literature assisted the understanding of social phenomena connected to family – as Janeen Baxter has also phrased it out – right in that they tried to point out the necessity of understanding the relationships within the family. Studies made from the aspect of male and female relations – that is the “insight” gained into the life of families – made it possible to have an overview of the relations between families and social institutions. “...they have (feminist analysers – note by the editor) critically examined the social organisation of the family, and highlighted men's and women's differing experiences of family life. Moreover, feminists have stressed the need to differentiate between the ideologies of the family and the reality of individuals' lives within families.” (Baxter 1992. p. 94) This becomes interesting for us in respect of our citation of a statement on the position loss of men's wage-earning status. The example that a man from the status marking the “wage-earning” role can transfer to his children, i.e. to the next generations will in turn take a significant part in shaping the future image of the society. It is not all the same either from this point of view

²Reproduced from European Population Committee of the Council of Europe (2005) Recent demographic developments in Europe 2005 – results: Later childbearing - particularly in north and west - UK and Spain oldest mothers (29+); Extra marital births - 1970 very low (8% UK) - 1990 /15% Europe; 2004 over 28% and over 40% Sweden, UK, France; low S. & E; Rising divorce rates from 1970 in northern Europe; Rise in divorce (1 in 3 marriages end in divorce UK); Impacts on households: more one- and two- person households.

By 2005 the rate of one-parent households in Hungary grew from 15.6 to 16.8 percentages, and within that the number of mother-child type one-parent families grew from 80 to 87 percentages. In 2001 11.3 % of children younger than one year old lived in one-parent families while this rate was already 18.4 % in the case of the 14 year olds. Source: Hungarian Demographic Research Institute; study by Erzsébet Földházi published in 2009:

http://www.demografia.hu/letoltes/kiadvanyok/DemPort/09foldhazi_csaladszerkezet.pdf
Download-09/11/2014

what happens within the family, in a battlefield of “gender fights”. As James Heartfield (2002) stresses in the beginning of his study titled “There is No Masculinity Crisis”, with regards to the young generations, it is necessary to have social control from the state’s part. And by citing Fukuyama, he highlights that the socialisation of young people with an inadequate fraternal example can be observed the best in criminal statistics. (Heartfield 2002. p. 4) After having collated, several theories dealing with the masculinity crisis Heartfield points out the relation as per which if we really can talk about the crisis of masculinity then it should be looked for in no way within the masculine values. It is rather worth connecting with the issues of self-confidence and prestige related to work and economic stability. „The crisis of masculinity at work” – writes Heartfield as a subtitle (p. 7.) –, and cites Susan Faludi to give support to his statement. In her study Faludi identifies the crisis of masculinity and the undermined prestige of the breadwinner’s role partly with the lack of economic prestige indicating the increasing unemployment due to the economic recession in the 90s as a starting point. And though Faludi gives an American example to that the crisis of masculinity is actually worth being interpreted as the crisis of the industrial working class – and finally Heartfield also agrees with this statement in general³ –, in order to make a European comparison, she shows a British example, as well, citing the book by Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Cornel West: „The War Against Parents”. The authors presume that the economic recession does not only have a destructive effect on family life but they also set up the thesis of „pathological masculinity” (Heartfield refers to Hewlett and West 2002. p. 8), which means in their understanding that as per their assumption economy deprives men (of the idea of real masculinity, the masculinity – by editor), mainly the young ones. So, based on the above lines the question is rightly raised that if the crisis of masculinity is to be considered actually the crisis of the working class as Faludi and Heartfield wrote, then what can we say in the meanwhile regarding women? And what happens to the people living at the lowest level of the social ladder who make a living by charring and do not really have a choice in doing industrial or agricultural work? Because at a phenomenal level it is also the economic pressure, the everyday problem of making a living that is responsible for the biggest stress in the families as well as in the men who themselves “theoretically play the wage-earning role” - without job and vision in an era hit by recession. A further question is that where can women get a role in the middle of the masculinity crisis? What role is incumbent on them in respect of the responsibility for family commitments until men face a crisis? May women also allow themselves - as if a whole class – to be in crisis? Or does the question itself already show the unequal opportunities both within the family and the society? Or is this an even more complicated issue? Certainly, it is. In the frame of the present study we cannot undertake to give an exact, detailed answer. However, we would like to demonstrate “the other side” of the crisis, the complementary one, the other aspect of the crisis.

