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Motivating Factors in Foreign Volunteering¹
Tibor Péchy’s Enlistment in the Anglo-Boer War

Abstract
Twelve Hungarian volunteers have been identified so far among the 2,500 pro-Boer foreign volunteers who were ready to sacrifice their lives in the war between the Boer republics and the British Empire (1899–1902). The overwhelming majority of these volunteers travelled to South Africa to join the commandos of the Boers following the escalation of the conflict. Tibor Péchy was one of the Hungarian combatants, but in contrast with the other Hungarian volunteers, he had been living in South Africa since 1896. This makes him a special Hungarian participant of the Anglo-Boer War. The present paper analyses the motivating factors behind Péchy’s enlistment with the Boers.

Keywords: Anglo-Boer War, foreign volunteering, combat motivations, primary-group bond, masculinity, military history, Boer republics, British Empire

Many aspects of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) have been studied by scholars, resulting in quite a rich historiography of the conflict. The studied factors range from the appearance of innovations in modern warfare (such as khaki uniforms, bicycle, the telegraph)² on the battlefields and in the hinterland (farm burnings, concentration camps), through the global scale of the conflict, to the impact of using modern media for war and propaganda purposes.³ The international character of the conflict has also attracted historians’ attention to the Anglo-Boer War. Although the name of the war indicates that the key belligerents were the British and the Boers, the circle of involved nationalities goes far beyond these two. Although the two sides can be easily defined, and it was mostly soldiers fighting under
the Union Jack and the commandos of the two Boer republics (the Transvaal or in its other name, the South African Republic and Orange Free State) who clashed in the battles, the presence, service, and activity of the various African communities of the region should also be acknowledged. In a war that was commemorated for almost a century as one fought only by white men, Africans served on both sides in several different roles, e.g. as pathfinders, cooks, or sources of information about the movement of the enemy troops. Moreover, the war also required the mobilisation of (human and material) imperial resources from the British. Apart from soldiers from the English countryside, the Welsh mountain ranges, or the Scottish Highlands, cavalry, infantry, and auxiliary units from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand also shed their blood or put their life at risk for Queen Victoria and King Edward VII. While the British troops represented the mother country, the dominions, the colonies, or the local Indian communities, the foreign pro-Boer volunteers brought multicultural, multilingual, and multi-ethnic characteristics to the military camps of the republics. 2,500 men volunteered to fight and even die for the cause of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. A large proportion of volunteers came from the Netherlands, but there was also a considerable number of French, German, Irish, American, and Russian volunteers among the foreign pro-Boer combatants. To a much lower extent than these nations, but Hungarians also fought for the Boers. Similarly to other ethnic groups (e.g. various African communities or even the Boers), Hungarians could be found on both sides of the trenches. Nevertheless, the majority of the Hungarians, twelve of the seventeen, were pro-Boer, and took part in the conflict in very different roles and appeared in different fronts. Tibor Péchy stands out among them in several respects. For example, in contrast to the majority of the Hungarian volunteers, Péchy had been living in the Transvaal for three years when the war broke out on 11 October, 1899. As a result, he had a more extensive knowledge of the country, the region, the language, and the culture of the Boers than his compatriots, who mostly moved to South Africa after the autumn of 1899. Péchy’s combat motivations stand at the centre of the present paper.

Foreign volunteering is a well-studied aspect of the Anglo-Boer War, and a considerable number of monographs and articles have been published on this issue even in recent years. A large number of these focus on one nationality, such as the book of Apollon Davidson and Irina Filatova, *The Russians and the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902.* Private papers and public texts written by the foreign volunteers have been published as well, e.g. the
German-American Teddy Luther’s diary edited by Donal P. McCracken.\(^5\)
The combat memoirs of Yevgeny Avgustus, one of the Russian pro-Boer volunteers, was also published in 2022, edited by Boris Gorelik.\(^6\) The book comprises Avgustus’ account of the war and the articles he published in Russian newspapers, which represent valuable historical work and provide an extraordinary insight into the narrative of a Russian volunteer for the international community of Anglo-Boer War scholars. The chapter written by Fransjohan Pretorius is a particularly valuable study of the less-than-harmonious relationship between the foreign pro-Boer volunteers and the burghers of the commandos, the local citizens they shared the camps with.\(^7\)

