

Killing the Canard: Saint Stephen's Crown, Nixon, Budapest, and the Hungarian Lobby

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“We are trying to kill this canard but it won't die.”
Helmut Sonnenfeldt¹

Ethnic interests have always been one of the driving forces of American foreign policy. Unlike in most other countries, in the United States a relatively small, financially less potent, but well-organized ethnic group can set the agenda, represent its own interests, and pressure policymakers, especially at the time of elections. This activity, however, has its limits. Traditionally, Eastern and Central European groups have not been successful in influencing diplomacy towards their home countries directly. At the same time, several cases demonstrate when such lobby groups were indeed able to affect American foreign policy and prevent Washington from taking certain steps.² Hungarian-Americans during the Cold War period were no exception: they also made efforts to shape American policy towards their homeland.

Drawing on primary sources available at the Nixon Presidential Library and interviews with influential Hungarian-Americans, this article presents an example of this phenomenon by examining the efforts of various Hungarian-American groups, and Hungarian-American and American politicians to prevent the return of the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen to the People's Republic of Hungary during the 1970s. It argues that this was, indeed, an example of effective ethnic lobbying.³ The opposition of the Hungarian-Americans was one of the reasons why the decision to return the Crown to Hungary was not made during the Nixon and the Ford administrations. It was postponed until 1978, during Carter's presidency.⁴ The power dynamics in the Carter Administration were different as the Democratic president was less concerned about the possible electoral effects on the Hungarian-American and the wider Eastern European-American community. The Hungarian-Americans could no longer effectively block the return of the Holy Crown as soon as there was clear political will on the part of the White House to make a decision and go through with it.

Ethnic groups influencing American policy is not a recent phenomenon. Though Nathan Glazer's and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's claim in 1975 according to which ethnic influences had become “the single most important determinant of American foreign policy” might be an

overstatement,⁵ the interests of various groups of people that share a common origin have been one of the factors shaping the political landscape of the United States since the foundation of the Republic.⁶ The significance of ethnic lobbying was also recognized by the major political parties, especially the Republicans. “White ethnic” workers, the majority of whom were Catholic and of Eastern European origin, were traditionally considered to be Democratic voters and became one of the focus points of the Republican campaign in 1972. According to a report on National Citizens Groups prepared for Fred V. Malek, Deputy Director of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, “blue collar workers of ethnic origin who live in and around major metropolitan areas . . . [are] recognized as one deserving major attention, but the specific campaign strategy for reaching them is still under consideration. . . . The [goal] is to enlist as much of this historically Democratic vote for the President as possible.”⁷

The leaders of the various ethnic organizations saw this as an opportunity to get more involved in national politics, represent the interests of their community, and influence policy-making. In the United States, the course of foreign policy is decided by various political actors, some of which (such as the President and the Congress) are elected, while some others (such as the State Department or the National Security Adviser) are not elected. During the Cold War, Eastern European-American organizations seemed to have been less successful in influencing the State Department and the foreign policy establishment.⁸ This, however, does not mean that their efforts were completely futile; the two most important tools these ethnic groups could apply were to use the “ethnic voters” to exert pressure on elected officials and to appeal to public opinion.⁹ The pressure groups were a lot more effective when they could claim that the given issue would affect not only the voting patterns of their particular nationality, but also those of Eastern European ethnics as a whole. In these cases, the validity of these claims to influence election results was secondary, as long as the decision-makers believed them to be true. According to the 1970 census, there were 447,497 Hungarian-Americans, but altogether more than four million Americans of Eastern European descent, many of them living in swing states.¹⁰ If these people voted as a block, they could, indeed, influence the outcome of elections.

During the 1972 campaign, the Republicans turned out to be better at organizing ethnic voters than the Democrats. According to László Pásztor, a Hungarian-American politician and at the time National Director of the Heritage Division of the Republican National Congress (RNC), Republicans

were more intent on reaching out to ethnic voters than Democrats.¹¹ This also meant that the perceived interests of these ethnic groups were less important for the Democrats, which could obviously explain why President Carter, unlike his Republican predecessors, was able to return the Crown after the Democrats regained power in the White House in 1977. Pásztor noted that the only organizer of ethnic groups on the Democratic side was Father Geno Baroni, the American Roman Catholic priest and social activist who helped found the National Italian American Foundation in 1975.¹² Baroni's efforts, however, were significantly less successful in comparison to those of the Heritage Division. Because of his position and role in the Republican campaign, Pásztor became an influential figure in the Hungarian-American struggle to prevent the return of the Holy Crown.

The Holy Crown of Saint Stephen, the first king of Hungary, has played an important role in Hungarian history since the Middle Ages and it is widely regarded as a powerful symbol of Hungarian statehood. At the end of World War II, the Holy Crown was taken out of Hungary by the Hungarian Arrow Cross government and the National Socialist Germans and fell into American hands after the capitulation in 1945.¹³ Hungarian authorities requested the return of the Holy Crown at least two times between 1945 and 1947,¹⁴ but while the Americans never denied that the Holy Crown rightfully belonged to the Hungarian nation, they were unwilling to return the artifact to a communist Hungarian government. The Holy Crown became one of the main issues that had to be settled between the United States and Hungary when they began working towards the normalization of relations during *détente* in the 1960s. According to Tibor Glant, a "bilateral ritual resulted": Hungary would ask for the return of the Crown and would be rejected by the United States, who would ask for some undefined improvement in bilateral relations.¹⁵ While the government of the People's Republic of Hungary was determined to acquire the Holy Crown, a significant portion of the anti-communist émigrés strongly protested against the artifact getting into the hands of the regime of János Kádár. They tried every means in their power to express their point of view. Part of the "ritual," as Glant explains, was a routine whereby the press would insinuate that the American government might return the Crown to the Hungarian government, then the Hungarian-Americans would protest against the proposal, and the American government would refute the allegations and reassure the protesters that they had no intention of giving the Holy Crown back to the Kádár regime.¹⁶

The first such incident took place after April 19, 1970, when the *New York Times* published David Binder's article "U.S. and Hungary Pleased by