³ „The crisis is not one of masculinity, but one of the working class.”(Heartfield 2002. p. 13.)

Crisis of female existence?

As we have already referred many times to that in our study we want to start with the investigation of the dimensions of inequality in the family by illustrating the results of a research done in Hungary in the end of the first decade of the 2000s. The research was made among women living in deep poverty with the help of 89 qualitative interviewees. In Hungary of the 2000s researchers wanted to know how inequalities in the family appear in connection with the present female poverty and how the people involved: women living in deep poverty live their own status. Along what system of relations, events will it be obvious that the immobile nature of women's role within family and its unequal situation/position compared to that of men remained strongly anchored in the case of the lowest social strata, which position is significantly stabilized by poverty⁴. The volume giving a summary of the research was published first in Hungarian in 2012 while it came out in English this year (2014) titled „Women in deep poverty”. The education level of the majority of the 89 interviewees is very low, but there were some women having GCE or college degree, as well. The definition of deep poverty was still uniformly typical to all of them, as per that the average amount of income per person in their families did not exceed the minimum amount of pension⁵. The majority of the 89 women⁶ were living in a small town or in a village at the time of the interview; most of them were under the age of 50 and were

⁴By putting up the summing question of who and why will become poor, when looking for the answer, first, we have to mention the theoretical approaches by Marx and Wright based on exploitation, as a challenging factor. Davis & Moor, the pair of authors representing the classical school of functionalism, based their theory on the fact that not all of the occupied positions are uniformly important for the society, and this picture is further detailed by the differentiation of individual capacities. Those will become poor whose position is less important for the society, and the remuneration going hand in hand with the position (work) – as an incentive system - also forwards inequality, hence low prestige is paired with low income (Monostori 2005). Peter Townsend—who actually criticises the functionalist approach – presumes that the desire for financial remuneration is not the same in the case of the different social groups that is the “motivation” for obtaining financial goods “also depends on the cultural environment” (Czibere 2012). Oscar Lewis proceeding along the line of „underclass poor” phrased out by Herbert J. Gans views that the way of life developed among the poor: “the subculture of poverty” is a kind of adaptation and, at the same time, a response given to poverty as marginalized position. Amartya Sen, at the same time, considers as a starting point that one of the most important instrument of a balanced life is the income which has an absolute effect on one's life. If there is no adequate income that deprives the persons from such opportunities as e.g. the liberty of “taking part in the activities they have a good reason to take part” (Czibere 2012).

⁵In Hungary the amount of the minimum old age pension is 28.500 HUF/month in 2014 (it is approximately 92 Euro at today's exchange rate) Source: Hungarian National Occupational Service http://www.afsz.hu/engine.aspx?page=allaskeresoknek_tajekoztato_oregsegi_nyugdij_legki

⁶Regarding their qualification women who finished 8 classes (i.e. primary school) (32 persons) and, respectively skilled workers' training (22 persons) were over-represented and the ratio of GCE-holders (17 persons) was higher than expected; 4 persons had a college degree. regarding their labour market position only 24 of the 89 had a job, more than this (33 persons) were unemployed, the number of women being on some sort of maternity leave was also high (17 persons), and the rest of them received pension or nursing fee.

rearing 1 or 2 children⁷, and the number of households experiencing the everyday without a masculine family member was relatively high. Their way of life was typically influenced by a family background where in most cases the daily problems of making a living were characteristic, and the childhood with the fraternal prestige, the cultural background, the financial circumstances at childhood and the (usually low) position of the parents in the labour market. It is an important momentum that compared to the parental family not any kind of social mobility could be traced by the research: the automatic inheritance of the social position has taken place in the case of the investigated group. It is even more interesting, however, that the women who possessed a degree were not able to climb the social ladder either. It was typical of the family organisations that each other's children were also reared in a large number of the cases as well as the common ones born in the meantime; i. e. women lived in a second or a common-law marriage which in turn made their situation complicated all the while. It is very likely that this circumstance – and the maternal responsibility – played a role also in that they marked their emotional life mostly as one where the love relationship lags much behind the need for their own and first of all the children's financial security on a priority list. The author of the book, Ibolya Czibere highlighted this line especially because the occurrence of harder life situations (insecure financial income, loss of employment) have weakened further the anyway infirm bound between the adult members of the family. This in turn gave way to the validation of physical dominance⁸ over and psychic outrage against women in most cases. All of the 89 interviewees have mentioned some form of violence that was committed against her. Those women gave account of the most brutal and most frequent outrages in whose case the male family member was unemployed while the female was not. Their lives were not eased by either the division of labour or the traditional division of power in the family. Due to the lack of the mentioned mobility in marriage the expectation of women living in deep poverty towards the husbands or common-law