All these works have gathered considerable data and brought new perspectives to our knowledge about foreign volunteering in the Anglo-Boer War. However, a holistic, comprehensive study of the motivating factors of the foreign volunteers has remained out of the scope of previous research, especially in the case of the Hungarian volunteers. Moreover, in most instances the motivations of the foreigners who fought for the republics were reviewed through the lens of their own narratives and understood within the framework of history. The present paper adopts approaches to studying combat motivation and volunteering that have been elaborated by military science, in order to get closer to understanding why a Hungarian person, Tibor Péchy, was willing to give his blood and sacrifice his life in a military conflict his homeland was not directly involved in.

**Methods and Sources: Combat Motivations and the Soldiers of the Modern Battlefields**

The issue of soldiers’ combat motivation has a considerable literature. The involvement of members of the armed forces of the United States and other western countries in international military missions has given a boost to studying the motivating factors of the participants. In the case of the servicemen and servicewomen of the US armed forces, their fights in foreign fields, waters, and airspace are explored, e.g. the involvement of their homeland in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Regarding the history of the research on combat motivation, Roger W. Little places emphasis on the importance of primary-group bond and highlight the personal connections between soldiers as the number one combat motivating factor. This approach was
based on research on US soldiers fighting in WWII and held a dominant position in studying combat motivations for three decades, from the post-war years up to the early 1980s. According to Little, interpersonal solidarity occupies an important place in motivating soldiers and has two crucial functions: defining and enforcing the norms and behaviours of the given group; and backing the individual in a combat situation. In the case of the Korean War, Little underlines the significance of the so-called two-man buddy system, the possibility provided by the US Army for volunteers to enlist together with their friends. One of the most influential military historians of the twentieth century and recent times, John Keegan accepts this approach, although he adds further elements to it. In his influential book *The Face of Battle*, Keegan cites another military historian, Brigadier General Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, who referred to losing one’s reputation among one’s pals as the most crucial motivating factor for combat soldiers.

The scope of analysis for combat motivation was broadened by William Cockerham and Lawrence E. Cohen in the early 1980s. Cockerham and Cohen wanted to challenge the dominant approach, which placed too much emphasis on the impact of a primary-group bond, and shed light on other factors, such as career opportunities. According to them, aspects like rank or attitudes towards the military organisation could also have an impact on combat motivation.

The present paper applies the approaches on combat motivating factors elaborated by Anthony Kellett, Anthony King, and Cockerham and Cohen. According to these scholars, motivating factors can be sorted into two large categories: organizational factors and individual factors. The first group includes elements such as loyalty to the given military organization. Regarding the foreign pro-Boer volunteers, it is challenging to review allegiance to any organized body or the impact of the organizational factors at all due to the structure of the republican armed forces. The overwhelming majority of the soldiers who served under the flag of the Orange Free State or the Transvaal were civilians, burghers who joined commandos under constitutions where the officers were elected and neither the generals nor the rank and file wore a uniform. The only exceptions to this were the artillery (Staatsartillerie) and the police forces, which were organised on the basis of European models and looked the most like contemporary Western military units, with uniforms. Austrian officer Adolph Zboril was one of the Europeans who were involved in organizing these troops. As a result of these core characteristics of the Boer army, organizational
motivating factors such as discipline and military career are difficult to study. In the modern armed forces, the army drills mastered by each and every soldier during the course of their training and the opportunity to advance in the military hierarchy through a good performance might play an important role in soldiers’ combat motivation. The lack of both of these elements contributed enormously to the battlefield culture shock most foreign pro-Boer volunteers went through in the republican military camps or in the trenches. Although the members of the Boer commandos did not receive any formal training, a considerable number of the foreign volunteers had a military background before they arrived to Southern Africa. Due to this bond to the armed forces, the ethos of the military (as a social institution or tradition) could be among the motivating factors of the former soldiers and officers who joined the Boers.

The individual motivating factors are less difficult to notice and study. Primary-group bond, beliefs and values, masculinity, patriotism, reward and recognition are studied in the case of Tibor Péchy’s combat motivation. Other aspects of combat motivation, such as casualties, tactics, aggression, combat stress, do not seem to have stood behind Péchy’s enlistment with the Boers and are thus outside the scope of the present paper.