Improving Relations.” The piece summarized the state of US-Hungarian normalization and alluded to the possible return of the Holy Crown: “According to reliable sources improving at the pace maintained in the last seven months, the day may be close when Washington finds an occasion to return Hungary’s national treasure, the Crown of St. Stephen, to Budapest.”¹⁷ Binder claimed that the artifact had been removed from Budapest by Hungarian soldiers of the German *Wehrmacht* and it was handed over to the Americans for safekeeping. Prominent figures in the Hungarian-American community, such as Tibor Eckhardt, the erstwhile founder of the Smallholders Party during the interwar years, immediately reacted.¹⁸ As Chairman of the Joint Foreign Policy Committee of the North American Hungarian Organization, he wrote a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* the day the article was published objecting to the returning of St. Stephen’s Crown for the sake of “diplomatic courtesies and commerce.” Moreover, he pointed out that the Crown had not been taken away by Hungarian soldiers serving in Hitler’s army as previously argued, but had been saved from the Red Army and entrusted to the Americans by Colonel Ernő Pajtás, who served Regent Miklós Horthy and the legitimate government of Hungary. Eckhardt claimed that the Holy Crown was given to the Americans for safekeeping by the Crown Guard, which was responsible for its safety, and it was not to be returned until the liberation of Hungary.¹⁹

Some Hungarian-American politicians hoped to contact the administration through László Pásztor. Dr. András Pogány, president of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters’ Federation in the USA and Hungarian-American advisor to the RNC, wrote to Pásztor the day after the publication of the article. Pogány emphasized the negative effect of these rumors on the Hungarian-American community and recommended a public denial by the White House or the State Department. While he pledged his allegiance to his “beloved President and [his] Party,” Pogány also warned that “no Hungarian will ever take easily any fooling around with the Crown of St. Stephen, and our Administration should realize it as soon as possible.”²⁰ Pogány wrote his letter to Pásztor in English, hoping to reach a wider audience, including the upper circles of the Republican Party.

On April 22, 1970, several board members of the American Hungarian Federation sent President Nixon a letter and an aide-memoire on the issue of the Holy Crown.²¹ The five signers were Bishop Emeritus Dr. Zoltán Béky, Judge Hon. Albert A. Fiok, Dr. Louis Fury, Professor Maurice Czikann-Zichy, and Professor Z. Michael Szasz. By this time, State Department officials had confirmed some of the contents of the *New York*

Times article. In the documents the Hungarian-Americans expressed their hope that no decision would be made without considering their views and that the Crown would not be returned while Hungary was still under Soviet occupation. The memorandum declared that the Holy Crown “[was] the property of the Hungarian nation,” not of a particular regime. Being the symbol of constitutional power, it must not be returned to the communist government in Budapest, as it would only strengthen it. The American Hungarian Federation, founded in 1906, was the oldest and largest Hungarian-American umbrella organization, and on behalf of all its constituencies, it expressed the hope that the Holy Crown would not be returned as long as Soviet troops were on Hungarian soil.²²

Executive Director of the Federation, Michael Szasz, also sent a copy of the letter and the memorandum to Pásztor.²³ Writing in English, Szasz asked Pásztor to convey the opinions expressed in the document to Chairman of the RNC, Rogers C. B. Morton. Szasz argued that returning the Crown would hurt American interests in Eastern Europe and could have negative consequences in the coming elections, referring also to other voters of East Central European heritage. On April 27, Szasz was reassured by Robert M. McKisson from the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the State Department that the political and emotional sensibilities of the Hungarian-Americans would be taken into consideration. In what would become the standard American response, McKisson acknowledged that the Holy Crown belonged to the Hungarian nation, that the normalization of the relationship was on the way, and that the return of the Crown would be tied to further improvements.²⁴

On April 24, 1970, Pásztor sent a letter to Harry S. Dent, deputy counsel to President Nixon, and several other members of the administration, including National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry A. Kissinger. Pásztor claimed to have received “at least seventy-five telephone calls from Hungarians, Croatians, Poles, Slovaks, and other Captive Nations people,” inquiring about the article and expressing their concern about the negative effects on the Republican Party if the Crown would indeed be returned to the “Communist puppet regime in Hungary.”²⁵ Attempting to frame the question as a wider issue, Pásztor threatened that if the Holy Crown was indeed returned, Republicans could “write off the votes of the majority of Hungarian-Americans and those of a significant portion of other Captive Nations people.” He attached the letters of the Hungarian-American leaders, confirmed their credibility as speaking for the community, and recommended a public statement by the White House or the State Department.²⁶

American politicians, including Congressmen John S. Wold, William S. Moorhead, and Lawrence H. Hogan, also requested information from the White House and the State Department about the intended fate of the Crown of St. Stephen.²⁷ On April 17, 1970, two days before the *New York Times* article was published, Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had referred to an earlier letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and inquired from Secretary of State William Rogers about the status of the Holy Crown.²⁸ The replies from the White House and the State Department pointed out that the Holy Crown was a Hungarian national treasure, and that the “political and emotional sensibilities” of the Hungarian-Americans would be taken into consideration. While the Hungarian government had raised the issue several times, the Nixon Administration claimed that there were no current plans to return the artifact. At the same time, they also acknowledged that the Holy Crown would continue to be a matter of interest for both governments in the future. The general conclusion was that the Crown of Saint Stephen would only be returned under the proper circumstances, as it should “serve the objective of general goodwill rather than discord.”²⁹

Nye M. Jackson, assigned by the Post Office Department to Harry Dent, urged a reply to Pásztor and pointed out that mishandling the issue could result in the loss of many votes.³⁰ Together with Kissinger, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, senior staff member at the National Security Council (NSC), prepared a draft reply for Dent, which followed a familiar pattern: first it elaborated on the significance of the Holy Crown and confirmed that the sensibilities of the Eastern Europeans would be taken into consideration. Then it acknowledged that the Hungarian government had raised the issue but claimed that there were no present plans to return the artifact and ensured Pásztor that the issue would be treated with the discretion it required. They declined to make a public statement on grounds, as they argued, that the State Department had already made its position clear to Congress and the Hungarian-American community and, therefore, such a move would only stir up emotions.³¹