⁷ From among the 89 families 35 reared 3 to 5 children while there were 6 to 9 children in 7 families. Most of the women lived in marriage or common-law marriage, some were about to get divorced or became a widow.

⁸ According to the statistical data, partner outrage means male perpetrator and female victim in 95 percent of the cases. Intra-family violence in Hungary demands the life of at least one woman a week. Every fifth woman grew up in a family where her father beat her mother. Perpetrators of violence against women are partners or ex-partners in the vast majority of cases. 22 percent of violent crimes against women were committed by their partner or ex-partner. The similar data relevant to men was 3 percent. More than half of the women killed was killed by their (ex) husband or common-law husband. In Hungary, according to the police statistics, e.g. in 2009 51.2 % of the killed women (43 women) and according to another police source 76 % of them (64 women) were killed by their partner. From the court files of men killed by their partners it turns out in 80 percent of the cases that the woman's becoming a perpetrator was preceded by a long-lasting, severe outrage of the wife from the husband's part. 23 percent of women experienced at least some kind of physical violence committed by their present or former male partner. (This data is a low value of conservative estimation.) 55 percent of the women experienced physical violence and 44 percent of the women experienced sexual violence suffered serious injuries (bruises, sprains, open wounds, fractures, head and facial injuries). Source: <http://nokjoga.hu/alapinformaciok/statisztikak>

husbands has actually imaged the patriarchal feature of their environment. In the case of the present social group this means that the wage-earning role of man is generally accepted and expected. However, it “cuts a hole” into this “tradition” when the man loses his job or odd job. Thus child rearing, housekeeping, many times the work around the house have been incumbent on women, and often a part of the wage-earning, as well, which usually provided a modest but stable income according to the educational level. Losing the wage-earning activity – as we could already see it when discussed the masculinity crisis – brings about a turn that is a crisis, that can be detected not only in the life of the family, but in that of a whole “masculine class” or group, as well. It is the same situation in the case of the group presented in our example, but the experienced situation precipitated in different forms in the families. Czibere writes in connection with this referring to the study of Falussy of 2001 that when men or women lose their wage-earning activity in Hungary the time spent on housework by women is going to be orders of magnitude more. Men, however, deal with their working time spent in the household “more modestly”. Falussy concludes from this that “there are much bigger differences in the working time of unemployed men and women and in its compound than in the case of the active ones”⁹. Actually the interviewees of Ibolya Czibere also support this interrelation by their own stories. At the same time, the situation is different if the woman regularly goes to work while the man in the family is unemployed — and for some reason he is not willing to go out charring.

But most men usually do not take over any burden from the women (child rearing) even in this case. Women practically remain alone with their troubles with the difference that the time spent together with the partner falls drastically. These time-structure shifts inherent the masculine unemployment, as Czibere phrases out, require therefore a large degree of independence and problem solving skills from the women. Meanwhile, Czibere assumes that the underlying reason of man’s off home time spending is right the “shuffling off” the troubles arising from poverty. The imbalanced situation evokes a growth in the experienced inequality compared to that of the former relations supported by the fact that men “disdain” the work women do at home irrespectively whether they take an active part in creating family income or not. The unequal or so to say unfair feature of the situation is further sharpened by that the behaviour of the man who became unemployed will be “malevolent” – as Czibere writes it referring to Gödri’s study of 2000 – if the family has to face economic difficulties which in turn lead to the quality degradation of the marriage. It is important to note, however, that as the monthly total income of the family is not enough in most cases to make a living¹⁰. The handling of money, due to the everyday

⁹Czibere: *Women in Deep Poverty*, p.128.