One may question the limitations of applying the methodology and approaches of studying the combat motivation of soldiers fighting in twentieth-century battles to the context of the Anglo-Boer War, which is a nineteenth-century colonial conflict. In other words, what is the relevance of the methods studying the motivating factors of the combat soldiers of World War II or the Vietnam War in the case of foreign volunteering in the war between the Boer republics and the British Empire? Two issues arise from this, a chronological one and one with military history in the focus, namely that the Anglo-Boer War is a nineteenth-century military conflict and whether this war has anything in common with twentieth-century wars.

According to Keegan, the infantry plays the most decisive role in modern warfare. The outcome of a military campaign (holding occupied positions, securing a territory) mostly depends on the performance of the infantry, and in modern battlefields the greatest pressure and terror fell upon the infantrymen. Machine guns, trenches, barbed wire, bombardment, shell shock – these describe the fights of the infantry in the wars of the twentieth century. The Anglo-Boer War gave birth to many of these features of modern warfare, and the war between the Boer republics and the British Empire is labelled as the first modern war or the real World War I partly due to these innovations. Although it took place at the dawn of the
twentieth century and had imperialist and colonial characteristics, the Anglo-Boer War has much in common with the great military conflicts of the twentieth century, for example in terms of the experiences and difficulties of the khakis\textsuperscript{19} and the Boer commandos, as well as the soldiers of twentieth-century wars.

Tibor Péchy’s private papers, which are in the custody of the Péchy family archive, have been the most valuable sources through which the above-mentioned motivating factors could be studied. Special attention was paid to two groups of these written materials: Péchy’s private correspondence with his mother; and his war diary. Péchy sent letters to his mother, who lived in Debrecen and Nagykároly at the time, on a regular basis, from the time he left Austria-Hungary in 1896 until his homecoming in the autumn of 1900. He kept a war diary, which resulted in three booklets published later. The first entry was made after he enlisted with the Boers in January 1900.

**Organizational Factors**

Regarding organizational motivating factors, Péchy’s relation to the republican armed forces must be clarified first. The majority of the Hungarian pro-Boer volunteers travelled to Southern Africa in late 1899 or in 1900, sometimes following the outbreak of the war. Thus, they could have been affected by the heroic image of the Boer commandos shared by European and Hungarian public opinion. The Boers had excellent press on the old continent, and the propaganda activities of the republics, especially those of the Transvaal, undoubtedly contributed to the rise of the pro-Boer sentiment in European countries, including Hungary. In addition, the pro-Boer Hungarian press tended to add Hungary-specific elements to the European mainstream interpretation of the war and the image of the invincible Boer warriors, for example, drawing parallels between the two freedom-loving nations, the commandos desperately fighting the British Empire and the Hungarians, who had bravely clashed with two empires (Austria and Russia) fifty years earlier, in the mid-nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{20} However, Péchy had moved to the Transvaal three years before the conflict between the Boers and the British escalated in 1899. Therefore, the extremely positive narrative on the Boer commandos in the European public discourse could have had less impact on him. In fact, he developed a rather bad opinion of the Boers, which cannot be separated from his
experiences with the armed forces of the Transvaal. In 1896, Péchy was a highly educated former cavalry officer when he offered his services to the Transvaaler government. According to the present state of research, this was his original purpose in moving to South Africa. The British attempt organized by the diamond magnate and politician Cecil Rhodes to overthrow the Afrikaner nationalist political elite of the Transvaal, the Jameson Raid of 1895–96 was covered by the European press. It was widely known that the South African Republic began to develop the country’s military capabilities, and Péchy hoped he could have his own share in this process.²¹ It soon became obvious that he could not. He was rejected by all the governmental officials he approached, from the military officers up to Paul Kruger, the President of the South African Republic.²² Once he realized that there was no opportunity for a quick and profitable military career in the Transvaal, his letters testified of his anger and deep disappointment in the Boers and their poorly organized institutions. The military and political elite of the country was also targeted in his private papers. For example, Major Erasmus, who was blamed for Péchy’s rejection by the Staatsartillerie, was labelled a ‘coward’.²³ Péchy did not have a high opinion of other high-ranking officers, either. He described the commander of the artillery as a ‘haughty, ignorant peasant’,²⁴ and he believed that Commandant-General Piet Joubert was spying for the British.²⁵ Some time later his range of criticism broadened to the whole nation and the Boers in general. Therefore, loyalty to the armed forces of the Transvaal could not have played a crucial role in Péchy’s enlistment in January 1900, not only due to the less-organized structure of the Boer military but also for personal reasons.