Congressman Lawrence J. Hogan (Republican, MD, 1969-1974), also joined the effort against the return of the Holy Crown. The Congressman was married to a Hungarian-American, Ilona Modly,³² the daughter of Stephen Béla Modly, who emigrated to the United States in 1951.³³ Hogan wrote to President Nixon on May 19, 1970, advising him not to make the Holy Crown of St. Stephen a “negotiable item.” Hogan claimed that by returning the Crown, the United States would violate the trust of the

Hungarians and “dash their hopes.” He pointed to the unresolved issue of financial claims that could serve as a basis for refusal.³⁴ On May 28, 1970, William E. Timmons, assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, assured Hogan that he would bring the congressman’s views to the attention of the President.³⁵ Meanwhile, Timmons asked for a draft reply from Kissinger. Sonnenfeldt proposed an answer almost identical to the one given to Dent, to be signed by Special Assistant to the President Richard E. Cook.

The Hungarian-American organizations relentlessly continued their campaign. On October 1, 1970, about a month before the US mid-term elections, the leaders of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters’ Federation sent a letter to President Nixon listing several reasons why the Crown should not be returned.³⁶ Their statement elaborated on the propaganda activities of Kádár’s communist regime among Hungarian-Americans, expressed the shock of the Hungarian-American community over the *New York Times* article, and requested with gratitude “the continuing safekeeping of St. Stephen’s Crown by the United States.” They claimed to have collected ten thousand signatures of the more than 150,000 Hungarian-Americans who supported their cause. The return of the Crown, they argued, would also affect others who had an “interest in the Central East European region.” Finally, the statement also warned that the Kádár regime might be putting pressure on Catholic bishops in Hungary to issue a statement requesting the return of the Crown. “The arm twisting tactics of a determined dictatorial system should not prevail,” they admonished.³⁷

The petition was written in strong, emotionally charged language. It emphasized the uniqueness and symbolic significance of the Holy Crown and described the Kádár regime as a totalitarian dictatorship forced on Hungary by the Soviet Union. The document did not absolve the United States but declared that the Soviet occupation had been made possible by American foreign policy. The petition claimed that the return of the Holy Crown would be “a deadly blow towards the population of Hungary” and would “elicit the indignation of people of Eastern European origin.” The authors wisely connected the question of the Holy Crown to the most current foreign policy issue of the day, the Vietnam War. “The hopes and sensitivities of traditionally pro-American Eastern European people deserve the same consideration, as those of South-East Asia,” they wrote.³⁸

The leadership of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation also sent the letter and the petition to Harry Dent. The latter replied to each of the four Hungarian-American leaders individually and tried to give them satisfactory assurances. As he explained to Anne Higgins of the

Correspondence Office of President Nixon, “We are doing everything we can to make inroads into the ethnic vote, and as you can see from the petitions, this subject means very much to the Hungarian-Americans.”³⁹ Higgins attached a note to the letter for Noble Melencamp, head of the Presidential Correspondence Office, in which she claimed that Dent was “right that politically we have to keep these fellows happy . . . [as] they can make more noise than Carl McIntire.”⁴⁰ As this case demonstrates, the Hungarian-Americans were successful in presenting themselves as a politically significant group that should not be ignored.

The State Department, however, had different priorities and recommended an alternative course of action. On October 21, 1970 Executive Secretary at the State Department Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. wrote a memorandum to Kissinger about the letter of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters’ Federation. He proposed the petition to be acknowledged by the State Department, since a reply from the White House would only encourage attempts to postpone the return of the Holy Crown, a “step we may have to consider at some future date.” He attached a draft response from John A. Baker, Jr., Director for Relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, underlining that nothing had changed since the previous inquiry, and quoted McKisson’s letter from June 2, 1970.⁴¹ As far as the interests of the Hungarian-Americans were concerned, the document pointed to the importance of the “free flow of people and ideas in both directions.” The draft also referred to Nixon’s first State of the Union address, in which he stated that the United States is “prepared to enter into negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe, looking to a gradual normalization of relations.”⁴² The State Department apparently considered the protest against the return of the Holy Crown as only a hindrance to the inevitable normalization of relations.

Alfred Puhan, ambassador of the United States to Hungary, also saw the Crown as another bilateral issue that had to be resolved. In a letter to Pásztor, Pogány and Szasz both suggested that Puhan might have been the “reliable source” mentioned in the *New York Times* article and one of the advocates for giving the Holy Crown to Hungary.⁴³ In his final telegram before finishing his mission in Budapest in July 1973, the ambassador unequivocally expressed his opinion concerning the Holy Crown: “[I c]an’t understand what keeps us from returning it in view of substantial improvements of US-Hungarian relations.”⁴⁴ Having priorities different from the elected politicians, the State Department officials and Puhan obviously did not consider the ethnic vote.

By contrast, the Nixon White House and the Republican Party were mostly concerned with domestic impact. On June 5, 1971 Sonnenfeldt prepared a memorandum for Kissinger considering the options. He acknowledged the significance of the relic for Hungarian-Americans, but also pointed out that the Holy Crown belonged to the Hungarian nation. The Hungarian government had repeatedly asked for it, while claiming to understand the “domestic emigre [sic] problem.” Sonnenfeldt referred to earlier speculations and presented the pros and cons of returning the Holy Crown. The decisive argument against the Crown’s return was the domestic impact: he quoted Pásztor, claiming that this step could result in the loss of the votes of the majority of the Hungarian-Americans and many other people of Eastern European origin. In accordance with the letters, the memorandum asserted that the émigrés would consider giving the Holy Crown to the Kádár regime as a breach of trust as well as an acknowledgement of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Sonnenfeldt also acknowledged that, since Hungary had become the most liberal communist regime in Eastern Europe by 1971, a symbolic gesture would be in place. He hoped that the domestic problem could also be managed. An alternative was to turn the Crown over for safekeeping to the Vatican, but Sonnenfeldt suspected that the Holy See “might not want a hot potato of this sort.”⁴⁵