¹⁰The different combinations of odd jobs and illegal work, various allowances and subsidies for children still do not actually cover the monthly expenses; therefore families surcharge themselves by borrowing from the rack-rent through bank credits to various forms of loans month by month.

depressing burden (children), will be the charge of women¹¹. This slightly cants the image of power division in the family expected among the patriarchal relations where handling money is a masculine duty, as well. At the same time if we examine that at which end of the parties is the necessary “jettisoning” stronger in respect of certain commodities due to the low income, it turns out clearly from the interviews that women are who forego in each case their individual necessities (except food, but sometimes even that if needed), in order to save the family income stability, even in the case when they are the breadwinners. The subject of jettisoning primarily serves to meet the child’s adequate requirements (fruit). Some of the interviewed women have not bought for themselves anything that can be considered as general consumer commodity (such as cloths or shoes) for many years. The individual consumption of men (alcohol, cigarettes, games), however, can be considered regular in many cases. And if we add to this the result of the survey on the satisfaction with the standard of living (which is an important part of supporting the hypothesis on the difference of how men and women experience poverty) we can observe interesting interrelations. In the opinion of the majority of the asked women men live the everyday with less responsibility, they can afford more things for themselves; therefore they live a better life and are more satisfied with it, which may be frustrating for the women. However, they gave a reason for all these statements not in the forgone individual consumption, but namely that “the husbands have much more rest and can afford much more amusement and spending.”¹² A significant part of the asked women phrased out a similar opinion respecting their disadvantage - related to socially free and bound time spending - when both members of the couple were unemployed, that is both of them began the day with the same conditions in the mornings. Based on this Czibere reckons that the consumer differences and inequalities existing in the family of the examined women show that the family members are not uniformly poor: women consider themselves poorer than men do that is “wellness” is not evenly distributed between family members.

Conclusion

There are few more expressing sentences regarding the desires of women living in deep poverty than the lines found in the interviews: “I would like to have a new pullover, because I can rarely make it...”¹³, „I am longing for everything, but most of all a pair of spring shoes...”¹⁴ „I’d like to have once a dress that has not been worn by anyone else before.”¹⁵

¹¹ The result validated by the author is identical with former researches in the topic: none of the 89 female interviewees had mentioned that money would have been budgeted by the man in her family.

¹² Czibere: *Women in Deep Poverty* p. 155

¹³ Interviewee No. 3

¹⁴ Interviewee No. 81

¹⁵ Interviewee No. 51

And while these women are busy with the procurement of money and consumer commodities necessary for making a living, the establishment of security and the maintenance of stability they are constantly experiencing every day that they make disproportionately more sacrifices for the sake of their relationships and their whole family than the other party does. The “party” that is theoretically in a crisis right now. Or isn't he? Hence actually the masculine members of this lowest stratum of the society sometimes reach (upwards) into the social stratum called the working class, while at other times not even there. But it certainly seems that they need the strength of the female side in order to solve the subsistence problems of the family – very likely irrespectively from that what level they are positioned at within a social stratum. Now is that only the crisis of the working class indeed as Faludi and Heartfield wrote it? Or is the picture yet more detailed than this, and is this the crisis of all men, irrespectively to their social “rank”, for a shorter or longer period of time who is staggered by economic circumstances in their belief in themselves and their masculinity?

There is no way to anatomize further this issue in the frame of this study. What can be seen for sure though through the demonstrated example is that men and women within the family treat the everyday life and their poverty and troubles in a different way. Women consider themselves poorer than men in many respects.¹⁶ This is in contrast with the generally accepted statement in poverty research according to which all family members are uniformly poor at a certain level of poverty¹⁷ (Czibere 2012). Regarding gender hierarchy, in addition to the image of “cheap female household manpower” the above example leads us to another dimension, as well.

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¹⁶ Katalin Koncz in her study of 2002, in course of examining her hypotheses has already set forth that the raising of poverty studies that all family members are poor to the same extent at a given level of poverty is not relevant. (Czibere 2012)

¹⁷For the description of women's social position most researches consider social exclusion the adequate definition. They examine women's poverty risk along this concept and do not consider the study by sex adequately measurable. (Iván Szelényi writes about this in his study of 2001) As per Zsolt Spéder's study of '97 Hungarian researchers have not really found—before the study has been published – a significant difference between the risk of masculine and feminine poverty; but the analysis made by the conference working group of the global organisation (UN) did not find other results either. (Czibere 2012)

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