**Individual Factors**

According to the literature on combat motivation, primary-group bond is one of the most important factors with a positive impact on the soldiers. Moreover, the benefits of providing an opportunity for pre-existing minor communities to enlist and serve together, to share the trenches were recognised by various armies of the twentieth century. The Pal Battalions of the British Army of the Great War or the two-man buddy system of the US Army during the Korean War serve as good examples for this phenomenon. The commando system that was the backbone of the Boer military potential had the same characteristics. The commandos, the most important military units, were organised on a territorial basis, and it was far
from unique for fathers, sons, or relatives to serve in the same unit at the same time.

Péchy was not alone when he joined the Boers. He was accompanied by another Hungarian, Mihály Ferenczy. From late 1896 until late autumn 1899, Péchy worked in the dynamite factory owned by Franz Hoenig, a European manufacturer. The war made life in the factory difficult, so Péchy moved to Johannesburg in November 1899, where he met Ferenczy. He was the first Hungarian Péchy had met for a long time. The encounter with another fellow countryman must have been meaningful for Péchy, whose letters talked a lot about feeling isolated in a country the culture and society of which he had not been familiar with before: ‘it is delightful to speak and hear the sweet mother tongue from time to time’. Péchy describes Ferenczy as a ‘modest but good Hungarian chap from the Great Plain’, while no other ethnic group is mentioned in an absolutely positive context in his private papers.

Not long after Péchy had arrived to Johannesburg, he was hired by a governmental office that dealt with reclaiming gold mines. Péchy hatched plans to make a living in this sector, to gather knowledge on gold-mining that could be used after the war. However, a bit over a month later Péchy changed his mind and gave up on this idea. On 19 January, 1900 he was on his way to Colesberg, to the military camp of General Schoeman. Before that, when time his probable involvement in the war came up in his correspondence to his mother, Péchy emphasized that he would not join the Boers unless he was called up and had no other choice. Ferenczy’s influence, the fact that Péchy was not alone in this move could be crucial among the factors that prompted him to enlist. In his letter written on his way to Colesberg, right after informing his mother of having joined the Boers, Péchy highlights the fact that he was accompanied by Ferenczy: ‘I struggled with myself [regarding the enlistment – author] for a long time and finally now I’ve decided to get on the path. I’m not alone, I’m with Ferenczi.’

Masculinity can be connected to primary-group bond in soldiers’ combat motivation. Modern armies exploited the ethos and myths woven around virility in their recruitment, and military service, especially in wartime, became an integral part of idealized manhood. This could be achieved through education, developing the cult of the army, or through propaganda activities. In addition, masculinity as a motivating factor can go hand in hand with small-group bonds. By virtue of underperforming, failure in combat, or avoiding enlistment, the individual could risk
emasculation in the eyes of his peers. The loss of one’s reputation as a man could occur in three dimensions: one’s comrades; the army; and society, including one’s family. In the case of Tibor Péchy, all three levels are relevant.