On August 4, 1971, shortly after Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum, the *Washington Post* published an article suggesting that Saint Stephen’s Crown might be one of the topics of the current Hungarian-American negotiations and that it could be returned to Hungary soon.⁴⁶ Sonnenfeldt’s cautious optimism in assuming an ability to handle the domestic impact of another wave of speculations was misplaced. The article launched a wave of protests even more far-reaching than the first one in the *New York Times* a year earlier, especially because of the increased focus on the issue. On July 30, 1971, only a couple of days before the article was published, Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution 385, “expressing the sense of Congress that the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen should remain in the safekeeping of the United States Government until Hungary once again functions as a constitutional government established by the Hungarian people through free choice.”⁴⁷ The resolution was sponsored by Congressman Hogan and co-sponsored by twenty-four other Congressmen. It paid tribute to the historical significance of the Holy Crown and described how it had been entrusted to the United States until Hungary became free again. It acknowledged that Hungary was currently under the control of a regime “in whose interest it would be to destroy the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen.” The conclusion was that the

Crown should remain in the United States until Hungary became a free, democratic country.⁴⁸

In his letter to the president on August 18, 1971, Hogan referred to the resolution and the *Washington Post* article. He advised Nixon not to take action with regard to the Holy Crown until Congress expressed its intentions in another resolution and once again recommended the issue of claims as grounds for refusing its return. Hogan sent the same letter to the President again on September 15, this time also signed by twenty-four Congressmen as co-sponsors.⁴⁹ The resolution and the letter put the issue in the forefront of attention, which was partly due to the activity of the Hungarian-Americans. The same day Deputy Director of the Secretariat Staff at the Department of State, Nicholas Platt, prepared a draft reply to the first letter to be signed by Timmons.⁵⁰ This reply, however, was never sent; instead, Timmons replied to all the Congress members individually assuring them that he would make their comments and requests known to the president.⁵¹ On October 21, 1971 the story was further complicated when the Austrian newspaper *Salzburger Nachrichten* [Salzburg News] published "Secret Exchange of Mindszenty for St. Stephen's Crown?"⁵² The newspaper claimed that the return of the Holy Crown was one of the conditions set by the Hungarian government in order to approve the safe resettlement of the Cardinal. These speculations were not entirely unfounded: while it was eventually dismissed, the possibility to exchange Mindszenty for the Holy Crown had come up during the negotiations between the two governments.⁵³

On November 1, 1971 syndicated journalist Paul Scott's "Will Reds Get St. Stephen's Crown?" was published in about seventy different newspapers.⁵⁴ Scott suspected Kissinger behind the plans to return the Holy Crown and referred to talks between Puhán and Hungarian officials. He also mentioned the concurrent resolution and the efforts by Congressman Hogan and other legislators to "expose the Kissinger plan before it can be consummated and rally public and Congressional support against the return." Scott argued that giving the Holy Crown to Kádár would signify that America acknowledged communist control over Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, which he believed to be the policy of the Nixon administration. The article also presented Cardinal Mindszenty's leaving the US Embassy in Budapest largely against his own will as another example of Kissinger's plan. Scott conveyed Mindszenty's plea to "keep the Holy Crown out of the hands of the Communists."⁵⁵

Soon afterwards Cardinal Mindszenty wrote a letter to President Nixon, claiming that he found it hard to believe that Saint Stephen's Crown

would get into the hands of “the atheistic, illegal Hungarian regime, or to that similar in Moscow,” because Nixon had promised him in 1970 he would not “hand over to these followers of Satan our holiest and greatest national relic and pride.”⁵⁶ A group of Hungarian-Americans led by Eckhardt delivered the letter to Dent along with a memorandum and the English translation of Mindszenty’s message to Eckhardt. The Cardinal informed Eckhardt that the rumors about the Holy Crown had also been confirmed by a diplomat and asked him to convince the president to publicly deny the “insulting intention, detrimental and revolting to all Hungarians.”⁵⁷ In his memorandum about the meeting for Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, Dent pointed out that Kissinger was also mentioned in the article. He emphasized that Pásztor, by then nationality leader at the Republican National Committee, was also a member of the delegation and that the Hungarians were very concerned: “I cannot tell you how emotional these people get about the subject.” He asked what he should tell the Hungarian-Americans, pointing to the political importance of the issue.⁵⁸

The following day, on November 17, 1971, Pásztor wrote to Kissinger concerning a letter from István Gereben of the Freedom Fighters’ Federation.⁵⁹ Once again his main aim was to present the Holy Crown as a politically significant question. He emphasized that he had been contacted by a large number of Hungarian and “other ethnic American leaders” about the allegations. He stressed the sensitive nature of the topic but also described it as an opportunity for Nixon to demonstrate that he had not deserted the Eastern Europeans. Pásztor argued that returning the Crown would cost Nixon a large number of votes among the anti-communist Eastern European ethnic community at the elections the following year. While Pásztor claimed not to believe the accusations, he urged Kissinger or the NSC to issue a reply, stating that the Holy Crown would not be returned as long as Hungary was under Soviet occupation and lacked free elections. In a telegram to Kissinger, Bishop Zoltán Béky, chairman of the American Hungarian Federation, also requested the further safeguarding of the Holy Crown.⁶⁰

A number of American politicians also expressed their concerns about the issue.⁶¹ They included Congressman Hogan, who indicated that by that time thirty-nine members of the House and seven senators had co-sponsored the concurrent resolution about the Crown. He also attached a letter from Cardinal Mindszenty, in which he expressed his gratitude to the Congressman for sponsoring the resolution. Hogan declared that he had also initiated hearings on the resolution as Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Timmons asked the NSC for guidance, to which Sonnenfeldt

and Kissinger presented the usual draft reply, asserting that there were no present plans to return the Holy Crown.⁶²

On November 30, 1971 the State Department sent the NSC its proposed response to the Legislative Referral Memorandum on the Senate Concurrent Resolution 48, "Relating to the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen," which Senator Fulbright had requested about a month earlier.⁶³ The State Department initially intended to send a detailed, paragraph by paragraph response to the concurrent resolution that would have contested almost every sentence. This proposed response revealed that State Department officials were intent on improving relations with Hungary and, under the appropriate circumstances, were open to the idea of negotiations about returning the Crown. But the fundamentally different perspective of the NSC viewed the Holy Crown as "a highly charged political issue" and believed that "the Administration cannot expose itself to attack in the way that the draft reply supplied by the State would do,"⁶⁴ referring to a possible backlash from Hungarian-Americans. For this reason, Sonnenfeldt and Lehman crossed out all but the first and the last sentences of the response, replacing it with the standard reply, and informed the Assistant Director for Legislative Reference at the Office of Management and Budget that "[t]his is a highly charged issue, and we do not believe a detailed report is either necessary or desirable."⁶⁵ Clearly the NSC in the Nixon administration was making the decisions and only delegated tasks to the State Department if deemed necessary. It is also apparent that while the White House was reluctant to grant the request of the Hungarian-Americans and state that they were not going to return the Crown to Hungary, they actually had no intention of returning the Crown themselves.

Sonnenfeldt summarized the most recent developments on "The Crown of St. Stephen, Again"⁶⁶ to Haig and sent a memorandum with suggestions for Dent and some talking points for a further meeting with the Hungarian-Americans. While Sonnenfeldt claimed that he was unaware of any changes in the position on the Holy Crown, he admitted that Kissinger had been interested in reviewing the question in the summer of 1971 (see the memorandum of June 5). In a postscript, Sonnenfeldt mentioned a telephone conversation with "Senator Dole's man," who urged him not to move on the subject without consulting Dole, as a bad decision "would cost the President 2 million votes." These many voters, especially in swing states (where many of the Eastern European-Americans lived), could indeed influence the outcome of an election.⁶⁷ In his reply on January 3, 1972, Haig recommended that Dent send a reply asking the delegation to express the president's respect

for the Cardinal and to convey the official standpoint, which had not changed.⁶⁸ Haig concluded that a public statement would only stir up emotions. Kissinger's handwritten notes reveal that he was upset about the issue, wanted Pásztor to "handle the people concerned," and had his suspicions about the origin of the affair. He presumed that it was not by accident that it had surfaced again and again. As he noted, "ethnics played up against us!"⁶⁹

Dent deemed the proposed solution manageable, but he also pointed out that Pásztor believed that some acknowledgement of the letter by Cardinal Mindszenty was inevitable. The Cardinal was a prominent personality who deserved this courtesy, and, along with Pásztor, Dent also anticipated that not replying could be used against the President and the Republican Party. Pásztor recommended acknowledgement to Eckhardt by someone other than the president or referral to the State Department.⁷⁰ On January 14, 1972 Sonnenfeldt agreed with Dent and warned Kissinger that "the Heritage Division is getting static because there had been no reply."⁷¹ In response, Haig proposed that Dent should reply to Mindszenty⁷² and provided a draft, also sent to Pásztor, which contained assurances that there were no present plans to return the Crown.⁷³ The White House growing increasingly concerned about the Hungarian-Americans and other ethnics tried to reassure them in order to retain their support.

On January 18, 1972 Charles ("Chuck") Colson was alerted to the issue by a letter to the editor of *The Evening Star*.⁷⁴ Colson was Special Counsel to President Nixon, responsible for contacting special interest groups, including ethnic groups. Claiming that he was neither Catholic nor Hungarian, the writer of the letter protested against the possible return of the Crown to Hungary. He asserted that by this the Nixon administration would also betray those Americans who respected the ideals of freedom and democracy. Colson forwarded the letter to Haig, along with an agitated note: "Please, please tell me the attached is not so. Are we trying to blow the entire Eastern European vote or just turn off all Catholics? We may succeed in doing both is [sic] there is any truth to the attached."⁷⁵ Colson was alarmed by the prospect that because of the Holy Crown, the Republicans might lose the votes of American Catholics, Eastern European ethnics, and anti-communists in general.

Colson was not the only one who grew irritated by allegations about the Holy Crown. Sonnenfeldt sent Haig a draft reply to Colson, stating that the return of the Holy Crown was "a non-issue."⁷⁶ Sonnenfeldt also wanted him to include in the draft "on which busy people have already had to spend

far too much time,” but eventually Haig omitted this part. Haig underlined that the administration did not intend to return the Crown to the current government of Hungary, as they had affirmed repeatedly. Haig identified the sinister misinterpretation of the phrase “there are no present plans” used in the letters as one of the possible sources of the controversy. He asked Colson to use his influence “to get the canard killed and to get the campaign of imputations against the Administration stopped.” In his handwritten comments to the memo addressed to Haig,⁷⁷ Sonnenfeldt identified the June 1971 memorandum requested by Kissinger as the starting point of the whole controversy, expressed his annoyance over the issue, and questioned whether it had been a wise decision by Kissinger to stir up the hornet’s nest: “I am sick of this constant badgering we are getting on this subject. It would help if HAK [Henry A. Kissinger] could let one in on just what prompted his interest in this last summer since this is what seems to have triggered the campaign against him and the Administration.” Based on what had been omitted from the draft to Colson and his handwritten notes, it appears that Sonnenfeldt had enough of the rumors about the Holy Crown. Although the White House was aware that the Crown would have to be returned sooner or later, there was no intention to give it back during the presidency of Nixon. Sonnenfeldt believed nothing good could come out of public attention on the issue and by asking Colson to use his connections he attempted to put an end to the allegations.