As it was mentioned above, Péchy’s original plans with moving to the Transvaal, namely to build a military career in the Boer republic, were never realized. Following this failure, he ran a café in Pretoria in order to make a living. He was an educated military officer, and he had served in the cavalry (hussars), the most prestigious branch of the military in Hungary, having been born to a noble family that gave well-known politicians and public figures to the country. His letters to his mother testify about disappointment, isolation, and humiliation: ‘Because I am a soldier with all my heart and soul, there is no denying it. In the evenings, when I arrive home and look at my sword, I almost shed tears.’ The fact that he could not live a life that was appropriate to his status caused him frustration. He kept writing to his mother, saying that he committed everything he could to find a proper place to move to and an army he could serve as an officer. It is easy to conclude that heading a café instead of a cavalry unit must have been emasculating for Péchy. If being in the military can be understood as a way of experiencing manhood, the rejection of the army could be perceived as losing not only the social status that came with being an officer but one’s virility as well. According to sources, it could be reasonably assumed that this was a serious disruption for Péchy on two levels: his attitude and personal relations to the army as a social institution in general and his family. These two were connected to each other. Péchy had just begun to climb the hierarchy of the 12th Hussar Regiment when he demobilised in early 1896 because he was ‘so deep in debt that it impairs his serviceability’. It is unknown why this was the case as of yet. A few months later, he had to realize that there was no possibility to continue his military career in the Transvaal, either. These developments must have affected Péchy significantly. Moreover, his demobilisation had a negative impact on his relationship with his family, and he kept emphasizing to his mother that he was determined to find an army to serve as an officer. These could be desperate attempts to restore his honour, reputation, and masculinity also before his family. Despite his efforts, Péchy did not get close to being hired by any armed force in the region or on another continent between 1896 and 1899. When the conflict escalated between the Boers and the British, the dilemma of enlisting appears in almost every letter in his correspondence to his mother, trying to explain why he was
staying out of the war. Erzsébet Móricz, Péchy’s mother encouraged her son to get involved in the war, hoping for an improvement of his financial standing and quicker homecoming.\textsuperscript{33}

The press in Britain and on the dominions tended to depict the foreign volunteers as mercenaries, soldiers of fortune.\textsuperscript{34} At the same time, pro-Boer journalists accused the British of being hungry for gold and being greedy. Nevertheless, the character of the fortune-hunting European, who joined the Boers in the hope of being rewarded by a country known for having gigantic goldfields or acquiring shares in the goldmines of the Transvaal even appears in the war reminiscences of the pro-Boer Hungarian volunteers.\textsuperscript{35} One cause of the less-than-harmonious relationship between the Boers and the foreign volunteers who joined them was indeed the lack of reward and pay. Former officers of the European armies arrived in many cases with hopes and dreams of getting rich by the end of the war. They became disillusioned quickly, recognising that there was no pay for the members of the commandos, not even for foreigners. Thus, financial reward was surely not among the factors that motivated Péchy to enlist with the Boers, quite the contrary. The lack of payment\textsuperscript{36} and military promotion\textsuperscript{37}, another form of reward and recognition, held him back from joining even after the outbreak of the war. These factors were highlighted in his correspondence. He wrote to his mother in October 1899, days before the outbreak of the war: ‘The Boers are not generous, and I don’t want to get shot for nothing.’\textsuperscript{38} In November he wrote: ‘I can’t tell you how much I’d love to go, but I’d have to go as a private with no prospect of promotion, and it’s not worth it.’\textsuperscript{39} In contrast with most of the foreign and Hungarian volunteers, Péchy was fully aware of the fact that a non-Boer person, despite his education or military experience, could start his military career from the bottom of the hierarchy, and he had very few opportunities for promotion. Péchy found this completely unacceptable until January 1900.

So what changed Péchy’s mind during the winter of 1899? Perhaps certain ideas he believed in, values he shared, or patriotism? Did some kind of loyalty to the South African Republic develop in Péchy? It can be concluded from the sources on his political views, the causes of war as they were contextualized and presented by the Boer propaganda that it was the fight of a small nation for its independence and sovereignty against a great imperialist empire that was something he could accept: ‘to the astonishment of the whole world, […] the small Transvaal dared to defeat the army of the mighty England’.\textsuperscript{40} Nevertheless, his attitude towards the Boers was far from unbridled admiration. From 1896, especially after he had been
rejected by the leaders of the Transvaal armed forces and the government officials of the country, until his homecoming, when the Boers appear in Péchy’s manuscripts as an ethnic group, they are assessed very negatively in the overwhelming majority of the cases. In his letters, he uses strong words to describe the Boers, e.g. ‘cowardice’41 and ‘reactionary’42. His sympathy towards the Boers ‘fell dramatically, and the longer I stay, the deeper it falls’.43 The political elite, especially Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert, was also targeted in Péchy’s manuscripts: ‘The conditions here are very sad indeed, and I don't think we will see any visible improvement as long as Kruger and this bigoted old reactionary Boer party are in government.’44