On January 25, 1972 Executive Secretary of the State Department, Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., wrote a memorandum for Henry Kissinger and discussed the reply to the November inquiry by Senator Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Chairman Thomas E. Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the concurrent resolutions, as the original answer by the State Department had been revised and completely rewritten by the NSC. As was explained, the NSC wanted a shorter reply, and while Sonnenfeldt had already penned what he considered to be the appropriate response, the State Department also provided its own version, as it wanted to emphasize that it did not agree with various statements made in the preamble to the resolution. Anticipating the opposition of the NSC, Eliot referred to Senator Dole’s office, who had asked for the State Department’s assistance in drafting a factually accurate resolution. Conscious of power relations, Eliot stated that the State Department intended to confine discussion with Dole’s office to factual matters, proposed to approach them only after Senator Fulbright, and most importantly, after the approval of the NSC.⁷⁸

Sonnenfeldt, along with John Lehman, was annoyed that “the Crown of St. Stephen is back,” and while he apparently did not object to the State Department’s reservations about the resolution, he was still not satisfied with the reply. Sonnenfeldt edited a major section of the letter, which first repeated the usual claim that the return of the Holy Crown should serve the objective of general good rather than discord and stated that “it should take place in circumstances and at a time appropriately marked by substantial improvement in the atmosphere and course of our relations with Hungary.” As to when that might be, the State Department asserted that “[s]uch an improvement is the objective of discussions we have conducted with the Government of Hungary for the past several years during which there has been a modest and gradual improvement in relations.” Sonnenfeldt characterized this paragraph as a “minor disaster, since it implies that we will return the Crown.” Instead, he proposed to phrase it as “there are no present plans to return the Crown,” then, in order to prevent any misunderstandings, even deleted the word “present.”⁷⁹ Finally, on February 5, 1972 Haig forwarded the draft to Theodore Eliot, emphasizing that “the Administration has no plans to return the Crown” and “any correspondence with the Congress should reflect this fact.”⁸⁰ The White House could no longer afford to be ambiguous on this issue, and they wanted the State Department and the whole administration to comply with this.

Senator Dole was satisfied, and he thanked and commended Nixon for “providing assurances to Josef Cardinal Mindzenty [sic] of Hungary that the Holy Crown of St. Stephen will remain in the safekeeping of the United States.”⁸¹ On the other hand, Congressman Hogan was suspicious that there would be another attempt by the Hungarian regime to convince the administration to return the artifact. At the same time, he expressed confidence that the United States would continue to keep the Holy Crown safe until Hungary became a free country again.⁸² In his reply, Timmons attempted to ease Hogan’s suspicions arguing that in spite of attempts by the Hungarian government to raise the issue, the allegations that the Nixon administration was negotiating or contemplating the return of the Holy Crown were untrue. Timmons tried to be as unambiguous and direct as possible and explicitly asserted that “the Nixon Administration has no plans to return the Crown.”⁸³

The reply to Congressman Roger Zion, a Republican from Indiana, further illustrates the effort by the Administration to be direct and unambiguous. Conveying the concern of one of his constituents, the Congressman requested information about the Holy Crown from Kissinger.⁸⁴

The State Department intended to send the same reply as in the past two years, but the NSC crossed out most of it, including sections about the significance and the history of the Holy Crown and the improvement of Hungarian-American relations, as it could foreshadow the eventual return of the Crown. What remained in the final version only stated that the Hungarian government had raised the issue several times, but the reports claiming that there had been negotiations were not true, and that the administration did not plan to return the Holy Crown.⁸⁵

Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe also forwarded a letter from a concerned voter, a certain Ms. Newton, to the National Security Adviser on the same subject.⁸⁶ Sonnenfeldt grew upset by “the old, wearisome charge” that Kissinger was ready to return the Crown to Hungary, and he also expressed his frustration over the constant reemergence of the issue: “we are trying to kill this canard but it won’t die.” As the National Security Adviser was named in the letter, Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to him on March 27, 1972, requesting a reply to “set the record straight.”⁸⁷ Kissinger’s reply asserted that there were no negotiations, no plans to return the Holy Crown, and that the cyclically recurring rumors were wrong.⁸⁸

The Nixon administration did not manage to convince Cardinal Mindszenty either. The latter inquired about the fate of the Crown on October 26, 1972 as well as on May 24, 1973.⁸⁹ The White House decided to reply, especially as Sonnenfeldt admitted that “Cardinal Mindszenty’s suspicions are not totally without foundation,” as illustrated by Puhan’s final telegram, mentioned above.⁹⁰ Finally, on July 19, 1973 Peter M. Flanigan, assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, also tried to reassure Mindszenty that there were no negotiations and no current plans to return the Crown.

As Tibor Glant has shown, the policy of postponing the return of the Crown continued under Ford.⁹¹ When in December 1976, less than a year before the election, Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson raised the issue, NSA Robert McFarlane was far from being delighted.⁹² The final conclusion of this administration was the same as that of its predecessor’s, as acknowledged by NSC member Robert Gates in his memorandum to McFarlane. Gates pointed out that opposition to the return of the Crown was ninety-nine percent domestic and that the president should not take any steps without consulting his political advisers. Confidentially he recommended letting the “sleeping dogs lie” and allowing “the next President face up to the goulash hitting the fan.”⁹³

Despite opposition from various Hungarian-American organizations and their supporters, President Jimmy Carter finally faced the goulash and decided to return the Holy Crown.⁹⁴ This was a bold move, especially considering that his victory in the 1976 presidential elections resulted in part from the support Americans of East European descent, many of whom voted for Carter rather than Gerald Ford.⁹⁵ Ford alienated these citizens when on October 6, 1976, during the presidential debate with Carter, he claimed that the Soviet Union did not dominate Eastern Europe and that “each of those countries is independent, autonomous.”⁹⁶ Carter went through with his decision, and on January 6, 1978, after almost thirty-three years, the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen was returned to Hungary.

Although the Holy Crown was eventually given back to Hungary, the Hungarian-Americans were successful in exerting pressure on the Nixon and Ford administrations. Even though the return of the artifact had come up as a possibility a lot earlier, they managed to postpone it until 1978. Whereas they were not able to change the course of American foreign policy, they managed to present the issue as politically uncomfortable enough to delay the decision. The Hungarian-American campaign showed many of the features of successful ethnic lobbying. The Hungarian-Americans took advantage of the liberal democratic ethos of the United States, which allowed them to participate in American politics, and used the characteristics of the institutional system to their benefit. As was explained above, they used electoral politics and the power of the press to reach the wider public. They were also able to present themselves as a strong and organized group that could be significant in electoral politics. This was even more so as they could successfully introduce their issue of a broader scope, one that did not only concern Hungarian-Americans, but also other Americans of East European descent. And finally, through László Pásztor and other Hungarian-American politicians, they had access to American governmental circles.

All of these features contributed to the success of the Hungarian-American lobbying activity, which certainly still had its limits. Due to the focus on white ethnics, the Hungarian-Americans had more influence on the Republican Party; with the Democrats in power during the Carter administration, the priorities of the administration as well as the whole political situation changed. The pros outweighed the cons, and there was enough political will to make the decision to return the Holy Crown to Hungary. After this decision was made, the Hungarian-American lobby could no longer change it, even though they employed the same tactics that seemed to have worked before. This clearly shows that the lobbying activity was

successful only as long as it was met by the actual desire of the decision-makers—but with the new administration and the new political situation, Hungarian-Americans lost their leverage, and they could not delay the return of the Crown any longer. The priorities of the executive branch had changed: Carter was willing to take the risk that the Republican presidents were not and face the possible backlash from the Eastern European electorate.

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Notes

¹ Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Mr. Kissinger, March 27, 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

² Stephen A. Garrett, “Eastern European Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 93.2 (Summer 1978): 307. Hereafter cited as Garrett, “Eastern European.”

³ Some other examples for Hungarian-American lobbying activity include the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation. See Eszter Herner-Kovács, “Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on Ethnic Lobby Success in the United States: The Case of HHRF,” *Minority Studies* 15 (2013): 199-222, and Gabriella Herman, “Az Amerikai Erdélyi Szövetség története, 1952–1977” [The History of the American Transylvanian Federation], *Magyar Kisebbség* 3–4 (2011): 7–111.

⁴ On protests during the Carter presidency, see Attila L. Simontsits, *The Last Battle for St. Stephen's Crown* (Cleveland: Weller, 1983).

⁵ Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, eds. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1975) 23.

⁶ Charles McC. Mathias Jr., “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 59.5 (Summer 1981): 975. Hereafter cited as Mathias, “Ethnic Groups.”

⁷ Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection: Frederic Malek Papers, Box 29: National Citizens Groups (1 of 3).

⁸ Garrett, “Eastern European” 307–08.

⁹ Garrett, “Eastern European” 311–19.

¹⁰ Garrett, “Eastern European” 303.

¹¹ Author's telephone interview with László Pásztor, 15 June 2013.

¹² For more on Msgr. Geno Baroni, see Gene Halus, “Monsignor Geno Baroni and the Politics of Ethnicity, 1960-1984,” *American Catholics and the Social Sciences*, special issue of *U.S. Catholic Historian* 25.4 (2007): 133–59.

¹³ Tibor Glant, *A Szent Korona amerikai kalandja: 1945-78* [The American Adventures of the Holy Crown of Hungary] (Debrecen: Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 1997). Hereafter cited as Glant, *A Szent Korona*.

¹⁴ Glant, *A Szent Korona* 30.

¹⁵ Tibor Glant, “Nixon, Ford, Kissinger, and the Holy Crown,” *Cracow University of Economics Discussion Papers Series 2* (2013): 7. Hereafter cited as Glant, “Nixon, Ford, Kissinger.” See also his essay in this issue, “Nixon, Ford, Kissinger, and the Holy Crown of Hungary in Bilateral Relations.”

¹⁶ Glant, "Nixon, Ford, Kissinger" 8–9.

¹⁷ "U.S. and Hungary Pleased by Improving Relations," *The New York Times* Sunday, April 19. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

¹⁸ Eckhardt left Hungary in 1940 and became one of the most influential political figures of the Hungarian emigration in the United States. For more on Tibor Eckhardt, see Katalin Kadar Lynn, *Tibor Eckhardt: His American Years, 1941-1972* (New York: Columbia UP, 2007).

¹⁹ Tibor Eckhardt to the Editor of the *New York Times*, 19 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²⁰ Dr. Andras Pogany to Mr. László Pásztor, 20 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²¹ Rt. Rev. Dr. Zoltan Beky, Hon. Albert A. Fiok, Dr. Louis Fury, Prof. Maurice Czikann-Zichy, and Prof. Z. Michael Szasz to President Richard M. Nixon, 22 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²² For more on the various Hungarian-American organizations and the Hungarian emigration, see Gyula Borbándi, *A magyar emigráció életrajza, 1945-1985* [The Biography of the Hungarian Emigration, 1945-1985] (The Hague: Mikes International, 2006).

²³ Z. Michael Szasz, Ph.D. to Mr. László Pásztor, 22 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70, and Memorandum on the Question of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, "New York Times' Article on US-Hungarian Relations," April 27, 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²⁵ Laszlo C. Pasztor, Director, Heritage Groups Division, to The Honorable Harry S. Dent, Deputy Counsel to the President, 24 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²⁶ Laszlo C. Pasztor, Director, Heritage Groups Division, to The Honorable Harry S. Dent, Deputy Counsel to the President, 24 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²⁷ David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to Honorable John S. Wold, 8 May 1970; David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to Honorable William S. Moorhead, 12 May 1970, and Richard C. Cook, Special Assistant to the President, to Larry Hogan, 11 June 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²⁸ J. W. Fulbright to William P. Rogers, 17 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger from Nyle M. Jackson, 6 May 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

³¹ Memorandum for Nyle M. Jackson from Henry A. Kissinger, 14 May 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

³² Matt Schudel, "Lawrence J. Hogan Sr., Md. Republican Who Called for Nixon's Impeachment, Dies at 88," *Washington Post* 22 April 2017. Web. 11 Nov. 2017.

³³ Obituary, *Washington Post*, 1 Aug. 2013. Web. 30 Oct. 2017. According to the obituary, "In lieu of flowers, memorial contributions may be made to Alba Regia Chapel, Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation."