‘I don’t want to be simple cannon fodder […] subordinated to these ignorant, peasant and even cowardly officers’, writes Tibor Péchy in May 1897 to his mother on enlisting if the conflict between the Boers and the British escalates to war in Southern Africa. This attitude did not really change even after the fights had begun. The factors he highlights as obstacles to his enlistment were still there in 1900. What changed? First of all, he was undoubtedly influenced by the wartime atmosphere in the Transvaal. This is evident in his writings, especially in the way he commented on the war in his letters. The impact of a small-group bond must be emphasized as well, which was more important than the public sentiment and the political climate. In December, he met Mihály Ferenczy in Johannesburg and spent Christmas at the home of his new Hungarian acquaintance. Less than a month later, Péchy gave up his plans to gain a foothold in the gold-mining industry and enlisted in the army. The enthusiasm of one person could encourage another, and an individual might not wish to risk their reputation in the eyes of their pals, either. Thus, maintaining or even restoring his reputation could have influenced Péchy’s moves. As he writes in the summer of 1896: ‘so that I can return home in a few years with my head held high, to make you happy, to the beloved homeland.’45 This former First Lieutenant made attempts to rebuild his honour after his discharge from the army, various failures, and rejection had damaged his reputation and masculinity. He finally saw the war as an opportunity to restore as much of these as he could.
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1 This project was supported by the Scientific Council of the University of Nyíregyháza.
3 Kuitenbrouwer, War of Words, 105.
5 McCracken, Teddy Luther’s War.
6 Gorelik, A Russian on Commando.
7 Pretorius, ‘Welcome but Not That Welcome.’, 122–149.
8 Little, ‘Buddy Relations and Combat Performance.’, 195–223.
9 Keegan, A csata arca, 86–87.
11 Kellett, Combat Motivation.
12 King, The Combat Soldier.
16 Even in the twenty-first century, the wars in Afghanistan and the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine serve as excellent contemporary examples.
17 Keegan, A csata arca, 332., 336.
18 Pakenham, The Boer War, 345–346.
19 Khaki was a nickname given to the British and imperial soldiers after their khaki uniform.
21 Péchy – Móricz, 27 April 1896; Péchy – Móricz, 9 May 1896; Péchy – Móricz, 27 July 1897.
22 Péchy – Móricz, 18 May 1896; Péchy – Móricz, 4–5 June 1896; Péchy, Boer földről.
23 Péchy – Móricz, 16 May 1897.
24 Péchy – Móricz, 18 May 1896.
25 Péchy – Móricz, 16 May 1897.
26 According to sources, such great changes were typical of his personality, which was described by one of his superiors as ‘reckless, with a lively temperament’. Schmidl, Österreichier im Burenkrieg, 1899–1902, 233.
27 Péchy – Móricz, 13 November 1899.
28 In the given context, this can be understood as a primary-group bond.
29 Péchy – Móricz, 19 January 1900.
30 Péchy – Móricz, 3 July 1896; Péchy – Móricz, 20 July 1897.
31 Péchy – Móricz, 27 July 1897.
33 Móricz – Péchy, 1 October 1899.
34 ‘Foreign Officers with the Boers.’, 939.; ‘Some of the foreign mercenaries who fought on the side of the Boers against the British.’, 7.; Penny, ‘Australia’s Reaction to the
Boer War.’ 107.; ‘Boer Prisoner-foreign Mercenaries.’, ‘Boer Prisoners-foreign Mercenaries.’, In Commons, 6 May 1901, 735–736.

35 Even Péchy referred to himself as a fortune hunter in one of his letters. Péchy – Móricz, 16 May 1897.
36 Péchy – Móricz, 19 March 1898.
37 Péchy – Móricz, 17 December 1896; Péchy – Móricz, 31 September 1899.
38 Péchy – Móricz, 1 October 1899.
39 Péchy – Móricz, 13 November 1899.
40 Ibidem.
41 Péchy, *Diaries in the Transvaal II*.
42 Péchy – Móricz, 27 July 1896.
43 Péchy – Móricz, 16 May 1897.
44 Péchy – Móricz, 24 November 1897.
45 Péchy – Móricz, 4 June 1896.

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