³⁴ Letter from Lawrence J. Hogan to the President, 19 May 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

³⁵ William E. Timmons to Honorable Lawrence J. Hogan, 28 May 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

³⁶ Dr. Andras Pogany, Istvan B. Gereben, Mrs. Jozsef Gyorik, and Jenó Szeitz Jr. to the President, 1 October 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

³⁷ Statement of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation U.S.A., 29 September 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Harry Dent to Anne Higgins, 2 October 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

⁴⁰ Harry Dent to Anne Higgins, 2 October 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70. Founder and minister of the Bible Presbyterian Church, Carl McIntire was a religious radio broadcaster highly popular at the time.

⁴¹ Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 21 October 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

⁴² "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: February 18, 1970." *The American Presidency Project*. Web. 30 Oct. 2014.

⁴³ Dr. Andras Pogany to Mr. László Pásztor, 20 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70; Z. Michael Szasz, Ph.D. to Mr. László Pásztor, 22 April 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1969-70.

⁴⁴ "Telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to the Secretary of State in Washington, DC, July 1973." Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-73.

⁴⁵ Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from Hal Sonnenfeldt on the Crown of St. Stephen: Should We Return It? 5 June 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National

Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁴⁶ "U.S., Hungary Resume Talks on Crown Jewels." *The Washington Post, Times Herald* (1959-73); 4 Aug. 1971; *ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post* (1877-97) A10. Web. 11 Nov. 2017.

⁴⁷ "H. Con. Res. 385, 92nd Congress 1st Session, July 30, 1971." Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Lawrence J. Hogan to the President, 15 September 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁵⁰ Memorandum from Nicholas Platt to the NSC Secretariat, 15 September 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁵¹ William E. Timmons to Lawrence J. Hogan, 17 September 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁵² "Secret Exchange of Mindszenty for St. Stephen's Crown?" 21 October 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71. This was based on an article in the newspaper of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria. The Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. translated it into English. Cardinal József Mindszenty was the head of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church, primate of Hungary, and a living symbol of resistance against communism. Mindszenty had sought asylum at the American Legation in Budapest when the Hungarian revolution was crushed by the Soviet Union in November 1956. He lived there until September 1971, less than a month before the publication of the article.

⁵³ Glant, "Nixon, Ford, Kissinger" 8.

⁵⁴ Glant, *A Szent Korona* 61.

⁵⁵ Paul Scott, "Will Reds Get St. Stephen's Crown?" *The Wanderer* 11 Nov. 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁵⁶ Joseph Card. Mindszenty to President Richard Nixon, 5 November 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁵⁷ Dr. Tibor Eckhardt to Harry S. Dent, 9 November 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁵⁸ Memorandum from Harry S. Dent to General Alexander M. Haig, 16 November 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁵⁹ Laszlo Pasztor to Dr. Henry Kissinger, 17 November 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁶⁰ Bishop Zoltan Beky to Dr. Henry Kissinger, 12 December 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁶¹ Lawrence J. Hogan to the President, 3 December 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁶² Richard K. Cook to the Honorable Lawrence J. Hogan, 22 December 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁶³ Legislative Referral on S. Con. Res. 48 on Return of Holy Crown of Saint Stephen to Hungary, 13 December 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁶⁴ Helmut Sonnenfeldt and J. F. Lehman to Jeanne Davis, 10 December 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁶⁵ Jeanne W. Davis to J.F.C. Hyde, Jr., 13 December 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁶⁶ Helmut Sonnenfeldt to General Haig, 29 November 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁶⁷ Garret, "Eastern European" 312.

⁶⁸ Memorandum from Harry S. Dent to General Haig, 3 January 1971 [1972]. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693. This memo is mistakenly dated January 3, 1971.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Harry S. Dent to General Haig, 7 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁷¹ Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Mr. Kissinger, 14 January 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693. This memo is mistakenly dated 1971; the actual date is January 14, 1972.

⁷² General Haig to Harry S. Dent, 18 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁷³ Harry S. Dent to Dr. Tibor Eckhardt, 19 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁷⁴ "Saint Stephen's Crown." *The Evening Star* 18 Jan. 1972, A-6." Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁷⁵ Chuck Colson to Al Haig, 19 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁷⁶ General Haig to Chuck Colson, 21 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁷⁷ Helmut Sonnenfeldt to General Haig, 20 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files, National Security Council Country Files, Country Files Europe, Box 693.

⁷⁸ Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. to Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, 25 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁷⁹ Helmut Sonnenfeldt to General Haig, 1 February 1971. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸⁰ Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., 5 February 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸¹ Bob Dole to the President, 15 February 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸² Lawrence J. Hogan to the President, 18 February 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸³ William E. Timmons to Honorable Lawrence J. Hogan, 26 February 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸⁴ Roger H. Zion to Mr. Henry Kissinger, 15 January 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸⁵ Jeanne W. Davis to Congressman Roger H. Zion, 11 February 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [GEN] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸⁶ John A. Volpe to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, 20 March 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸⁷ Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Mr. Kissinger, 27 March 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸⁸ Henry A. Kissinger to the Honorable John A. Volpe, 31 March 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71.

⁸⁹ Jos. Card. Mindszenty to Mr. Richard Nixon, 26 October 1972. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-71, and Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty to the Honorable Richard M. Nixon, 24 May 1973. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-73.

⁹⁰ Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Mr. Kissinger, 11 July 1973. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, CO (Countries) Box 35, [EX] CO 64 Hungary 1-1-73.

⁹¹ For more on Ford and the Holy Crown, see Tibor Glant, "A Ford-kormány és a Szent Korona, 1974-1977" [The Ford Administration and the Holy Crown, 1974-77], *Századok* 148.1 (2014): 151-80. Hereafter cited as Glant, "Ford és a Korona."

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⁹³ Robert Gates to Robert McFarlane, 8 December 1976. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Europe, Canada, and Oceanic Affairs Staff: Files 1974-1977, Box 11, Hungary 1976 (3) WH. The Hungarian translation is published in Glant, "Ford és a Korona" 178.

⁹⁴ For more on the return of the Holy Crown, see Glant, *A Szent Korona* chapters 4-7.

⁹⁵ Glant, *A Szent Korona* 100.

⁹⁶ "The Second Carter-Ford Presidential Debate, October 6, 1976." *Commission on Presidential Debates*. Web. 11 Nov. 2017. Also see Glant, *A Szent Korona* 72.

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